Barnes (Council 82, AFSCME on Behalf of Monroe), Matter of

• Decision Date: 15 January 1998
• Citation: 246 A.D.2d 755,666 N.Y.S.2d 527
• Parties: 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 271 In the Matter of the Arbitration between William W. BARNES, as Sheriff of the County of Schenectady, Appellant, and COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, on Behalf of David MONROE et al., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 527

666 N.Y.S.2d 527

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 271

In the Matter of the Arbitration between William W. BARNES as Sheriff of the County of Schenectady, Appellant and COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, on Behalf of David MONROE et al., Respondent.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Jan. 15, 1998.

Gordon, Siegal, Mastro, Mullaney, Gordon & Galvin, P.C. (Joan Leary Matthews, of counsel), Schenectady, for appellant.

Harry R. Hayes, III, Albany, for respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MIKOLL, CREW, WHITE and SPAIN, JJ.

MIKOLL, Justice.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered April 22, 1997 in Schenectady County, which, inter alia, granted respondent's application pursuant to CPLR 7510 to confirm an arbitration award, and (2) from an order of said court, entered July 10, 1997 in Schenectady County, which denied petitioner's motion to renew.

Petitioner commenced this proceeding for a judgment staying the arbitration commenced by respondent on behalf of David Monroe and John Lazzari, two former Schenectady County correction officers who were denied disability benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c. Determining, inter alia, that the matter was arbitrable, Supreme Court (Dawson, J.) denied petitioner's application and ordered the parties to submit to arbitration. Petitioner failed to appeal from such order and we affirmed the denial of his ensuing motion to reargue based upon an intervening change in the law precluding arbitration of General Municipal Law § 207-c claims as untimely (see, 235 A.D.2d 826, 652 N.Y.S.2d 383). Following hearings on the matter, an arbitration award was made in Monroe's favor. Petitioner appeals from both Supreme Court's (Kramer, J.) judgment confirming the award and its order denying his subsequent motion to renew.

Petitioner argues that because the claim was not arbitrable the arbitration award violated public policy and was made in excess of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Petitioner's argument is in essence an attack upon Supreme Court's order determining that the matter was arbitrable and, inasmuch as we previously held in this case that such order was not subject to review upon appeal from the judgment confirming the arbitration award (see, id., at 826, 652 N.Y.S.2d 383; see also, Matter of Morrow [Paragon Enters.], 135 A.D.2d 931, 932, 522 N.Y.S.2d 333), we decline to review it. As to petitioner's claim that the award was irrational because the arbitrator misstated the dates associated with Monroe's disability, an arbitration award will not be vacated for...