Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Civ. No. PJM 92-2473.

Decision Date07 March 1994
Docket NumberCiv. No. PJM 92-2473.
Citation846 F. Supp. 442
PartiesKaren R. BARNES, Plaintiff, v. HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Suzanne Levin, Rockville, MD, for plaintiff.

Thomas J. Flaherty, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, A. Neal Barkus, and James J. Rooney, Hunton & Williams, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION

MESSITTE, District Judge.

I.

Karen Barnes, formerly a sales representative with Hewlett-Packard Company, sues her former employer, alleging sexual discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. When she returned to work in September 1991, having been away for approximately one year by reason of combined maternity, medical, and parental leave, she contends she was demoted and a few weeks later constructively discharged, allegations which Hewlett-Packard (H-P) vigorously denies.

Because the Court decides that Barnes' claim is not assertible under Title VII, it is not necessary to resolve such factual disputes as may exist between the parties. The Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II.

Barnes was an employee of H-P for approximately 14 years, from 1977 until 1991. She held a variety of positions with the firm in California prior to becoming a sales representative in its Rockville, Maryland, office in January 1988.

In late July 1988, Barnes took leave from H-P to have a child, returning to work on November 1 of that year. She was reinstated to her previous job and makes no complaint regarding her treatment in connection with that pregnancy. She continued with her training and apparently functioned successfully as a sales representative for the next two years.

In September 1990, Barnes, again pregnant but this time with twins, requested and received medical leave due to back pain and insomnia, also receiving permission to remain on leave through her pregnancy. This was consistent with H-P's policy, which not only granted expectant mothers leave to give birth, but medical leave in connection with any disability related to the pregnancy.

Barnes' twins were born in February 1991, and her maternity leave eventually extended to May 17.1 Her request for leave of absence thereafter bears quoting in full:

I would like to request a parental leave of absence for the period beginning May 17, 1991 and ending on my return to work on September 16, 1991.
Reason: I gave birth to twins on Feb. 19 and one of my twins needs medical treatments in the next 3-9 months which will be both time consuming and emotionally trying. (Emphasis supplied)

H-P's policy regarding the interplay of maternity and parental leave as of that time is particularly noteworthy:

An employee on a medical leave for maternity purposes will have the option of a maximum four-month parental leave after the doctor has released her to work.
Note: The parental leave for the birth mother is not an extension of the medical leave but is, rather, a personal leave with a job guarantee for the four-month period following the doctor's release. (Emphasis in original)

Barnes in fact remained off the job until September 16, but alleges that from the moment she returned she was met with discrimination. She suggests first that "she was treated in a cold and harassing manner, given no tasks, direction or sales territory." Next she says that she was "demoted to the position of staff representative and although she would have no immediate reduction in pay (although there was no longer a commission potential and she could lose her company car), she would be ineligible to get a raise `for a very long time.'" Finally she contends that, following her return, two sales representative positions opened up and were filled by two males, rather than by her. Although H-P offered her the opportunity to find other positions within the company with her salary guaranteed for two years, Barnes chose in December 1991 to sign a Voluntary Severance Incentive, received one year's salary as severance pay, and departed.

Almost immediately Barnes arranged a new job for herself in California at an annual salary $24,000 higher than her salary at H-P. Claiming the loss of certain other benefits, she eventually brought the present Title VII action.

III.

Barnes complains that she was subject to discrimination "because of her sex (availing herself of parental leave) in violation of Title VII." (Complaint, par. 23). Indeed, it is only on the basis of parental leave that she can claim whatever discrimination may have ensued, not pregnancy leave. As indicated, in her final Request for Leave she specified it was "parental" leave she was seeking. HP's policy, moreover, made it clear that the four-month parental leave following maternity leave was "not an extension of medical leave, but ..., rather, a personal leave...." Finally, it is undisputed that Barnes' old job was waiting for her when her maternity leave ended in May 1991.2

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), makes it illegal to discriminate "against any individual with respect to ... conditions of ... employment ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). However logical it may be to argue, as Barnes does, that parental leave following maternity leave is gender-based and thus protected under Title VII, that proposition has been consistently rejected from the outset.

Analysis begins with the legislative history of the PDA, found in H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753:

... Testimony before the Committee indicates that in 95 percent of the cases, the time lost from work due to pregnancy of 6 weeks or less, so barring any medical complications, this period would be the normal time a pregnant woman would be covered. If, however, medical complications arose, which is the case in about 5 percent of all pregnancies, these complications should be covered by the same time limits or dollar amounts otherwise provided disabled workers.

Id. at 4753.

Specifically on the matter of child care, the Committee Report observed:

For example, if a woman wants to stay home to take care of the child, no benefit must be paid because this is not a medically determined condition related to pregnancy. Id.

All pertinent authorities since the inception of PDA are in accord that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of childrearing activities or parental leave. Among the EEOC Guidelines Questions and Answers on the PDA, for example, is one specifically addressed to child care leave:

Q. Must an employer grant leave to a female employee for childcare purposes after she is medically able to return to work following leave necessitated by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions?
A. While leave for childcare purposes is not covered by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, ordinary Title VII principles would require that leave for childcare purposes be granted on the same basis as leave which is granted to employees for other non-medical reasons. For example, if an employer allows its employees to take leave without pay or accrued annual leave for travel or education which is not job related, the same type of leave must be granted to those who wish to remain on leave for infant care, even though they are medically able to return to work. (Emphasis supplied)

29 C.F.R. 1604.18(A) Appendix.

The case of Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran School, 611 F.Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) states the proposition more directly:

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not protect people wishing to take child-rearing leaves as opposed to women wishing to take pregnancy leaves. See, Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 690, n. 2 (1983); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-Guide-lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604, App. (1984) (Question and Answer 18); 1 A. Larson & L.K. Larson, Employment Discrimination-Sex § 38.70-Parental Leave. A disservice is done to both men and women to assume that child-rearing is a function peculiar to one sex. Whether leaves for child-rearing should be protected from employer discrimination, as leaves for jury duty are, is not a question for this court to determine. Plaintiff does not claim that defendant's actions have a disparate impact on
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    ...leave," citing Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.Supp. 867 (W.D.Ky.1990), aff'd. 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.1991) and Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F.Supp. 442 (D.Md.1994). In Wallace, plaintiff sought leave to breast feed her baby, which leave was refused by the employer. Plaintiff claimed......
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  • Subtle but pervasive: discrimination against mothers and pregnant women in the workplace.
    • United States
    • Fordham Urban Law Journal Vol. 33 No. 5, November 2006
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    ...requirements--clearly gender-based in nature--end and gender-neutral child care activities begin." Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Md. 1994) (granting summary judgment to employer on plaintiff's claim that she was discriminated against in the meaning of Title VII be......

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