Cooper v. Drexel Chemical Co.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:95cv092-D-B.
• Citation: 949 F.Supp. 1275
• Parties: Robert G. COOPER, Plaintiff, v. DREXEL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Marc Gilbertson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

949 F.Supp. 1275

Robert G. COOPER, Plaintiff, v. DREXEL CHEMICAL COMPANY and Marc Gilbertson, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:95cv092-D-B.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

April 22, 1996.

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Lawrence J. Hakim, Charlie Baglan & Associates, Batesville, MS, for plaintiff.

Louis H. Watson, Jr., Holcomb Dunbar, Southaven, MS, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIDSON, District Judge.

Presently before the court is the motion of the defendants for the entry of summary judgment on their behalf. Finding the motion well taken, the same shall be granted.

Factual Background¹

The plaintiff Robert G. Cooper was hired by the defendant Drexel Chemical Company ("Drexel") on July 27, 1993, as a "production supervisor" for its facility in Tunica, Mississippi. Drexel engages in the production of chemicals, including fertilizer for agricultural use. Drexel hired Cooper at an annual salary of $24,000, and then trained and placed him in charge of the Tunica plant. Even though he regularly supervised multiple employees in the mill area, Cooper also worked alongside the employees he supervised whenever his crew was short handed.

Another duty assumed by Cooper was the driving of a company van to and from work at the request of his superiors. While working in Tunica, the plaintiff lived in Senatobia, Mississippi. The plaintiff agreed to drive the van to and from work, and to use that van to ferry other employees to and from the plant.

Because of his wife's pregnancy, the plaintiff requested time off from work for the birth. On a calendar in the office where shift managers met, he wrote "want time off for baby" on the date corresponding to the approximate time the baby was expected. Upon asking his supervisor, Marc Gilbertson, more directly for this leave time and engaging in a discussion on the topic, Gilbertson told the plaintiff that he "better not take off work." The plaintiff then inquired about his job performance, and Gilbertson told him "I think you do what is expected of you."

I said, "so if I am terminated it is going to be solely for me wanting to take off work for the baby to be born?"

He said, "Yes."

Deposition of Robert Cooper, p. 61. Drexel terminated the plaintiff's employment that day, April 6, 1994. This action followed.

The plaintiff initially filed this action on June 5, 1995, in the Circuit Court of Tunica County, alleging various federal and state law causes of action against the defendants. The defendants subsequently removed the action to this court on June 27, 1995, and have now moved for the entry of summary judgment in their favor as against all of the plaintiff's claims. Finding the motion well taken, and pursuant to the reasons set forth in this memorandum opinion, the motion shall be granted.

Discussion

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir.1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994).

II. THE PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS

A. TITLE VII — THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT

The first claim of the plaintiff arising under federal law is that the defendants, by firing him, violated the "Pregnancy Discrimination Act," ("PDA") contained within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

1) AGAINST DEFENDANT MARC GILBERTSON

The initial assertion of the defendants in this matter is that Marc Gilbertson, as a supervisor, cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. This court has recently discussed the matter of supervisor liability under Title VII in some detail, and concluded that even in light of the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, "[t]he Fifth Circuit law is clear — supervisors cannot be held personally liable under Title VII." Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp., 914 F.Supp. 1396, 1402 (N.D.Miss.1996) (Davidson, J.). Therefore, as the plaintiff has no viable Title VII claim against the defendant Marc Gilbertson individually, the defendants' motion shall be granted as to that claim against him.

2) AGAINST DEFENDANT DREXEL CHEMICAL COMPANY

Discrimination under the PDA is a type of gender discrimination. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir.1996) ("Title VII's ban on gender discrimination encompasses pregnancy-based discrimination."); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (explaining pregnancy and related medical conditions constitute "sex" for purposes of sex discrimination). The plaintiff is correct that, at least in some instances, the PDA protects males as well as females against gender discrimination. E.g., Newport News Shipbuilding v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983) (holding PDA violated where pregnant female employees received greater monetary medical benefits than male employees who had pregnant spouses); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Newport News retroactively). However, the PDA does not require that an employer such as Drexel provide to its employees maternity leave or parental leave to spend time with a newborn.² Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating PDA does not require an employer to give maternity leave "or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work."); Afande v. National Lutheran Home for the Aged, 868 F.Supp. 795, 803 (D.Md.1994) ("Title VII does not insure fair and objective treatment by employers."); see also Stacy J Cooper, Sexual Harassment and the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevaluation of the "Hostile Environment" Doctrine, 26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 387, 434 n. 207 ("The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 prohibited disparate treatment, but did not require employers to provide any leave at all."). Rather, the impetus of this provision of Title VII is to "make clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions." E.E.O.C. v. Texas Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684, 103 S.Ct. at 2631) (emphasis added). A "pregnancy related condition" is limited to "incapacitating medical conditions for which medical care or treatment is usual and normal." Wallace v. Pyro Min. Co., 789 F.Supp. 867, 869 (W.D.Ken.1990).

As already noted, other child-related absences from work are not protected by the PDA. E.g., Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F.Supp. 442, 444 (D.Md.1994) ("All pertinent authorities since the inception of the PDA are in accord that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of child-rearing activities or parental leave."); Wallace, 789 F.Supp. at 869 (finding no protection for additional time off for breast-feeding when otherwise medically able to return to work). Also instructive on the point is the legislative history of the PDA:

[I]f a woman wants to stay home to take care of the child, no benefit must be paid because this is not a medically determined condition related to pregnancy.

H.R. No. 948, 95th Cong. 5, reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 4749, 4753.

The parties agree in this case that at the time of the plaintiff's termination, Drexel had no written maternity leave policy. Further, Mr. Cooper was not entitled to take any vacation time under company policy, as he had not yet completed one year of employment. Finally, there is no evidence before the court that he suffered from a medical infirmity which required his absence from work. As the PDA does not require that employers grant leave to prospective parents, Mr. Cooper has no protection under Title VII under the facts at bar. Cooper, Sexual Harassment, 26 Colum.J.L. & Soc. Probs. at 434 n. 207 ("For example, if an employer allowed no sick leave for first-year employees, a woman who needed to take time off to have a baby had no claim if her employer fired her — she was treated just like a male employee who took a sick leave."). In order to establish a claim, Mr. Cooper would have to demonstrate that he was treated differently than other male employees who wanted time off because of a spousal medical condition unrelated to pregnancy. Under the policies in effect at Drexel at the time of this incident, Mr. Cooper did not have any independent right to take leave time because of his wife's medical condition. Further, there is no evidence that other employees were granted any type of discretionary leave for spousal medical conditions while he was denied such. There is nothing before the court which would establish a viable claim under the PDA provision of Title VII. There is no genuine issue of material fact in this matter, and the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's Title VII claim.

B. THE FAIR LABOR...