Barnes v. City of Centralia

Decision Date26 November 2019
Docket NumberNo. 19-1377,19-1377
Citation943 F.3d 826
Parties Shirlena BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CENTRALIA, ILLINOIS, and Michael Peebles, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Frank R. Ledbetter, Attorney, Ledbetter Law Firm, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Victor, Brian M. Funk, Attorneys, O'Halloran, Kosoff, Geitner & Cook, LLC, Northbrook, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Kanne and Brennan, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

While arresting gang members in Centralia, Illinois, police officer Michael Peebles felt intimidated when Shirlena Barnes, a city resident with gang connections, drove up and yelled derogatory epithets. Later, Barnes posted statements on social media that Peebles believed threatened him and his family. As a private citizen, Peebles submitted a complaint to the police department and participated no further. After a police investigation, Barnes was arrested, and a criminal prosecution followed. The state later dismissed the charges, and Barnes sued Peebles and the City of Centralia asserting her civil rights were violated. The district court granted summary judgment to the officer and the city, which we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, drawing our own legal and factual conclusions from the record. Tapley v. Chambers , 840 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 2016). We construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant Barnes’s favor. Id. (citing Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc. , 674 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2012) ).

A gang named the "Rude Boyz" is well known in the City of Centralia in downstate Illinois. Two of its members threatened a twelve-year-old boy who witnessed a gang-related shooting in a park. The threats were investigated by Peebles, who over the years has arrested many of the Rude Boyz and became the "go-to guy" in the Centralia police department for intelligence on the gang. Peebles and Centralia Police Sergeant Jamie James found and arrested the two gang members on open warrants for weapons and other charges.

As the officers took the two into custody, Barnes drove by the scene. According to Peebles, Barnes parked her car across the street and yelled "bald motherf*****" and "thirsty."1 In a witness statement given later that day, Peebles identified Barnes as yelling the epithets at him. In later deposition testimony, Peebles admitted he could not identify exactly who was yelling. He concluded the insults were directed at him because he was the only bald individual there.

James was present at the arrests and did not recall specifically what Barnes yelled. He believed Barnes was angry and that she tried to intimidate Peebles into not arresting the two gang members. Barnes later denied yelling at the arrest scene and said she was speaking with a relative in another vehicle.

Law enforcement knew that Barnes had connections with the gang. Barnes and Peebles were familiar with each other through police contacts with several of Barnes’s family members. Officers understood that the Rude Boyz used Barnes’s home as a safehouse. Video of the park shooting shows Barnes’s daughter retrieving the suspect’s bicycle. Before the arrests, Barnes complained about Peebles to city authorities. According to Barnes, she did not know if, at the time of the arrests, any of her family members were involved in gang activity. She also said she did not know the two Rude Boyz whom Peebles and James arrested.

The evening of the arrests, Barnes posted on Facebook: "This thirsty b**** Mike out here on the same on [sic] bulls***." After someone responded to her post, Barnes posted a second time: "But this b**** don’t believe that what goes around come[s] around and when you got kids of your own."

A secretary at the Centralia police department saw the posts and texted Peebles who was at home. Peebles felt, based on earlier attempts by the gang at intimidation, that these were credible threats against him and his family, so he called Assistant State’s Attorney Melissa Doran. The prosecutor told Peebles she could not tell him what to do but that he could file a report like a private citizen if he desired. Peebles then called Sergeant James about the Facebook posts and the conversation with Doran. He told James he felt Barnes had threatened his family.

Sergeant James dispatched another officer to Peebles’s house to take a written voluntary statement. Peebles said Barnes was at the scene of the arrest of known gang members and yelled "bald head motherf*****" at him. Peebles also relayed the content of Barnes’s Facebook posts, his belief that his "kids and family" were threatened, and his desire "to make sure nothing happens to [his] family."

James also texted the assistant state’s attorney:

Sgt. James: Hey Melissa, its [J.] [J]ames. I talked with [Peebles] and just wanted to clarify before we acted. You want us to arrest her after 9 but no offense report just a vague pc [probable cause] sheet?
Prosecutor Doran: Pretty much. That will give me a chance to talk to Matt about it before he decided right away what to do with the case[.] However, as I told [Peebles], I can’t tell you guys that you should or should not arrest anyone. That discretion lies solely with you. As the statute re: intimidation of a public official is written this is a debatable case since it isn’t clear to me whether this was a specific unique threat of harm vs a generalized threat of harm (as the statute reads). As always however, what may not be able to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt still may have probable cause since it is a much lower burden.

Based on Barnes’s association with the Rude Boyz and the content of her posts, James concluded Barnes had credibly threatened Peebles and his family. James testified that he believed the Rude Boyz had "put out a hit" on Peebles, and he also witnessed Barnes’s behavior at the arrests. Given this, James decided to arrest Barnes for intimidation. He concluded this decision was within his sole discretion. After the arrest, the Marion County State’s Attorney charged Barnes with intimidation and aggravated intimidation. See 720 ILCS 5/12-6 ; 720 ILCS 5/12-6.2. Three months later the state stopped pursuing those charges and Barnes’s prosecution ended.2

As a result of Barnes’s arrest and prosecution, she sued Peebles for unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state law. She also claimed the City of Centralia, under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), was civilly liable for an express policy or widespread practice that motivated her arrest and prosecution.

The parties engaged in discovery, including several depositions. Peebles and James testified Peebles made his complaint against Barnes as a private citizen. Peebles said his only role in the arrest and prosecution was as the complaining witness providing a voluntary statement. He did not know what crimes Barnes was eventually charged with and was never contacted by the assistant state’s attorney after the case was filed. Peebles also said that when he made his statement he was seeking to get Barnes arrested and prosecuted. Barnes admitted she wrote the Facebook posts about Peebles but said she did not intend that Peebles see them. Per Barnes, her statement about "what goes around comes around" referred to "karma" and that you should treat other people’s kids the way you want yours to be treated.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Barnes’s claims, which the district court granted.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the admissible evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co. , 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ). For Barnes’s § 1983 claims to survive summary judgment, she must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that a constitutional deprivation occurred. Homoky v. Ogden , 816 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 2016).

A. Under Color of State Law

A law enforcement officer can be liable under § 1983 if the officer deprives the plaintiff of a federally guaranteed right while acting "under color of state law." Wilson v. Price , 624 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010). "Action is taken under color of state law ‘when it involves a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’ " Id. (quoting Honaker v. Smith , 256 F.3d 477, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2001) ). Not every action by a state official or employee occurs under color of state law. Hughes v. Meyer , 880 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989). "A state officer’s conduct does not constitute acting under color of state law unless it is ‘related in some way to the performance of the duties of the state office.’ " Wilson , 624 F.3d at 392 (quoting Honaker , 256 F.3d at 485 ). " Section 1983 does not cover disputes between private citizens, even if one happens to be an officer." Plaats v. Barthelemy , 641 F. App'x 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2016).

Although Peebles is a police officer, and the interaction with Barnes which led to her arrest occurred during Peebles’s employment, Peebles complained about Barnes’s yelling and Facebook posts as a private citizen, not as an investigating officer. The circumstances surrounding Barnes’s arrest and prosecution confirm Peebles’s role was limited to that of a complaining witness. A different officer took Peebles’s statement. Peebles did not arrest Barnes and had no role in her arrest. James had sole discretion to decide whether to arrest Barnes, and Peebles did not know if Barnes would be arrested. James also witnessed some of Peebles’s allegations because James was present when the two gang members were arrested. Based on this evidence James...

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