Barmel v. Minneapolis-Saint Paul Sanitary District

• Citation: 277 N.W. 208,201 Minn. 622
• Decision Date: 14 January 1938
• Docket Number: 31,471
• Parties: LOUISE BARMEL v. MINNEAPOLIS-SAINT PAUL SANITARY DISTRICT
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

277 N.W. 208

201 Minn. 622

LOUISE BARMEL v. MINNEAPOLIS-SAINT PAUL SANITARY DISTRICT

No. 31,471

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 14, 1938

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover certain expenses incurred by plaintiff in a condemnation proceeding. There was judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant Gustavus Loevinger, Judge, from which plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Eminent domain -- condemnation proceeding -- abandonment of proceeding -- expenses of landowner.

1. 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 6552, which creates a cause of action in favor of a landowner for his expenses incurred in a condemnation proceeding under c. 41 of those statutes, does not apply to expenses incurred under the provisions of § 1552, et seq. of those statutes.

Malicious prosecution -- abandonment of condemnation proceeding -- liability of condemnor.

2. The defendant sanitary district in conducting a condemnation proceeding does so as an arm of the state in the discharge of a sovereign legislative function and is not liable in tort for the alleged malicious prosecution of such proceeding.

Lewis L. Anderson, for appellant.

Oscar Hallam and Bruce J. Broady, for respondent.

OPINION

LORING, JUSTICE.

This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, which in 1934 commenced proceedings in condemnation to take the plaintiff's 60-acre homestead in Ramsey county under the provisions of 1 Mason Minn. St. 1927 § 1552, et seq. (L. 1911, c. 185) sometimes known as the Elwell act, for use in connection with the purposes for which the sanitary district was authorized and organized. Commissioners were duly appointed and on February 1, 1935, reported and filed their award of $17,949 to the plaintiff for her land. This amount was more than twice the average yearly "true and full value" of such land as designated upon the tax rolls for the five-year period preceding 1935. February 8, 1935, seven days after the report of the commissioners was filed, L. 1935, c. 7, was approved, § 1 of which amended L. 1933, c. 341, § 14, and prohibited the defendant from acquiring any property by purchase or condemnation except in a court of competent jurisdiction for a price exceeding twice the average yearly true and full value of such land as designated upon the tax rolls for a five-year period preceding the year 1935. The Elwell act is not a proceeding in court and makes no provision for the condemnor to appeal to any court from the award of damages, such right being given to the landowner only. Thereupon the condemnor abandoned the proceedings under the Elwell act and initiated proceedings under 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, c. 41 (§ 6537, et seq.), to acquire a tract of land which did not include the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff brought this suit to recover her expenses incurred in the proceedings under the Elwell act for engineers, expert witnesses, and lawyers in the total sum of $1,118.71 with interest. The issues were made up and the trial court granted judgment for the defendant upon the pleadings.

The defendant is a public corporation organized under the provisions of L. 1933, c. 341, for the purpose of building a sewage disposal plant and system for St. Paul and Minneapolis, which under the provisions of that act constitute one sanitary district. By § 14 of the act the district was authorized to acquire property under the Elwell act.

The plaintiff bases her right to recover upon two grounds. She asserts that 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 6552, which is part of c. 41, dealing with the exercise of eminent domain, applies to proceedings under the Elwell act, though under that act there is no specific provision by which the landowner is entitled to recover his expenses and attorney's fees upon a dismissal by the condemnor. Her second ground is in the nature of a charge of malicious prosecution of a civil suit, asserting that the district never really wanted the land, that it had no use for it, and was actuated by malice in bringing the proceedings.

1. To quote from the language of this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Mitchell in Fairchild v. City of St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 542, 49 N.W. 325:

"There is nothing better settled than that, the power of eminent domain being an incident of sovereignty, the time, manner, and occasion of its exercise are wholly in the control and discretion of the legislature, except as restrained by the constitution. It rests in the wisdom of the legislature to determine when and in what manner the public necessities require its exercise; and with the reasonableness of the exercise of that discretion the courts will not interfere."

Of course our constitution limits the right of eminent domain to the taking of private property for public use with just compensation therefor first paid or secured. The courts will review such proceedings to see that these constitutional requirements have been complied with, but beyond that we have no power to interfere with the exercise of what is purely a legislative function as distinguished from a judicial one, although of course the legislature may do what it has done in c. 41 and use the court as an instrumentality in which to initiate the proceedings. This is not an unconstitutional delegation of its powers to the judicial branch. Weir v. St. P.S. & T. F.R. Co. 18 Minn. 139, 147 (155). It is not even necessary for the legislature to employ the court to determine what is adequate and fair compensation for the taking. It need only provide an impartial tribunal or instrumentality before which the landowner has ample opportunity to present his case. In State ex rel. Simpson v. Rapp, 39 Minn. 65, 67, 38 N.W. 926, 928, this court, again speaking through Mr. Justice Mitchell, used the following language:

" Condemnatory proceedings in the exercise of the right of eminent domain are not civil actions or causes within the meaning of the constitution, but special proceedings, only quasi judicial in their nature, whether conducted by judicial or non-judicial officers or tribunals. The propriety of the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a political or legislative, and not a judicial question. The manner of the exercise of this right is, except as to compensation, unrestricted by the constitution, and addresses itself to the legislature as a question of policy, propriety, or fitness, rather than of power. They are under no obligation to submit the question to a judicial tribunal, but may determine it themselves, or delegate it to a municipal corporation, to a commission, or to any other body or tribunal they see fit. Neither are they bound to submit the question of compensation incident to the exercise of the right of eminent domain to a judicial tribunal. Provided it be an impartial tribunal, and the property-owner has an opportunity to be heard before it, the legislature may refer the matter for determination to a jury, a court, a commission, or any other body it may designate."

By the terms of the Elwell act, the legislature did not use the court as the instrumentality by which damages for the taking were primarily determined, but created a board or commission to perform that function, providing for an...