Barnes v. Healy
| Decision Date | 25 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-15520,92-15520 |
| Citation | 980 F.2d 572 |
| Parties | Mary BARNES; Cynthia Conger; Karen Crary; Belinda Foster; Debra Gonzalez; Brenda Hall; Pamela Miller; Trisha Parker; Marcie Sanz; Cheri Sousa; Diane Wolford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John D. HEALY, Director, California Department of Social Services; Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General; Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Carole S. Ungvarsky, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, Cal., Brian H. Paddock, Legal Services of Northern Cal., Redding, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Eileen Gray, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before: ALARCON, BOOCHEVER, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court defining the scope of a preliminary injunction issued in favor of appellants, a class of custodial parents participating in California's child support enforcement program. We are called upon to decide what form of notice of the state's collection and distribution of child support payments is required to satisfy due process. We affirm the district court's order in part and reverse in part.
Appellants represent a class of custodial parents ("the class") who receive or have applied for child support enforcement services from the California Department of Social Services ("DSS"). The class includes both families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") and families not collecting AFDC benefits. Appellee Healy is the Interim Director of DSS. The class action brought in the district court alleged, inter alia, that DSS' denial of meaningful notice of child support collections and distributions violated procedural due process.
California participates in the federal AFDC program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). To receive federal funds, a state must establish and operate a child support enforcement program in compliance with the requirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Id. § 602(a)(27); see id. §§ 651-69. Appellee DSS is the single state agency charged with administering California's child support enforcement program. Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code § 10600 (West 1991). DSS has delegated most of the enforcement functions to the Family Support Divisions of County District Attorney's Offices. Id. §§ 11475, 11475.1.
The statutory and regulatory framework requires AFDC families to assign their right to receive child support to the IV-D agency. These families are entitled to receive a "pass-through," or "disregard," consisting of the first $50 in child support payments collected on their behalf in the month when due; this amount is disregarded in determining their eligibility for AFDC benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), 657(b)(1) (1988). Any support payments in excess of this pass-through are first used to recoup AFDC paid in the month of collection. If the amount of support collected exceeds the amounts retained as reimbursement for AFDC plus $50, then the family is entitled to that additional amount. Id. § 657(b); 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(b)(5) (1991). Former AFDC recipients who continue to receive child support enforcement services are entitled to current support payments as well as past arrears collected in excess of the amount previously paid as AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 302.51(f) (1991). Families who have never received AFDC may also participate in the child support enforcement program and are entitled to receive the entire amount of support collected by the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 302.33(a) (1991).
The statute requires annual notice to former and current AFDC recipients of the amount of support collected by the state; 1 no notice is statutorily required for non-AFDC families. 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) (1988). The implementing regulations require only that this notice include the total amount of support collected and paid for the year and, if more than one absent parent is paying support, a breakdown as to each absent parent's payments for the year. 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.54, 305.45(a) (1991).
The class alleged in the district court that the annual notice failed to provide the information necessary to evaluate the timing and accuracy of the agency's disbursements and thus violated due process with regard to custodial parents' property rights in state-collected child support payments. On September 26, 1991, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering, in addition to the notice required by statute and regulation, "meaningful periodic notice" On appeal, the class contends that the district court's order failed to provide for meaningful notice sufficient to avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation of their property interests. The class challenges three specific elements of the district court's order: (1) the order permits the notice to specify the actual date of the agency's receipt of support payments, rather than the federally defined collection date; (2) the order states that while AFDC recipients must be informed of the reason for the non-payment of a pass-through, this requirement is satisfied by a statement that any money collected was not "current support"; and (3) the order states that procedural due process requires notice only to AFDC families and not to non-AFDC families who receive the same enforcement services. The class also challenges the district court's schedule for issuance of quarterly notices. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
to all class members. Pursuant to the court's order, DSS submitted a written plan attempting to outline an adequate individualized notice procedure, and the class submitted its objections to the proposed plan. The parties engaged in settlement discussions between themselves and two days of conference in chambers with the court's participation in an attempt to resolve controverted issues. On January 13, 1992, the district court issued an order setting forth the elements of the notice required by the preliminary injunction. The class filed a timely notice of appeal on March 11, 1992
DISCUSSION
Healy does not question the district court's granting of the preliminary injunction; only the scope of the injunctive relief is at issue on this appeal. We review a challenge to the scope of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, erroneous legal standards, or clearly erroneous factual findings. Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir.1986). An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir.1992).
When injunctive relief is sought against a state agency or official, such relief "must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). Thus,
[w]e will scrutinize the injunction closely to make sure that the remedy protects the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and does not require more of state officials than is necessary to assure their compliance with the constitution. Within these parameters, we will defer to the district court.
Id. at 1089; see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir.1987) (); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 785 (9th Cir.1985) (); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1982) (). 2 In the case of a preliminary injunction, we keep in mind that the district court may alter its position if and when it makes the injunction permanent. See Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.1982).
The district court's finding that both AFDC and non-AFDC families have a protected Once the district court determined that class members had protected property interests that were subject to a substantial probability of erroneous deprivation and a significant threat of irreparable injury, it determined that more process was likely required to satisfy due process. The court awarded preliminary relief in the form of notice that was intended to permit class members to ascertain whether they had received all the payments to which they were entitled. The court's analysis was properly guided by balancing the factors set out in Mathews v. Eldridge:
interest in state-collected child support payments is not challenged on appeal. The central issue is what process is due to guard against the risks of non-payment and delay in child support distributions that the district court found to exist
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
The district court concluded that appellants had made a sufficient showing that "due process requires at a minimum ... meaningful...
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