Barnes v. Bickle

• Decision Date: 12 May 1920
• Docket Number: 15560.
• Citation: 111 Wash. 133,189 P. 998
• Parties: BARNES v. BICKLE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

189 P. 998

111 Wash. 133

BARNES v. BICKLE et al.

No. 15560.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 12, 1920

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.

Action by Ina C. Barnes against C. N. Bickle and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Modified.

S. H Kelleran, of Seattle, for appellants.

Meyers & Couden, of Seattle, for respondent.

MOUNT, J.

This appeal is from a judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff for $550 upon two causes of action separately stated in the complaint.

The first cause of action is for alleged damages to the person of the plaintiff; the second is for damages to her property.

The principal contention of the appellants is that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor.

The facts, as alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial may be briefly stated as follows: In July, 1918, the appellants were the owners of a lodging house, known as the 'Alamo Villa,' in the city of Seattle. This lodging house was leased to the respondent by a month to month tenancy. She had paid her rent for the month of July. On about the 20th of July she became sick with appendicitis and was required to go to a hospital for an operation. At the time she left her rooming house, she autorized a Mr. and Mrs Hughes to have general charge thereof; but neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hughes resided in the house. The immediate charge of the rooming house was left with a maid, who cared for the rooms and lived at the house. On about the 24th of July, the maid became ill and invited the appellant Mrs. Bickle to assume charge of the rooming house. Mrs. Bickle took charge that day, took care of the rooms, and notified several of the lodgers that she intended to keep the house and that the rent of rooms was to be payable to her. This fact was reported by some person to the respondent, who was in the hospital, and it is alleged greatly worried her and damaged her health. Thereafter, on about the 26th day of July, the appellants prepared a notice to the effect that, beginning with the month of August, the rent of the lodging house would be increased from $150 to $300 per month. This notice was handed to a nurse at the hospital with the request that it be delivered to Mrs. Barnes if she was able to receive it. It was delivered to her, and it is alleged that this notice caused her great mental anguish and retarded her recovery. Thereafter, on the 1st day of August, when the rent for the month of August became due, Mrs. Barnes tendered to the appellants her check for $150 rent for that month. The appellants at first refused to receive this check, but later in the day did receive it, and thereafter, on the 6th day of August, after Mrs. Barnes had returned to her lodging house from the hospital, a notice was served upon her, terminating her tenancy on the 1st day of September following. It is alleged that at this time Mr. and Mrs. Bickle created much disturbance in the halls of the lodging house, and attempted to force their way into the room where the respondent was and that thereby she was severely injured in health. These events are alleged in detail in paragraph 5 of the first cause of action of the complaint. The sixth paragraph then alleges as follows:

'That the unlawful and malicious acts of said defendants as described in paragraph 5 herein were calculated to and did cause plaintiff great physical and mental distress, pain and suffering, seriously impairing her general health and postponing her complete recovery from the effects of the operation hereinabove described, and each of said acts contributed to such result. The plaintiff has been thereby damaged in the sum of $3,000.'

It is apparent from the allegations of the complaint, and from the proof in support thereof, that there was no physical invasion of the respondent's person. The gist of the complaint is for physical and mental distress of the respondent caused by the things which she alleges she was informed the appellants did. We think it is plain that the appellants were rightfully at the lodging house upon the first...