Barnette v. Casey

• Decision Date: 10 March 1942
• Docket Number: 9274.
• Citation: 19 S.E.2d 621,124 W.Va. 143
• Parties: BARNETTE v. CASEY.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

19 S.E.2d 621

124 W.Va. 143

BARNETTE v. CASEY.

No. 9274.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 10, 1942

Rehearing Denied May 4, 1942.

Syllabus by the Court.

Kay Casto & Amos and Vincent V. Chaney, all of Charleston for plaintiff in error.

John T Simms and L. E. Poteet, both of Charleston, for defendant in error.

FOX President.

Joe Casey complains of the action of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County in affirming a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of said county against him and in favor of D. C. Barnette, for the sum of $170 and costs.

Barnette instituted his action against Casey before a justice of the peace and obtained a judgment, from which an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas where a trial by jury was had, resulting in a verdict upon which the judgment complained of was entered. Casey operated a parking lot in the City of Charleston, and Barnette, a traveling salesman using an automobile furnished him by his employer, delivered the same to an attendant and agent of Casey at the parking lot. With the automobile he delivered three keys: one known as the ignition key, another for a lock on the gasoline tank, and the third a key to a rear compartment or trunk of the automobile. At the time the automobile was delivered, Barnette removed therefrom a small piece of baggage, locked the baggage compartment, and then delivered the keys to the attendant. Two pieces of baggage, in which were packed various articles of wearing apparel, were, in fact, left in the baggage compartment. The cost price of the baggage and the wearing apparel was $297.95. The baggage and the clothing contained therein had been used by Barnette over varying periods of time, all of which appears from the evidence, and the jury, instead of a finding in his favor for the full amount paid therefor, returned a verdict of $170, indicating clearly that they gave consideration to the fact that, because of the use of the property in question, its value was probably less than the original cost. It may be said at this point that we see no error in the jury's verdict on the question of value; and we can not say that its finding as to value was incorrect, or that any improper evidence was introduced in relation thereto. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any prejudicial error in plaintiff's instruction No. 1. The reference therein to market value is not, in our opinion, justified as stating the correct basis of a finding of value in a case of this character. The market value of secondhand baggage and wearing apparel is necessarily much less than its value to the owner. We think the correct rule would be to ascertain the fair value of the property in question, taking into consideration all of the elements entering into the ascertainment of such value. The contention that this instruction assumes that the property was received by the defendant is not, we think, entitled to serious consideration.

In one sense of the word, the property was physically received by the defendant, but whether it was received under such conditions as to make him liable therefor is another question, one determinative of this case, and will be hereafter considered.

It is obvious that this case must be decided upon the law of bailments. "In general, bailment may be said to be a contractual relation. It has been said that a bailment is a contract which is governed by the same rules as are other contracts. Certainly, in a broad sense, the relationship of bailor and bailee results from contract, express or implied. This does not necessarily mean that an agreement inter partes is always necessary to create a bailment; it may be created by operation of law. It has been stated as a rule that no particular ceremony or actual meeting of minds is necessary; it is the element of lawful possession, however created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that creates the bailment, regardless of whether or not such possession is based on contract in the ordinary sense." 6 Am.Jur. 190. "In the ordinary case, the nature of the bailment requires that there be a delivery by the bailor and an acceptance by the bailee ***." 6 Am.Jur. 191. "Since the duties and responsibilities of a bailee cannot be thrust upon a person without his knowledge or against his consent, it is essential to a bailment that there be an acceptance of the subject matter." 6 C.J. 1104. "Since, *** the duties and responsibilities of a bailee cannot be thrust on a person without his knowledge or consent, or against his protest, it is essential to a bailment that there be an acceptance of the subject matter by the bailee. It is not requisite that the acceptance be actual; one that is constructive or implied is sufficient *** acceptance will not be inferred, however, unless there is something to show notice or knowledge on the part of the alleged bailee that the goods are in fact in his possession, and that they are the property of the bailor." 8 C.J.S., Bailments, § 15, p. 249.

Under these authorities the delivery of the automobile at the parking lot, and its acceptance by the attendant in charge, created the relationship of bailor and bailee as to the automobile, and the tools and fixtures connected therewith, and imposed upon the bailee the obligation to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the safety of the property so delivered. We think it also included any other property in plain view, or of which the bailee had notice express or implied. There is no evidence in this case that the defendant, bailee, had any notice or knowledge of the two pieces of baggage, or the property contained therein, which were left in the rear or baggage compartment of the automobile, and this raises the question of whether, in these circumstances, there was in fact a bailment of this particular property. We...