Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 01 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA0720 |
Citation | 497 P.3d 5,2021 COA 89 |
Parties | Julie BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John L. Springer, Aurora, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Patterson Ripplinger, P.C., Franklin D. Patterson, Karl A. Chambers, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
¶ 1 In this declaratory judgment action, Julie Barnes appeals the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶ 2 Barnes first contends that the district court erred by allowing State Farm to file a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss after it had already filed a separate C.R.C.P. 12(f) motion to strike because C.R.C.P. 12(g) requires consolidation of C.R.C.P. 12 motions. Although we agree that the court erred, under the circumstances discussed below, we conclude the error was harmless.
¶ 3 Barnes next contends that the district court erred by dismissing her complaint because she asserted a plausible claim that a State Farm form contained a false or misleading representation — a "half-truth" — regarding uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) coverage. Specifically, she contends that, by disclosing that UM coverage follows the insured person rather than the insured vehicle, see § 10-4-609(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020, State Farm became legally obligated to further disclose that an insured who rejects UM coverage on one of multiple policies loses the ability to "stack" available UM coverage. We reject this contention and affirm the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint.
¶ 4 Colorado law requires that an insurer offer UM coverage for each automobile liability policy that it issues. § 10-4-609(1)(a). An insured may reject such coverage in writing. Id.
¶ 5 State Farm issued Barnes two automobile liability insurance policies — one for a 2006 Honda and one for a 1990 Geo. After Barnes visited her insurance agent to discuss her automobile coverage, State Farm sent Barnes a form titled "Colorado Automobile Coverages Acknowledgment of Coverage Selection or Rejection" (UM Rejection Form). Barnes signed the UM Rejection Form, rejecting UM coverage on the Geo policy.
¶ 6 The two policies were in effect when Barnes sustained serious bodily injuries in a car accident caused by another driver. Because her damages exceeded the amount she recovered from the at-fault driver, Barnes sought the $100,000 limit of UM coverage under the Honda policy and $70,000 (of what she believed was a $100,000 limit) of UM coverage under the Geo policy. State Farm paid Barnes $100,000, the maximum amount of UM coverage available under the Honda policy; but because she had rejected UM coverage on the Geo policy, State Farm declined to pay her anything more. Had Barnes not rejected UM coverage on the Geo policy, she alleges that she would have been able to "stack" the UM coverage, meaning that she would have been entitled to UM coverage on both policies, resulting in a total of $200,000 in available UM coverage.
¶ 7 Barnes filed a declaratory judgment action against State Farm, seeking a declaration that the UM Rejection Form was invalid or unenforceable. After Barnes filed an amended complaint, State Farm filed a C.R.C.P. 12(f) motion to strike certain paragraphs of the amended complaint or, alternatively, to require Barnes to state facts to support the statements contained in those paragraphs. The district court denied the motion to strike.
¶ 8 State Farm then filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Approximately two weeks later, State Farm filed an answer to Barnes’ amended complaint. Barnes opposed the motion to dismiss. After conducting a hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the amended complaint.
¶ 9 Barnes first contends that the district court erred by allowing State Farm to file a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss after it had already filed a separate C.R.C.P. 12(f) motion to strike. She argues that, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(g), the court should have disallowed the motion to dismiss because it was not joined with the earlier-filed motion to strike. We perceive no reversible error.
¶ 10 We interpret the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure de novo, DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. , 2013 CO 36, ¶ 24, 303 P.3d 1187, according to their commonly understood and accepted meanings, Antero Res. Corp. v. Strudley , 2015 CO 26, ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 149. We do not add words or provisions to a rule. Id. But we construe the rules liberally "to effectuate their objective to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and their truth-seeking purpose." Id. (quoting DCP Midstream , ¶ 24 ); see also C.R.C.P. 1.
¶ 11 Because the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "we may also look to the federal rules and decisions for guidance." Garrigan v. Bowen , 243 P.3d 231, 235 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 12 On appeal, we disregard any error or defect in the proceedings that did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. C.R.C.P. 61. An error affects the substantial rights of the parties if it "substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself." Bernache v. Brown , 2020 COA 106, ¶ 26, 471 P.3d 1234 (quoting Laura A. Newman, LLC v. Roberts , 2016 CO 9, ¶ 24, 365 P.3d 972 ).
¶ 13 C.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that every defense to a claim shall be asserted in the responsive pleading, except that certain defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "may at the option of the pleader be made by separate motion." C.R.C.P. 12(c) provides that, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed ..., any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." And C.R.C.P. 12(f) authorizes a party to move to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" from any pleading.
¶ 14 C.R.C.P. 12(g) states as follows:
A party who makes a motion under this Rule may join with it any other motions herein provided for and then available to that party. If a party makes a motion under this Rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to that party which this Rule permits to be raised by motion, that party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in section (h)(2) of this Rule on any of the grounds there stated.
C.R.C.P. 12(h)(2), in turn, states as follows:
A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.
¶ 15 Although we disagree with the district court's interpretation of C.R.C.P. 12(g), we conclude that any error by the district court in considering State Farm's second C.R.C.P. 12 motion was harmless.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 17 We read the rule differently. C.R.C.P. 12(g) plainly states that a party who makes a motion "under this Rule" but omits a then-available defense or objection allowed to be raised by motion "shall not thereafter" make a motion based on the omitted defense or objection. Section (g) nowhere states that only defenses and objections allowable under "one subparagraph" must be brought in a single motion. Instead, section (g) generally prohibits serial C.R.C.P. 12 motions regardless of which section or subsection permits the defense or objection being asserted; it requires consolidation of all C.R.C.P. 12 motions. C.R.C.P. 12(g) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) ; Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 771 F.3d 697, 701 (10th Cir. 2014).
¶ 18 But C.R.C.P. 12(g) contains an express exception to the general rule for "a motion as provided in section (h)(2) of this Rule on any of the grounds there stated." And section (h)(2) permits a party to assert the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, among other ways, "by motion for judgment on the pleadings." C.R.C.P. 12(h)(2). Thus, even if a party made an earlier C.R.C.P. 12 motion, section (g) does not preclude it from making a subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting the defense of failure to state a claim. C.R.C.P. 12(g), (h)(2) ; see also BSLNI, Inc. v. Russ T. Diamonds, Inc. , 2012 COA 214, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 598.
¶ 19 Indeed, if a defendant files a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim after it has filed its answer, the court should treat the motion as a C.R.C.P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See City of Aurora v. 1405 Hotel, LLC , 2016 COA 52, ¶ 16 n.3, 371 P.3d 794 ...
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