Barnett v. Barnett, 7176
Decision Date | 22 January 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 7176,7176 |
Citation | 95 Ariz. 226,388 P.2d 433 |
Parties | Martin BARNETT, Appellant, v. June Anne BARNETT, Appellee. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
James E. Flynn, Phoenix, for appellant.
Lewis, Roca, Scoville, Beauchamp & Linton, Phoenix, for appellee.
The parties hereto were divorced by decree of court on June 5, 1957. This appeal is from an order entered after the divorce denying the appellant's application to modify the decree. The portion of the decree sought to be modified provides:
In April of 1960, appellee, the wife, applied for an order to show cause alleging among other things, that appellant had stopped making payments under the order above quoted. The appellant answered urging that the court delete the alimony clause from the decree and cancel all requirements for payments of alimony from the time of appellee's remarriage. At the hearing, it was stipulated that appellee had remarried in August, 1959, and that she was now being adequately supported by her present husband. The lower court ruled in favor of appellee that:
'There being a permanent and final award of $6,000, which award was not appealed and is final, the same is not subject to modification on the petition of the wife or on the petition of the husband, or by operation of law.'
The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the remarriage of a wife automatically terminates an obligation to pay permanent alimony. Appellant contends that the great weight of authority throughout the United States supports the principle that a subsequent remarriage automatically terminates a husband's decretal obligation to pay alimony to his former wife. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270. Appellee does not quarrel with this general proposition. However, she contends that the lower court's decree was in effect a lump sum award which was due but not necessarily payable upon the entry of judgment. The decree deferring payment to future dates permitted appellant to pay in monthly installments a specific amount over a period of time until completely paid. This provision was of benefit to the appellant and did not change the nature of the award from that of a single lump sum payment. Where a lump sum payment is awarded, it constitutes an absolute judgment and cannot be subsequently modified. Cummings v. Lockwood, 84 Ariz. 335, 327 P.2d 1012. We held, quoting from Ziegenbein v. Damme, 138 Neb. 320, 292 N.W. 921, 923, on facts less conclusive than those presented in the instant case, that:
"Without discussing the matter further, it is our view that an unqualified allowance in gross, in a divorce decree, whether payable immediately in full or periodically in instalments, and whether intended solely as a property settlement or as an allowance for support, or both, is such a definite and final adjustment of mutual rights and obligations as to be capable of a present vesting and to constitute an absolute judgment, and the court cannot subsequently modify the amount thereof under section 42-324, Comp.St.Supp.1939." 84 Ariz. 339, 340, 327 P.2d 1016. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that we overrule Cummings on the grounds that A.R.S. § 25-321 does not impliedly except alimony in gross from its operation. A like argument was there urged and rejected. We have re-examined the reasons which impelled us to the conclusions expressed and are satisfied that the results reached were correct and conclusive of the instant appeal.
A.R.S. § 25-321 relates to the power of the court from the time after entry of the final judgment to alter, amend or revise a decree. By A.R.S. § 25-319, the court may direct the husband to pay to the wife such amounts as are necessary for support and maintenance...
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