Barmapov v. Amuial, 19-12256

Decision Date03 February 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-12256,19-12256
Citation986 F.3d 1321
Parties Benny BARMAPOV, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guy AMUIAL, Yossi Amuial, Avrham Amuial, Reuben Sastiel, Sam Moshe, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Andrew Lynch Cole, Cole Schotz, PC, Baltimore, MD, Andrew Teitelman, Law Offices of Andrew Teitelman, PC, Huntingdon Valley, PA, Scott J. Topolski, Topolski Law Firm, PA, Boca Raton, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William Edward Stacey, Jr., Law Offices of William E. Stacey, Jr. PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants-Appellees Yossi Amuial, and Avrham Amuial.

Timothy Powers O'Neill, Cohen Norris Wolmer Ray Telepman & Cohen, N Palm Beach, FL, Gary A. Isaacs, Gary A. Isaacs, PA, N Palm Beach, FL, for Defendants-Appellees John Obeid, Palm Beach Auto Wholesale, LLC, and Terry Rafih.

Keith Silverstein, Keith D. Silverstein, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellees Ariad Sommer, Roberto Habaue, and Somo Financial Services, Inc.

Guy Amuial, Pro Se.

Reuben Sastiel, Pro Se.

Thomas H. Dougherty, Pro Se.

Orna Sastiel, Pro Se.

Yossi Amuial, Pro Se.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed Benny Barmapov's second amended complaint with prejudice because it was a shotgun pleading. The district court dismissed the first amended complaint for the same reason, but it gave Barmapov another chance to file a proper pleading. Unfortunately for Barmapov, his second amended complaint was no better than his first. The district court described it as "a rambling, dizzying array of nearly incomprehensible pleading." After reviewing it, we agree. Because Barmapov, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, repeatedly failed to file a proper pleading, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his complaint with prejudice, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Barmapov filed his initial complaint in the district court in March 2018, and he filed an amended complaint five months later. The amended complaint was 116 pages and 624 numbered paragraphs long, and it included 20 causes of action, under both federal and state law, against 23 named defendants and 20 John Doe defendants. The district court dismissed it because it was "in an improper shotgun format." Barmapov had "lumped together" many of his allegations against the 23 named defendants, rendering his complaint "unclear and confusing as to which [d]efendant [was] being charged with which conduct." The district court also described the complaint as "devoid of specific allegations" such that it was not clear what each defendant "specifically did to be liable as to each stated count." Finally, the court criticized the complaint for incorporating about 350 paragraphs into each of the 20 counts, even though the "paragraphs [were] not all properly directed at the [d]efendants subject to [each] count, nor [were] they pertinent to each claim." The court granted Barmapov leave to file a second amended complaint.

In his second amended complaint, Barmapov reduced the number of named defendants to 16 and the length of the complaint to 92 pages and 440 numbered paragraphs. He also removed all federal causes of action. The 19 counts against the defendants included allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy—all presumably under Florida law.

The district court concluded that Barmapov's second amended complaint "still fail[ed] to provide a short and plain statement justifying relief and ... allegations that [were] simple, concise, and direct." Nine of Barmapov's counts "incorporate[d] by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 21–269." Many of these allegations, the district court said, were "irrelevant to the instant litigation" and "serve[d] to confuse the issues." Barmapov exacerbated the problem by "continu[ing] to impermissibly lump [d]efendants together ..., rendering it unclear and confusing as to which [d]efendant [was] being charged with which specific conduct." Because Barmapov had not followed "specific instructions and warnings from the [c]ourt regarding how to formulate a proper pleading," the district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district court dismisses a complaint because it is a shotgun pleading, we review that decision for abuse of discretion. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets , 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off. , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Rule 8(a)(2) requires the complaint to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires a party to "state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). "If doing so would promote clarity," Rule 10(b) also mandates that "each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence ... be stated in a separate count ...." Id. The "self-evident" purpose of these rules is "to require the pleader to present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that[ ] his adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading." Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1320 (quoting T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. , 760 F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). These rules were also written for the benefit of the court, which must be able to determine "which facts support which claims," "whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted," and whether evidence introduced at trial is relevant. Id. (quoting T.D.S. , 760 F.2d at 1544 n.14 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).

Shotgun pleadings "are flatly forbidden by the spirit, if not the letter, of these rules" because they are "calculated to confuse the ‘enemy,’ and the court, so that theories for relief not provided by law and which can prejudice an opponent's case, especially before the jury, can be masked." Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting T.D.S. , 760 F.2d at 1544 n.14 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). Besides violating the rules, shotgun pleadings also "waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public's respect for the courts." Vibe Micro , 878 F.3d at 1295 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have "little tolerance" for them. Id.

"[W]e have identified four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings." Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1321. The first is "a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint." Id. The second is a complaint that is "replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action." Id. at 1322. The third is a complaint that does not separate "each cause of action or claim for relief" into a different count. Id. at 1323. And the final type of shotgun pleading is a complaint that "assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Id.

Barmapov's second amended complaint does not fall into the first category because although nine of the 19 counts incorporate almost every factual allegation in the complaint, none of them adopts the allegations in the preceding counts. It also does not fall into the third category because each count presents a unique cause of action. Nor does it fall into the fourth category because even though several of the counts target multiple defendants, these counts "specify[ ] which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions." Id.

But the second amended complaint undoubtedly falls into the second category of shotgun pleadings. It is rife with immaterial factual allegations, including five pages and 24 paragraphs of irrelevant details about the alleged criminal backgrounds of some of the defendants. To make matters worse, the complaint then incorporates these paragraphs into 13 of the 19 counts, including counts against defendants who had no part in this background history. Other examples of inconsequential details include Barmapov's business background; the relationships among Yossi, Guy, and Avrham Amuial, Terry Rafih, and John Obeid; Barmapov's history with Reuben Sastiel; the experiences of Barmapov's grandson working for the Amuials; and the contentious business meetings between Barmapov, the Amuials, and Sastiel. In addition, the second amended complaint indiscriminately incorporates and repeats 249 numbered paragraphs of factual allegations—spanning 50 pages—into nine of the 19 counts, without any effort to connect or separate which of those 249 factual allegations relate to a particular count. As a result, these nine counts include factual allegations that are immaterial to the underlying causes of action. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp. , 123 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing a complaint in which four counts incorporated all 43 numbered paragraphs of factual allegations, many of which appeared to relate to only one or two counts, as "an all-too-typical shotgun pleading"); see also Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1322 n.12 (identifying Chudasama as an example of one of the second category of shotgun pleadings).

If these problems were not enough to make Barmapov's second amended complaint a shotgun pleading, the complaint also includes numerous vague and conclusory allegations. It alleges that Yossi Amuial "sabotage[d]" Barmapov's efforts to apply for...

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