Ignatova v. Jaddou
| Docket Number | 22-cv-62103-SINGHAL/DAMIAN |
| Decision Date | 15 August 2023 |
| Parties | SVETLANA IGNATOVA, Petitioner, v. UR M. JADDOU, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No 11] (“Motion”) filed January 27, 2023, by Respondents, Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Ur M. Jaddou, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Andrew Davidson, USCIS, and Varsenik Papazian, Director of Miami Asylum Office (collectively, “Respondents”). The Motion was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Raag Singhal, United States District Judge, for a Report and Recommendation. [ECF No. 14]. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The undersigned has considered the Motion [ECF No. 11], the Response and Reply thereto [ECF Nos. 12, 13], the pertinent portions of the record, and all relevant authorities and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. Respondents request the Court dismiss this action on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be granted and that Ms. Ignatova's claims pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act be dismissed without prejudice and that the claims pursuant to the Mandamus Act and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution be dismissed with prejudice.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) permits any alien “who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespective of such alien's status,” to apply for asylum in this country, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (2). The INA sets forth procedures for the consideration of asylum applications by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Relevant here, the INA specifies that “in the absence of exceptional circumstances,” an initial interview or hearing on the asylum application “shall commence not later than 45 days after the date an application is filed” and “final administrative adjudication of the asylum application . . . shall be completed within 180 days after the date an application is filed.” Id. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii), (iii). However, Section 1158(d)(7) - entitled “No private right of action” - expressly provides that “[n]othing in [Section 1158(d)] shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.” Id. § 1158(d)(7).
Petitioner, Svetlana Ignatova (“Petitioner” or “Ms. Ignatova”), a citizen of the Russian Federation who currently resides in Hollywood, Florida, submitted an I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal (“Asylum Application”) to USCIS on December 2, 2019. [ECF No. 1 (“Petition”) at ¶ 12].[1] On December 30, 2019, Ms. Ignatova received an Acknowledgement Notice from the Miami Asylum Office confirming receipt of her asylum application. Id.; [ECF No. 1-2]. Having heard nothing further from USCIS, on July 28, 2022, Ms. Ignatova's counsel sent correspondence to the Miami Asylum Office requesting an interview date. Petition ¶ 17; [ECF No. 1-3]. Ms. Ignatova alleges the asylum office did not respond to the letter and that she made various attempts to contact USCIS, as well as other government officials, to determine the status of her asylum application, to no avail. Petition ¶¶ 16-19.
On November 14, 2022, Ms. Ignatova initiated this action by filing a “Petition For A Writ In The Nature Of Mandamus.” [ECF No. 1]. In the Petition, Ms. Ignatova asserts one cause of action for “Unreasonable Delay In Adjudication.” Id. at 3. In that cause of action, Ms. Ignatova seeks relief pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. See generally id.
In the Petition, Ms. Ignatova alleges that USCIS has “unreasonably delayed” the adjudication of her asylum application. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. According to Ms. Ignatova, Respondents have all the information required to adjudicate her application but have failed to do so. Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Ignatova alleges she has been greatly damaged and deprived of the unique benefits conferred to asylum beneficiaries, including a pathway to citizenship, the right to vote, freedom of movement and travel, and the right to obtain a U.S. passport. Id. ¶ 3, 25. She also alleges that the delay in processing her asylum application has placed a severe mental and emotional burden on her well-being. Id. ¶ 24.
Consequently, Ms. Ignatova requests the Court order Respondents to adjudicate her asylum application by scheduling an interview with USCIS within thirty (30) days and issue a declaratory judgment finding that Respondents' failure to adjudicate the asylum application violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.[2] Id. at 7.
On January 27, 2023, Respondents filed the Motion to Dismiss now before the Court arguing the Petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 11]. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to seek dismissal of a complaint for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Consequently, courts must determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004). If a federal court determines at any time during the litigation that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) “come in two forms: facial or factual attack.” Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021). “On a facial attack, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, meaning the court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true.” Fru Veg Marketing, Inc. v. Vegfruitworld Corp., 896 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1179 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Ungaro, J.). On the other hand, factual attacks “challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). The “party invoking the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction.” McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court assumes as true all well-pled factual allegations and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff makes a facially plausible claim when she pleads factual content from which the court can reasonably infer that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the Court draws on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 1950.
Although the Court resolves all doubts or inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff bears the burden to frame the complaint with sufficient facts to suggest that she is entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not stand. Id. at 557. Dismissal pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint.” Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
Although she asserts only one cause of action in the Petition, Ms. Ignatova asserts three bases for relief based on Respondents' alleged failure to take action on her asylum application: (1) mandamus relief under the Mandamus Act; (2) unreasonable delay under the APA; and (3) due process and equal protection violations. She alleges subject matter jurisdiction based on the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. § 1361), federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the APA (5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1)).
Respondents seek dismissal of the Petition on three grounds: (1) lack of subject...
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