Barnett v. Hodges, Case No. 14-cv-117-MJR
| Decision Date | 03 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-cv-117-MJR |
| Parties | ROBERT BARNETT, # R-64880, Plaintiff, v. MARC HODGES, ASSISTANT WARDEN STORM, COUNSELOR HENTON, and JOHN DOE TRUST FUND ADMINISTRATOR - LAWRENCE C.C., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center ("Lawrence"), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is serving two eight-year sentences, one for attempted murder, and the other for battery. Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied his constitutional rights to access the courts, when they failed to pay his partial appellate filing fee after he authorized payment from his inmate account.
The appeal at issue here was from an earlier civil rights suit brought by Plaintiff in this district, Barnett v. Bates, et al., 11-cv-722-MJR-SCW (). This Court dismissed the case on May 31, 2013, on several motions filed by defendants in that action (Docs. 107, 108 in Barnett I). Plaintiff timely appealed, and on June 21, 2013, this Court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in his appeal (Doc. 117 in Barnett I). The IFP order directed Plaintiff's custodian (he was housed in Lawrence at the time) to deduct a partial payment of the appellate fee in the amount of $12.19 from Plaintiff'saccount, and forward this sum to the Clerk of this Court.
Plaintiff asserts in the instant complaint that he sent a signed money voucher to the Trust Fund Office at Lawrence, authorizing the payment of his partial filing fee in accordance with this Court's order (Doc. 1, p. 4). In July 2013, he sent a request to Defendant Henton (correctional counselor) asking about the status of the payment request, because Plaintiff had not received back his copy of the payment voucher. Defendant Henton responded that the matter would be taken care of, because the Court's order had been sent directly to the Trust Fund Office.
On August 20, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to pay the initial partial filing fee (Doc. 122 in Barnett I; Doc. 11 in Seventh Circuit Appeal No. 13-2293). Plaintiff sent a notice to the appellate court, stating that he had authorized payment of the fee with his signed money voucher, and had followed up to inquire about the status of payment. However, the fee was never paid, and on October 30, 2013, the appellate court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for failure to pay the required docketing fee (Doc. 123 in Barnett I; Doc. 16 in Appeal No. 13-2293).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' refusal to process his money voucher for payment of the required appellate fee caused his appeal to be dismissed, thus denying Plaintiff his constitutional right to access the courts. He sues Warden Hodges and Assistant Warden Storm (who oversees the Inmate Trust Fund operations) in their official capacity for injunctive relief (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 5-6). He alleges that the unknown party (John Doe) Lawrence Trust Fund Administrator failed to carry out Plaintiff's request to make the court-ordered payment from his account, and that Defendant Henton failed to pursue his inquiry regarding non-payment of thefiling fee.
The Court may take judicial notice of public records such as court documents filed in its own electronic docket, as well as court records available on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") website (www.pacer.gov). See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff's civil rights claims in Barnett I survived the initial merits review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and he was granted leave to proceed IFP in this district court. In that case, Plaintiff raised due process and deliberate indifference claims. He asserted that prison officials had failed to protect him from a sexual assault at Big Muddy River Correctional Center, and that after he was attacked, they refused to investigate the incident, refused to place him in protective custody, denied him medical care, and filed a false disciplinary report against him. The prison adjustment committee had conducted a hearing on those disciplinary charges, and found that no sexual assault had taken place (See Doc. 107 in Barnett I). Plaintiff was found guilty of two disciplinary infractions (impeding an investigation and giving false information). This Court concluded that Plaintiff could not prevail on his due process and deliberate indifference claims without "imply[ing] the invalidity of" the judgment in the disciplinary proceeding, which ruled Plaintiff had not been assaulted. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Because Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Heck doctrine, his civil rights case was dismissed.
Upon dismissing Barnett I, the undersigned judge also determined that Plaintiff's claims were frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and assessed a "strike," citing Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
When Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of Barnett I, the undersigned granted his motion for leave to proceed on appeal as a pauper (this order, Doc. 117 in Barnett I, directed payment of the initial $12.19 partial fee). The order included a statement that the Court was unable to certify that the appeal was not taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).1 The "good faith" test means that the Court must "find that a reasonable person could suppose that the appeal has some merit." Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff's new access-to-courts claim in the instant case has necessitated a review of Barnett I. That review leads the undersigned to conclude that it was error to allow Plaintiff to proceed IFP in his appeal of Barnett I.
The Seventh Circuit has instructed that "an appeal in a frivolous suit cannot be 'in good faith' under § 1915(a)(3), because 'good faith' must be viewed objectively." Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Lee, 209 F.3d at 1026 (); Tolefree v. Cudahy, 49 F.3d 1243, 1244 (7th Cir. 1995) (). Under this authority, once the Court determined that Plaintiff's claims were wholly frivolous, he should not have been granted leave to pursue his appeal IFP. See Lee, 209 F.3d at 1027 (). Instead, this Court should have certified that the appeal was nottaken in good faith and denied leave to appeal IFP. See Hefley v. Bruch, 276 F. App'x 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2008) ().
Had this Court denied Plaintiff's motion to appeal IFP, Plaintiff could then have filed a motion in the appellate court for leave to proceed with the appeal IFP. In the event that he had done so and been granted leave to appeal IFP by the Seventh Circuit, he would still have been required to make a timely partial payment according to the formula in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), thus placing him in the same position with respect to the fee. Alternatively, if Plaintiff's motion to appeal IFP had been denied (by either this Court or the appellate court), he would have been required to pre-pay the entire $455.00 appellate filing/docketing fee before his appeal could proceed.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, as well as the procedural history of Barnett I, the Court concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Prisoners have a fundamental right of meaningful access to the courts, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), and prison officials have an affirmative duty to provide inmates with reasonable court access. Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1990). However, in order to maintain a constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim has been frustrated or impeded. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1996); see also Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir. 2006) ().
The dismissal of Plaintiff's appeal for non-payment of the partial appellate filing fee was clearly an impediment to his ability to pursue that matter. Even if the Court accepts at face value Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants were at fault for failing to pay the partial filing fee from his inmate account,2 Plaintiff must still demonstrate that his appeal was "non-frivolous." Otherwise, the complaint states no claim for denial of access to the courts.
This Court dismissed ...
To continue reading
Request your trial