Barnes v. Jeffreys
| Decision Date | 26 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20 C 2137,20 C 2137 |
| Citation | 529 F.Supp.3d 784 |
| Parties | Marcus BARNES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rob JEFFREYS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Mark G. Weinberg, Attorney at Law, Adele D. Nicholas, Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Marcus Barnes.
Adele D. Nicholas, Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs Mark Faller, Jonathan Sparks, Paul Hubbard, David Easton, Kenneth Green, Wade Council, John Margarella, Fredrick Chamblis, Kenneth Schroeder, Joshua Atkins, Columbo Galindo, Christopher Shelton, Dana Monson, Andra Sampson, Corey Crowe, Joshua Huddleston.
Sarah Hughes Newman, Michael T. Dierkes, Sunil Shashikant Bhave, Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Approximately 1,200 inmates imprisoned in the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") who have completed their court-ordered sentences of incarceration and are entitled to release to a community setting on mandatory supervised release ("MSR") remain in prison because they are unable to secure an approved "host site" to live while on mandatory supervised release. Title 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6), a section of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections, prohibits an individual on mandatory supervised release for a sex offense from living "at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense." (hereinafter the "One-Per-Address Statute").
Plaintiff Marcus Barnes was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for criminal sexual assault in 2008. Upon completing his sentence, Barnes was entitled to start his term of mandatory supervised release ("MSR"), a form of post-confinement monitoring intended to assist individuals transition from prison to liberty. Under the "One-Per-Address Statute" convicted sex offenders on MSR may not live in the same building as another registered sex offender. Because he was unable to secure housing which complied with the One-Per-Address Statute, Barnes spent an additional 18 months imprisoned at the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC").
Barnes, and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, challenges the constitutionality of the One-Per-Address Statute on Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. In Murphy et al. v. Raoul et al., No. 16-cv-11471—a related case brought by the narrower class of convicted sex offenders sentenced to an indeterminate term of MSR—this Court identified a protectable liberty interest in release from prison onto MSR once eligible and awarded the class summary judgment as to their Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims.
Plaintiffs in the present suit move for summary judgment on all their claims against Defendant Robert Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 32) is granted as to both their Eighth Amendment (Count I) and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims (Count II) but denied as to their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
In Illinois, almost every criminal sentence includes a period of MSR following the term of imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-15(c). Authority over MSR is vested in both the IDOC and the Prisoner Review Board ("PRB"). See Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Bd. , 386 Ill.Dec. 660, 21 N.E.3d 423, 428 (Ill. 2014). Broadly, the PRB is responsible for setting the conditions of MSR, but the IDOC assists inmates locating a suitable "host site" for residential placement. See id. , 386 Ill.Dec. 660, 21 N.E.3d at 430.
The One-Per-Address Statute precludes convicted sex offenders on MSR from living "at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense[.]" 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). The One-Per-Address Statute is a mandatory condition, meaning neither the IDOC nor the PRB has the discretion to impose the condition. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). Until April 7, 2020, the IDOC interpreted the One-Per-Address Statute to prohibit sex offenders on MSR from living in the same trailer parks as other sex offenders or from living in adjacent apartment buildings. Id. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 2). When evaluating proposed host sites, a parole agent verifies compliance with the One-Per-Address Statute. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 1). If a host site is denied, the offender is notified in writing of the reason for the denial and afforded the opportunity to file a grievance. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 3). Sex offenders on MSR must register with the local police department and, in the past, local registering agencies have occasionally refused to register sex offenders at sites which violate the One-Per-Address Statute or rearrested them for living at such locations. (Dkt. 50 ¶¶ 7–8, 10). Once a host site is approved and the sex offender moves in, a parole agent conducts monthly checks to ensure the host site remains compliant with the One-Per-Address Statute. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 5). If the parole agent determines the host site violates the One-Per-Address Statute, he provides the sex offender written notice of the need to find a new host site. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 6). The IDOC will only reincarcerate a sex offender for a violation of the One-Per-Address Statute to keep local authorities from arresting the offender on the new charge of failure to register. (Dkt. 50 ¶ 12).
When questioned at his deposition in Murphy as to the basis of the IDOC's previous application of the One-Per-Address Statute to trailer parks, Dion Dixon, the IDOC's Deputy Chief of Parole, did not reference any safety or rehabilitative purpose. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 1). Instead, Dixon said registering entities and the state police understood the One-Per-Address Statute to prohibit a sex offender on MSR from living in the same trailer park as another registrant. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 1; Dkt. 49 ¶ 1; Dkt. 34-6 at 3–5). Because allowing sex offenders on MSR to live in the same trailer park as another registrant might prove counterproductive or result in reincarceration, the IDOC similarly refused to permit such placements. (Dkt. 49 ¶ 1; Dkt. 34-6 at 6). Subject to the permanent injunction ordered in Murphy , the IDOC altered the way it interprets the One-Per-Address Statute. No. 16-cv-11471, Dkt. 161.
A study produced by the Minnesota Department of Corrections examined the impact of permitting convicted sex offenders to live "in close proximity to one another." (Dkt. 33 ¶ 2). The report found no negative effects from such close living and, instead, identified a handful of benefits. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 2). For example, the reduced travel time between offenders affords closer supervision of registrants, more visits per registrant, and registrants tend to inform on one another for restriction violations or crimes. (Dkt. 32 ¶ 2). These findings are consistent with the deposition testimony of Bob McKelvey, the founder of NewDay Apartments. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 7).
Separate and apart from the One-Per-Address Statute, host sites for sex offenders on MSR are subject to myriad other restrictions. For example, it is a crime for child sex offenders to "knowingly reside within 500 feet of a school building" or "playground, child care institution, day care center, party day child care facility, day care home, group day care home, or a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed towards [children]." 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(b.5), (b.10). Registered sex offenders are further restricted from living "near ... parks, schools, day care centers, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, or any other places where minor children congregate" without preapproval by the IDOC. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(b-1)(12). Finally, until April 7, 2020, IDOC policy would not approve a host site with computers, routers, wi-fi access, smart TVs or other internet-related devices, where children lived or resided, or without a land-line telephone. Murphy , No. 16-cv-11471, Dkt. 161.
NewDay Apartments ("NewDay"), located in Lake County, Illinois, specializes in providing compliant housing to registered sex offenders. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 3). Bob McKelvey, the founder of NewDay, views its primary purpose as keeping "communities safe by housing registrants responsibly." (Dkt. 33 ¶ 12). NewDay has a 0% recidivism rate among its registrant tenants. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 12).
NewDay currently owns eight properties which comply with the various statutory prohibitions on sex offender host sites and has plans to expand its holdings over the next three years. (Dkt. 33 ¶¶ 4, 11). NewDay contracts with the IDOC to make four of these properties available to house indigent members of the Murphy class otherwise unable to procure housing. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 4). Prior to the Court's Order granting preliminary injunctive relief in Murphy , NewDay was limited to housing a single registrant per location. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 5). NewDay also owns multi-unit properties which, under the One-Per-Address Statute, are limited to registrants off MSR. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 12). Permitting multiple registrants on MSR would "easily double" the number of units NewDay could offer and would make the housing more affordable. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 12). Several registrants have been released to NewDay on preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 68).
Wayside Cross Ministries ("Wayside"), located at 215 E. New York Street, Aurora, Illinois, is a "Bible-based residential program" with over 90 years of experience. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 13). Its Master's Touch Ministry program targets men struggling with drug and alcohol addiction and transitioning after a...
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