State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission of City of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 08 July 1952
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HIGGINS et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 862

90 A.2d 862

139 Conn. 102

STATE ex rel. HIGGINS et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 8, 1952.

John F. Clancy and James F. Kenney, Bridgeport, with whom were Robert J. Testo and Michael J. Sicilian, Bridgeport, for plaintiffs.

John V. Donnelly, Bridgeport, for the named defendant and defendant personnel director.

Maurice J. Magilnick, Bridgeport, for other defendants.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The first issue presented by this reservation concerns the constitutionality of a special act of the General Assembly authorizing credits for veterans taking promotional examinations in the classified service of the city of Bridgeport. Should the act be declared constitutional, a further issue is whether the credits were properly applied by the municipal civil service commission.

For the purpose of discussing the constitutional question, the following statement of facts stipulated by the parties will suffice: In 1935 the General Assembly provided a civil service system for the city of Bridgeport. 22 Spec.Laws, p. 261, No. 407. Since then, all positions in the police department, now totaling 337, have been in the classified service under the administration of the defendant commission. In 1943 the General Assembly passed a special act requiring the commission to add five points to the earned rating received by an honorably discharged war veteran taking an examination for original employment with the city, and ten points if he had a service-connected disability. 24 Spec.Laws, p. 212, No. 300. In 1945 the General Assembly adopted an amendment calling for the addition of similar points on promotional examinations as well. 24 Spec.Laws, p. 789, No. 406.

The plaintiffs and five of the defendants are either patrolmen or detectives in the Bridgeport police department. While none of these defendants is an honorably discharged war veteran, all of the plaintiffs qualify as such under the provisions of the act of 1943 as amended in 1945. The other defendants are the civil service commission and Linley, its personnel director. Unless otherwise indicated, the word defendants, as used in this opinion, refers only to the nonveteran officers.

On March 1, 1951, the commission held a promotional examination in which the plaintiffs and the defendants participated. A list of names was then compiled, showing the relative standing of the several candidates as defermined by their examinative ratings. Any vacancy hereafter occurring in the position of police sergeant is to be filled by the appointment of him whose name, at the time, tops the list. Because of the addition of the points required by the amendment of 1945, the standing of each plaintiff was materially improved. By this means he obtained, to the detriment of the defendants, a position on the list higher than he would otherwise have merited. The defendants maintain that this amendment, compelling, as it does, preferential treatment of veterans on promotional examinations, is improper class legislation and hence unconstitutional.

The defendants rely in part upon the provision of § 1 of article first of the constitution of Connecticut which states that 'no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.' They also assert that the amendment of 1945 violates that provision in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which prohibits every state from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. The latter claim adds nothing to the former. The guarantee incorporated in the federal constitution has a meaning equivalent to that found in our own. State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 195, 132 A. 561. We confine ourselves, therefore, to the claim that the Connecticut constitution renders the amendment of 1945 invalid.

Legislation authorizing preferential treatment of honorably discharged war veterans seeking either original employment or promotional advancement in the civil service has not previously been examined by this court. Determination of the validity of such legislation presents a problem with a double aspect. The first requires disposition of the question whether the legislation serves a public purpose, that is to say, whether it promotes, inter alia, the general welfare of the community. Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 350, 82 A. 1030; Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District v. County of Lincoln, 144 Neb. 584, 589, 14 N.W.2d 202, 155 A.L.R. 412; City Affairs Committee v. Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 182, 46 A.2d 425; 37 Am.Jur. 734, § 120. No enactment creating a preference can withstand constitutional attack if the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual. Its validity is contingent, at least in part, upon its furthering a public purpose; if enacted with that end in view, legislation can be sustained even though it may incidentally confer a direct benefit upon an individual or a class. Horrigan v. Mayor of Pittsfield, 298 Mass. 492, 497, 11 N.E.2d 585; 3 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (2d Ed.) § 1150.

We have recently upheld the validity of two acts authorizing special treatment of veterans in fields other than that of public employment. The first dealt with the distribution of $5,000,000 as a socalled bonus; the other, with limited tax exemptions. Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 52 A.2d 702; Walsh v. Jenks, 135 Conn. 210, 62 A.2d 773. The public purpose, we noted, in the preamble of the act in the Lyman case, supra, 133 Conn. 518, 52 A.2d 702, was that the proposed distribution of bonus payments to veterans was to encourage patriotism, and we observed that, whatever our own convictions in this regard might be, we could not, as a matter of law hold the purpose to be beyond the realm of reason. We repeated and gave approval to this observation when discussing the act providing tax exemptions for veterans. Walsh v. Jenks, supra, 135 Conn. 221, 62 A.2d 773. We are, therefore, committed to the proposition that a proper public purpose may be found in the fostering of patriotism.

The amendment of 1945, unlike the so-called bonus act, did not set forth in preamble a statement of the legislative purpose. That omission, however, is of no moment. If there is any reasonable ground upon which the validity of the act can be sustained, we must presume that the legislature intended to further that ground rather than that it acted upon some improper motive. Walsh v. Jenks, supra, 135 Conn. 222, 62 A.2d 773. In adopting the amendment, the General Assembly could reasonably have believed that the extension of preferential treatment to veterans taking civil service examinations, either for original employment or for promotion, would encourage patriotism. Since we are bound to consider that this was one of the ends intended to be served, the purpose was genuinely public in nature.

The second aspect of the problem presents the question whether the amendment is improper class legislation. The provision of § 1 of article first of the Connecticut constitution that 'no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community' does not necessarily prevent the General Assembly from dealing differently with different classes of persons. It may constitutionally do so (1) if there is a natural and substantial difference between those preferred by the legislation and all others, and (2) if that difference is logically related to the subject and object of the legislation. Ruppert v. Liquor Control Commission, 138 Conn. 669, 675, 88 A.2d 388; Francis v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Conn. 619, 623, 30 A.2d 552, 145 A.L.R. 505; State v. Cullum, 110 Conn. 291, 295, 147 A. 804. No serious question can be raised as to the existence of (1). Those who have served in the armed forces obviously occupy in the community a different status than do other citizens. Lyman v. Adorno, supra, 133 Conn. 521, 52 A.2d 702. The debatable point is concerned with (2).

In the Lyman case, supra, 133 Conn. 521, 52 A.2d 702, the essence of the enactment in question was to effectuate grants to veterans. A similar situation prevailed in Walsh v. Jenks. In the case at bar, however, we are faced with a different kind of legislation. While it incidentally provides preferences for veterans, its essence is to prescribe rules for the selection of municipal employees. This legislation is more nearly akin to that involved in Franco v. New Haven, 133 Conn. 544, 52 A.2d 866, wherein we upheld the validity of an issue of bonds to finance a veterans' housing project. We said 133 Conn. at page 548, 52 A.2d at page 868: 'The situation before us differs in certain material respects from that we were considering in the Lyman case. * * * [T]he provisions of the act indicate that it was designed to relieve the untoward conditions resulting from an acute housing shortage as it particularly affected veterans of the late war.' After pointing out the evil social effects of a housing shortage, we went on to say, 133 Conn. at page 549, 52 A.2d at page 868: 'The question then is: Can the General Assembly properly regard the situation of veterans coming within the definition in the act as substantially different from that of other members of the community as regards the unfortunate results of an acute housing shortage?' The opinion concludes that veterans were in a distinguishable class under this test because their absence, while in service, had caused many of them to lose dwelling accommodations which they otherwise would have kept.

The test in the Franco case may thus be phrased to meet the problem in the case at bar: Can the General Assembly properly regard the situation of honorably discharged war veterans as substantially different from that of other members of the...