Barnes v. Dep't of HUMAN Serv.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-CA-00438-SCT.,2009-CA-00438-SCT.
• Citation: 42 So.3d 10
• Parties: Kenny BARNES a/k/a Kenneth Barnes v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, State of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

42 So.3d 10

Kenny BARNES a/k/a Kenneth Barnes v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, State of Mississippi.

No. 2009-CA-00438-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 3, 2010.

Rehearing Denied September 2, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Patricia Peterson Smith, attorney for appellant.

Russell William Holmes, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

DICKINSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. This case requires that we address three competing interests: the supremacy of federal law over state law; the compelling public interest in child support;¹ and the compelling public interest in the protection of the mentally disabled.

¶ 2. Kenny Barnes fathered a child out of wedlock. According to a determination made pursuant to Social Security guidelines, Barnes was mentally incompetent. After a paternity test established him as the father, the trial court ordered Barnes to pay child support in the amount of fourteen percent of his income, which consisted entirely of Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments, and entered an order of withholding. The questions presented are whether a federal law which prohibits garnishment or attachment of SSI payments: (1) prohibits inclusion of SSI benefits in income used to calculate child support, and (2) prohibits an order of withholding on SSI benefits to satisfy a child-support order.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

¶ 3. On February 18, 2009, the Chancery Court of Franklin County entered a paternity order adjudicating Kenny Barnes the father of Cindy London's minor child, L.L. Because London had received services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, the Mississippi Department of Human Services ("DHS") filed suit on London's behalf, seeking child support from Barnes.

¶ 4. Barnes's only source of income was Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), a benefit he had received since infancy because of a physical disability. Barnes is illiterate. Although he possesses a driver's license, he does not drive. He testified that he is "slow" and has been determined to be incompetent under the Social Security guidelines for purposes of handling his own financial affairs. He could not remember the name of the child he fathered.

¶ 5. When asked at trial to stand up and show the court how much money he had on his person, Barnes had only one quarter in his pocket. His SSI checks are made payable to his sister, Hazel Henderson,² whom the Social Security Administration designated as his "care-giver."³ Barnes replied "Uh-uh" when asked whether he had ever worked anywhere or was capable of working. When asked where his SSI money went he replied "Bills, I guess. Bills.... Like, light bill."

¶ 6. Upon determining Barnes's monthly income to be $637—which was derived entirely from SSI benefits—the trial court ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $89 per month, which the court found "compatible with the child support guidelines as set out in Section 43-19-101 of the Mississippi Code Annotated." The chancellor ordered child support to be paid at the statutory guideline rate of fourteen percent. The chancellor also ordered Barnes to pay an additional amount toward arrearages, court costs and fees, as well as the cost of genetic testing. To collect these amounts, the court entered an order for withholding the amounts due from Barnes's SSI benefits. Barnes now appeals from this order.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. Barnes argues that the Social Security Act precludes use of SSI payments in calculating child support and that federal law protects his SSI benefits from garnishment or other legal process. In analyzing Barnes's assignments of error, our standard of review is clear: We will not disturb a chancellor's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong, but we must reverse a chancellor's application of an erroneous legal standard. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Miss.1994).

I.

¶ 8. We first shall review various federal statutes and interpretive caselaw applicable to the issues presented in this case.

The Social Security Act

¶ 9. As a part of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), the United States Congress established SSI for the aged, blind, and disabled to "assure a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who are blind or disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal minimum income level." 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (2009). To receive SSI benefits, Barnes was required to establish that he was disabled—as defined by the Act—and that his income and resources were below the permitted limit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (2009). The Act defines disability as

the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. To meet this definition, [one] must have a severe impairment[] that makes [him] unable to do [his] past relevant work ... or any other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2009).

¶ 10. SSI benefits are, in some cases, paid directly to the beneficiary. However, where the Social Security Administration has determined that the beneficiary is mentally incompetent, the benefits are paid to a "representative payee." 20 C.F.R. § 416.610 (2009). Once SSI benefits are awarded, "[n]o restrictions, implied or otherwise, are placed on how recipients spend the Federal payments." 20 C.F.R. 416.110 (2009).

¶ 11. Barnes argues that the Social Security Act prohibits the transfer, assignment, garnishment, or attachment of his SSI payments to anyone other than himself. He relies on the portion of the Act commonly referenced as its "Anti-Attachment Clause," which reads as follows:

(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter⁴ shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.

42 U.S.C. § 407 (2006) (emphasis added).

United States Supreme Court Precedent

¶ 12. In reaching our decision today, we are assisted by three United States Supreme Court decisions involving attempts by States to attach Social Security benefits. In Bennett v. Arkansas,⁵ addressing the State of Arkansas's attempt to attach the Social Security benefits of some of its prisoners as reimbursement for the cost of their imprisonment, the Court held that "Section 407(a) unambiguously rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits." Id. at 397. The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute included an "implied exception" which allowed it to attach benefits in cases in which a state has provided a recipient with "care and maintenance." Id.

¶ 13. In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,⁶ the state of New Jersey attempted to attach retroactive Social Security payments, which were paid to a citizen who had been the recipient of state welfare benefits. The state's claim was based on the citizen's written agreement to reimburse the county welfare board for all payments received. In rejecting the argument, the Court stated that Section 407 "imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits. That is broad enough to include all claimants, including a State." The Court also stated, "We see no reason why a State, performing its statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as compared with any other creditor." Id. at 416-417, 93 S.Ct. 590.

¶ 14. Finally, in Keffeler,⁷ a group of foster children who were Social Security beneficiaries brought a class-action suit against the State of Washington, alleging that the State had violated federal law when it reimbursed itself for foster-care expenditures from the children's benefits. The children's benefits actually were paid to the State of Washington as "representative payee," and the Court held:

Although it is true that the State could not directly compel the beneficiary or any other representative payee to pay Social Security benefits over to the State, that fact does not render the appointment of a self-reimbursing representative payee at odds with the Commissioner's mandate to find that a beneficiary's `interest ... would be served' by the appointment .... a representative payee serves the beneficiary's interest by seeing that basic needs are met.

Id. at 389-90, 123 S.Ct. 1017 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(1)(A), 1383(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006)). Stated another way, the Court held that the Department of Social and Health Services's reimbursement did not violate Section 407 of the Social Security Act where the State—as "representative payee" for the children—used the funds to care for the basic needs of the beneficiaries and employed no legal process that was barred by Section 407 to reimburse itself.

Federal Child Support Enforcement Act

¶ 15. DHS points out that Congress enacted the Federal Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 659, to facilitate collection of child support from parents who receive Social Security Benefits. That act, however, reads in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407 of [the Social Security Act]) ... moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remunerationfor employment) due from, or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof) to any individual ... shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private person, ... to any other legal process brought, by a State agency administering a program ... to enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or alimony.

42 U.S.C. §...