Barnes v. City of New Haven

• Citation: 98 A.2d 523,140 Conn. 8
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 02 June 1953
• Parties: BARNES v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 523

98 A.2d 523

140 Conn. 8

BARNES v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 2, 1953.

John N. Reynolds, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was William L. Beers, New Haven, for plaintiff.

John W. Barclay, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was George G. DiCenzo, New Haven, for defendants.

Before BROWN, C. J., BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ., and QUINLAN, Superior Court Judge.

BROWN, Chief Justice.

This is a taxpayer's action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Under their answer the defendants claim a further declaratory judgment. The case comes to us from the Superior Court on a reservation which raises questions as to the validity and interpretation of 1951 Special Act No. 473, 26 Spec.Laws 339, entitled 'An Act concerning the Creation of a New Haven Parking Authority' and approved July 10, 1951. The act took effect September 10, 1951, upon approval by a majority of the electors participating in a referendum pursuant to § 11 thereof. It provides, § 2, for the appointment of a parking authority of five members with power, § 3, subject to the approval of the board of aldermen, to acquire, create and establish, as well as operate, parking facilities and to collect reasonable off-street parking fees for their use. It specifies, § 1, that these facilities may include 'lots, garages, parking terminals or other structures and accommodations for the parking of motor vehicles off the street or highway and open to public use with or without charge', and authorizes, § 3, the exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire them. It further provides, § 3, that when parking facilities have been procured they either may be operated by the parking authority itself or may be leased by it to private parties for operation restricted solely to parking, 'upon such terms and conditions as the public interest may warrant'. An express procedural restriction upon the authority's power states, § 2, that '[n]o action of said authority shall be valid unless authorized by a vote of the majority of its members taken at a meeting open to the public.' The act gives the city broad latitude in financing the undertaking. It thus provides, §§ 4, 5, subject to specific authorization by the board of aldermen, for the issuance of bonds constituting a general obligation of the city or of bonds payable only out of parking revenues, for the appropriation of funds raised by taxation, and for the assessment of benefits against owners of property specifically benefited by any parking facility. It contains further provisions, §§ 6, 7, 9, to safeguard the holders of revenue bonds and to exempt these bonds from taxation within the state.

The reservation is not in proper form. The stipulation fails to 'clearly and fully state the * * * questions upon which advice is desired'. Practice Book, § 470. Nor does it comply with Form No. 570 of the Practice Book. 'Questions in a reservation should be so stated that each will present a definite point of law and that the court may give to each a categorical or very definite answer.' Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 82, 198 A. 176, 182, 115 A.L.R. 907; General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 132, 55 A.2d 732. The parties have merely stipulated that the questions are those 'upon which the claims for a declaratory judgment are made in the complaint and the answer.' Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the public interest involved in the issues concerned, we have decided to entertain the reservation. General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, supra, 134 Conn. at page 133, 55 A.2d 732. By various concessions made in the plaintiff's brief, his questions are limited to those stated in the first three questions in the footnote. ¹ The last five cover the questions propounded by the defendants.

The further essential stipulated facts may be thus summarized: New Haven was settled in 1638, and the layout of its streets and its traffic facilities have developed gradually over the intervening three and a quarter centuries. The present streets, highways and parking facilities, both public and private, are inadequate for the safe, convenient and expeditious handling of modern motor traffic. In the process of normal development, retail shopping and other commercial business have tended to become largely concentrated in the downtown business areas, necessitating a large amount of traffic between those areas and the residential sections. For the convenience of the public in transacting business with stores and other business establishments, modern motor traffic requires parking facilities beyond the capacity of the public streets and present private parking facilities. The establishment of additional parking facilities will relieve traffic congestions and reduce traffic hazards.

The five individual defendants constitute the parking authority under § 2 of the act. The authority has already paid out substantial sums of public funds in obtaining plans, reports and the services of a traffic engineer and for other expenses, and threatens to continue to incur similar obligations at public expense. It has adopted plans for the construction and maintenance of parking facilities which, after receipt of the city plan commission's report thereon, the board of aldermen has approved. To carry out its plans for such facilities, the authority threatens to acquire land by purchase and by eminent domain and to use land already owned by the city, including certain land heretofore dedicated to school and other public uses. To finance the establishment and operation of the facilities, the authority threatens to use one or more of the methods provided in the act. It further intends to operate the facilities as a business, either directly, exacting fees and other special charges therefor, or indirectly, under lease or contract for their operation by others. The provisions of the act and the plans adopted by the authority thereunder are primarily for the benefit of merchants in the shopping center of the city, who constitute but a small portion of its total population and whose need for parking facilities is limited to the usual daytime store hours. The authority, however, threatens to operate the facilities on a twenty-four hour basis. The meetings of the authority are held after public notice and at a place where adequate provision is made for the attendance of the public. At these meetings the public is invited to address the authority upon particular questions being discussed, in so far as the authority, in its discretion, deems desirable.

The fundamental question for decision is whether the parking project for which the act provides is a legitimate public purpose. While the specific question has not been passed upon by this court, the principles applicable in its determination are well established under our decisions. These relate primarily to the effect of the provisions of § 1 of article first of the Connecticut constitution, which states that 'no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.' This provision has a like meaning to that which prohibits the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, contained in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515, 52 A.2d 702; State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 105, 90 A.2d 862. As we further observed in the former opinion [133 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 705], '[t]he broad provision in § 1 of article third of our constitution which vests the legislative power in the General Assembly is subject to the limitation that an act which serves no other purpose than individual gain or profit goes beyond the power of that body to enact and is necessarily void. * * * That is not to say that, if an act serves a proper public purpose, the fact that it incidentally confers a direct benefit upon some individual or individuals renders it invalid.' The aggravated nature of the traffic problem on city streets and the serious effect which it has upon a very large part of the public in such localities are a matter of common knowledge of which courts take judicial notice. State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 95, 100 N.E.2d 225. The stipulated facts leave no doubt that such a situation exists in New Haven and constitutes a problem increasingly urgent. It is one which calls for an appropriate exercise of the police power of the state operating through the city as one of its municipalities. A limit upon the exercise of this power, however, is fixed by the constitutional provision quoted above. Whether the act does provide for a legitimate public purpose in the constitutional sense involves the question whether it primarily serves, in a reasonable manner, to promote the public welfare. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 517, 52 A.2d 702; State v. Cullum, 110 Conn. 291, 293, 147 A. 804. If it does, that an incidental financial benefit may result to certain individuals as distinguished from the public at large does not deprive it of its legitimate public purpose.

A public use defies absolute definition, for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 270, 59 A.2d 142; 37 Am.Jur. 734, § 120. Courts as a rule, instead of attempting judicially to define a public as distinguished from a private purpose, have left each case to be determined on its own peculiar circumstances. Promotion of the public safety and general welfare constitutes a recognized public purpose. 'If the expenditure of public funds will promote the welfare of the community, it is for a public purpose.' Lyman v. Adorno, supra. The modern trend of...