Barnes v. Winchell
Decision Date | 03 February 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-4008,95-4008 |
Citation | 105 F.3d 1111 |
Parties | Johnida W. BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Byron R. WINCHELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
David L. Day (argued and briefed), Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
George D. Jonson, Elizabeth A. McCord (argued and briefed), Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before NELSON, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
This appeal addresses whether absolute judicial immunity extends to actions taken by a state judge that were allegedly prosecutorial in nature. Defendant-Appellant, former Ohio Municipal Court Judge Byron R. Winchell, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of his absolute judicial immunity in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Johnida Barnes. Ms. Barnes alleges that Judge Winchell violated her constitutional rights and acted without jurisdiction in a nonjudicial capacity by assisting in the initiation of and maliciously continuing criminal prosecutions against her. For the reasons that follow, we hold that Judge Winchell is absolutely immune from suit for the complained-of actions and therefore reverse the district court's order.
Ms. Barnes's complaint alleges that, at all times pertinent to this action, Byron R. Winchell served as a judge of the Municipal Court of Chillicothe, Ross County, Ohio. On March 30, 1993, Scott A. Barnes and Carolyn Barnes, Scott's first wife, each filed a criminal complaint against Johnida W. Barnes, Scott's second, but at the time estranged, wife. Each complaint charged menacing by stalking, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (Banks-Baldwin West 1996). Compl. p 11. The law director for the City of Chillicothe had previously authorized Scott and Carolyn to file complaints against Johnida Barnes for criminal trespass in violation of OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2911.21 (Banks-Baldwin West 1996), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Compl. p 12. When Scott and Carolyn came before Judge Winchell, the judge directed that the charges against Ms. Barnes be "changed to allege that [Johnida Barnes] was engaged in a pattern of conduct knowingly causing ... Scott A. Barnes and Carolyn Barnes to believe that [she] would cause physical harm or distress" to them in violation of OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (Banks-Baldwin West 1996), menacing by stalking. Compl. p 13. According to Ms. Barnes, Judge Winchell thereafter "prepared or assisted in the preparation of one or both of the complaints" against her, and he notarized Carolyn's complaint. Compl. p 14. Ms. Barnes was subsequently arrested.
In June of 1993, at a scheduled pretrial, the Chillicothe prosecutor determined that the criminal cases against Ms. Barnes should be dismissed as frivolous. Compl. p 16. Nonetheless, Ms. Barnes asserts that Judge Winchell, the presiding judge, refused to dismiss the charges against her and maliciously continued to prosecute her. Id. On July 10, 1993, Ross County Probate Judge Gerald Ratcliffe removed Judge Winchell from the cases because Judge Winchell appeared to be biased against Ms. Barnes and because he acted as a prosecutor. Compl. p 17. Four days later, the charges against Ms. Barnes were dismissed. Compl. p 18.
On July 5, 1994, Ms. Barnes filed a civil action in U.S. district court against Judge Winchell, Scott Barnes, and Carolyn Barnes, alleging, inter alia, that Judge Winchell's actions subjected her to the deprivation of rights, privileges, and/or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the "right to be free of arrest and prosecution and to due process of law." Compl. p 25. Judge Winchell moved to dismiss all claims against him on the basis of absolute judicial immunity. On August 9, 1995, the district court dismissed all claims against Scott Barnes and Carolyn Barnes, but denied Judge Winchell's motion to dismiss. The sole issue on appeal is whether Judge Winchell is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Ms. Barnes's § 1983 suit.
As a threshold matter, we must consider our jurisdiction to review this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court has held that a district court's denial of a claim of immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ( ); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697-98, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (absolute presidential immunity); see also Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir.1996) ( ). As the Supreme Court reasoned, "the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. at 2815.
Recently, the Supreme Court elaborated on the appealability of denials of immunity in Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995): "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified-immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2159. Johnson, however, reaffirms Mitchell 's holding that orders denying immunity are immediately appealable to the extent that they concern "abstract issues of law" rather than determinations about factual disputes. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2158.
An argument can be made that the present action is superficially similar to Johnson. In denying Judge Winchell's motion to dismiss, the district court appears to base its decision on the presence of unsettled factual questions: Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. We do not, however, interpret such language as a finding that genuine factual disputes exist which implicate Johnson 's jurisdictional bar because of the crucial distinguishing feature here, namely, the procedural posture of this case. The present action came before the district court, as it comes before us, not on a motion for summary judgment but on a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, there cannot be any disputed questions of fact at this stage; the district court and this court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993); see also Wood v. Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600, 604 (6th Cir.1994) ( ). Thus, despite the language of the district court's order, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of Judge Winchell's motion to dismiss on the basis of absolute judicial immunity because our review solely involves applying principles of law to a given and assumed set of facts. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 n. 9 105 S.Ct. at 2816 n. 9 ( ); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1156-1157 (6th Cir.1996) ( ).
Because the availability of absolute judicial immunity here in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Archie, 95 F.3d at 440. As the proponent of the claim of absolute judicial immunity, Judge Winchell bears the burden of showing that such immunity is warranted. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 2169-70, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993).
It is a well-entrenched principle in our system of jurisprudence that judges are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). Immunity from a § 1983 suit for money damages is no exception. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1217-18. The doctrine of judicial immunity is justified "by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability." Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435, 113 S.Ct. at 2171. Thus, compelling public benefits outweigh the "unfairness and injustice to a litigant [that] may result on occasion, [because] 'it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own...
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