Barnes v. Rodgers

• Decision Date: 06 January 1899
• Citation: 31 S.E. 885,54 S.C. 115
• Parties: BARNES v. RODGERS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

31 S.E. 885

54 S.C. 115

BARNES v. RODGERS.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 6, 1899

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Sumter county; W. C Benet, Judge.

Action by Henry N. Barnes against Francis S. Rodgers. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The following is the charge:

"This is a suit in equity, brought on the equity side of the court. The defendant's answer denies that the plaintiff had title. You remember that the complaint of the plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of one-third interest in the tract of land described in the complaint. (I believe it is said to contain 130 acres.) He asks that it be partitioned; in other words that his one-third of the 130 acres be set off to him. But the defendant denies that he is the owner of the one-third interest in the land. That makes the issue of title. The law says that where issues as to title to real estate are found in an equity case, that title must be tried by a jury, and for that reason this issue as to title is submitted to you. So your inquiry will be, is the plaintiff entitled to one-third interest in that tract of land, which is said to contain 130 acres, more or less? If you find that he is, then we take it on the equity side of the court, and see what the respective rights of the parties are in reference to it. If you find that he is not, that ends the case right there. The suit is bottomed on the fact that he claims to be the owner of one-third interest in this real estate. That issue is for you to determine. It is proper that I should charge you that in determining this question the law lays down certain rules by which title to real estate can be tested. If you find that the defendant is in quiet, peaceable possession of this land, before he can be ousted, the party claiming to be the owner of it must show one of the following states of fact: First, that he traces his title to a grant from the state of South Carolina, or that he traces his title back to certain parties or certain persons who have been in adverse possession of it for twenty years or more; and the law will presume a grant, under that state of facts. To presume a grant from the state of South Carolina, the law says he must prove that he has been in possession or claim under a possession of ten years or more. The law would say that he had legal title. Or he must go back to a common source. That he can trace his title from some one from whom the defendant traces his title, and when he gets to a common source, the question is then, who has the better title? In other words, if two parties claim a tract of land from A.,--each claim from A.,--in adjusting that title you need not go further back than A., both claiming their title from A. In going back to a grant from the state or the presumption of twenty years or ten years, the question is who has the better deed? Who had the older deed or prior deed? That is the general rule to be laid down. In presuming a grant, the law is that uninterrupted possession in any one, or if he held for the whole period of twenty years, or if he held for a certain period, and he claims from some one else, and he from some one else, for a certain period, that by reason of these periods of possession, taken together, if it be a possession of twenty years or more, the law presumes that these parties have a grant from the state of South Carolina. The object is to quiet title to real estate; that, after a certain length of time, the law presumes a man who has been in possession of real estate for a certain length of time,--twenty years or more,--the law presumes that he has a grant to it. If a party holds adversely for ten years, he secures a legal title; that is, such title as would give him the right to occupy and possess that land. He must show that it was adverse and continued. He can't show that he held it for five years, and the party from whom he bought held it for five years. He must show that he himself has held it for ten years, to get legal title. That is the general rule in adjusting title to real estate. The plaintiff in this case contends that he claims title from Eadie Dunn, and it is contended that Eadie Dunn and her brothers and sisters and nephews have been in possession of her share and of their portion of the land uninterrupted for a period of twenty years or more. The rule is that he who asserts title to real estate must not only show that he has a strong title, but he must show that he has perfect title, and must recover on the strength of his title, and not on the weakness of the party in possession. The burden is upon the plaintiff to show a perfect title either by adverse possession for ten years continued, or twenty years' prescription, or a grant from the state or common source, and that it is a better and superior title. If you find that the plaintiff made his case, that he is entitled to one-third of the land described in the complaint, the form of your verdict will be: 'We find for the plaintiff one-third. We find that the plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the land described in the complaint.' If you find that he has failed to make out his case by the preponderance of the evidence, then you simply say: 'We find for the defendant. We find for the plaintiff one-third of the land described in the complaint,'--or, then, 'We find for the defendant.' Take the record, and write out your finding, and sign your name as foreman. You can write out your verdict on a separate piece of paper or upon that complaint, and after you find your verdict we will take the case on the equity side of the court, and determine the rights of the parties."

The following are the exceptions:

"(1) Because his honor, the presiding judge, erred in not granting the defendant's motion for a nonsuit, and erred in not withdrawing the case from the jury and giving judgment for the defendant, when it appeared at the close of the plaintiff's case that the defendant held the deed from one W. S. Barnes (by the master), which not only did not show common source, but pointed to a different source of title; and upon this showing by the plaintiff he should have been nonsuited, or judgment given for the defendant.

"(2) Because his honor, the presiding judge, committed error in his charge to the jury as a whole, in that: First. In the beginning of his charge his honor stated to the jury: 'You remember that the complaint of the plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of one-third interest in the tract of land described in the complaint. (I believe it is said to contain 130 acres.) He asks that it be partitioned; in other words, that his one-third of the 130 acres be set off to him.' In referring to the claim set up by the plaintiff, his honor erred in saying, 'In other words, that his one-third of the 130 acres be set off to him,' for by so referring to the claim of the plaintiff his honor erred in using the words, 'his one-third,' charged upon the facts, and gave in that expression the conclusion to the jury that the plaintiff should have one-third of the land set off to him. Second. His honor erred in charging the jury: 'So your inquiry will be, is the plaintiff entitled to one-third interest in the tract of land, which is said to contain 130 acres, more or less? If you find that he is, then we take it on the equity side of the court, and see what the respective rights of the parties are in reference to it. If you find that he is not, that ends the case right there. The suit is bottomed on the fact that he claims to be the owner of one-third interest in this real estate. That issue is for you to determine,'--because: (a) Such charge limited the jury to finding for the plaintiff one-third part of the land, and they could not do otherwise if they found any interest at all for the plaintiff, and the defendant was thereby deprived of the benefit of all proof in the case tending to show that the plaintiff's rights, if any at all, embraced less than one-third of the land. (b) Such charge was a charge upon the facts, and was equivalent to his honor saying to the jury that, if the plaintiff was entitled to anything, he was entitled to one-third of the land, and embodied in it the expression of his honor's opinion of the weight to be given to the evidence, and was contrary to the constitution and laws of this state.

"(3) His honor erred in charging the jury: 'If you find that the plaintiff has made his case,--that he is entitled to one-third of the land described in the complaint,--the form of your verdict will be, 'We find for the plaintiff one-third. We find that the plaintiff is entitled to one-third of the land described in the complaint.' If you find that he has failed to make out his case by the preponderance of the evidence, then you simply say: 'We find for the defendant. We find for the plaintiff one-third of the land described in the complaint,'--or, then, 'We find for the defendant, '--in that: (a) If the jury found any interest at all for the plaintiff, they had no other alternative than to find one-third part of the land for him, whereas it should have been submitted to them to find a one-third, or less, interest for the plaintiff, if they found for him at all. (b) Such charge was contrary to the constitution of this state, prohibiting a charge upon the facts. Directing the jury to find for the plaintiff one-third of the land, or else to find for the defendant, was summing up and giving the jury the judge's conclusion as to, and his opinion upon, the facts of the case.

"(4) Because his honor erred in allowing the jury to find one-third of the 130 acres described in the complaint,

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