Barnes v. State, 2017–KA–00691–COA
| Decision Date | 05 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2017–KA–00691–COA,2017–KA–00691–COA |
| Citation | 269 So.3d 415 |
| Parties | Edward BARNES a/k/a Edward Barnes III, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: LISA D. COLLUMS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KATY TAYLOR GERBER
BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND TINDELL, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. On July 13, 2015, Edward Barnes III was indicted for failure to register as a convicted sex offender, specifically that he violated Mississippi Code Annotated section 45–33–25(4)(a) (Rev. 2015), which prohibited him from residing "within three thousand (3,000) feet of ... a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, a child care facility, a residential child-caring agency, a children's group care home or any playground, ballpark or other recreational facility utilized by persons under the age of eighteen (18) years."1 Although the initial indictment alleged Barnes was a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–19–81 (Rev. 2015), the State subsequently moved to amend the indictment to reflect habitual-offender status under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–19–83 (Rev. 2015). The motion stated that Barnes had been convicted of:
The Harrison County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, granted the State's motion to amend.
¶ 2. A jury trial was held on September 21, 2016. Jessica Akers, the registrar for the Harrison County Sheriff's Department, testified that "sex offenders must register all addresses that they live at between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. for seven or more consecutive days." She noted the various requirements with which a convicted sex offender has to comply, including the proximity restriction that prohibited Barnes from residing within three thousand feet of any schools, child-care facilities, playgrounds, ballparks, or recreational facilities utilized by children under the age of eighteen. When Akers met with Barnes on September 9, 2014, for a registration visit, she went over the requirements on the registration form with Barnes. He signed the form and acknowledged the individual requirements by putting his initials by each one listed. When Akers later entered the address provided by Barnes, she noted a proximity violation—the address was four hundred (400) feet from a day care center. To verify the proximity violation, Akers searched for the location on a Google Earth map and called the day care center to make sure it was still in operation. After verification of the address, Akers sent Barnes a letter on September 26, 2014, notifying him of the violation and giving him fifteen days to relocate and register a new address. The letter stated that failure to relocate and register a new address would "result in the issuance of a felony warrant for [Barnes's] arrest." Barnes never responded to the letter.
¶ 3. Wade Bryant, an investigator with the sheriff's department, testified that on February 2, 2015, he went to the address provided by Barnes to follow up on the violation. He spoke with Barnes's mother, and she confirmed that Barnes had been staying there and showed the officer his bedroom. Officer Bryant noted some male clothing in the room, and he confirmed the address's proximity to the day care center. Officer Bryant later interviewed Barnes, who admitted that he lived at the address and knew it was within a prohibited location. Barnes explained to Officer Bryant that he had nowhere else to live. On cross-examination, both Akers and Officer Bryant acknowledged that neither had informed Barnes he could register as homeless and be in compliance with the requirements. After the circuit court denied the defense's motion for a directed verdict, the defense rested.
¶ 4. The jury found Barnes guilty of the charge, and the trial judge sentenced him as a habitual offender to life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Barnes filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and had sheriff's personnel informed him he could have registered as homeless, he would have been in compliance with the sex-offender registration laws. The trial court denied the motion, and Barnes appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
DISCUS...
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