Barnhart v. Brinegar
| Decision Date | 06 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73CV57-W-2.,73CV57-W-2. |
| Citation | 362 F. Supp. 464 |
| Parties | John W. BARNHART et al., Plaintiffs, v. Claude BRINEGAR, Secretary, Department of Transportation, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Howard E. Bodney, of Gage, Tucker, Hodges, Kreamer, Kelly & Varner, Kansas City, Mo., Byron Constance, of Reese, Constance, Slayton, Stewart & Stewart, Independence, Mo., Tom J. Helms, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.
Earl H. Schrader, Jr., Missouri State Highway Commission, Vernon A. Poschel, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.
This is an action by four real property owners in Jackson County, Missouri, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory judgment, specific performance, and injunction, against the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) and the Missouri State Highway Commission (Commission.)1 The Commission is attempting to acquire five tracts of plaintiffs' real property in Jackson County by condemnation for a federally assisted state highway improvement project. Plaintiffs' complaint was filed January 31, 1973. We issued an order on February 2, 1973, temporarily restraining the Commission from prosecuting its condemnation action against plaintiffs' property in the Jackson County Circuit Court. The Commission consented to continuing the temporary restraining order until the hearing on plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. That hearing and the trial on the merits were consolidated under Rule 65(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The consolidated hearing and trial were held April 13, 1973. The Commission again consented to continuing the temporary restraining order pending the Courts' final judgment.
Plaintiffs' complaint is in two counts. We will consider each count separately.
The facts necessary for disposition of Count I have been stipulated. Plaintiffs are residents of Jackson County, Missouri, and are co-owners of the five tracts of land in Jackson County that are the subject of this action. These tracts abut and are approximate to U. S. Highway 24, a Federal Aid Primary System Highway, at its intersection with U. S. Highway 71 Bypass. For several years the Commission has pursued a project to improve U. S. Highway 24 by widening it from the eastern city limits of Kansas City, Missouri, to Missouri State Route 7. The federal government has been involved in this project since September 17, 1965.
In connection with the highway improvement project, the Commission has attempted to acquire plaintiffs' five tracts of land. In December, 1970, the Commission engaged two appraisers to appraise plaintiffs' property. The appraisals were submitted to the Commission between July and December, 1971. On January 10, 1972, the Commission made a written offer to plaintiffs in the amount of $232,510 for the purchase of their property. The Commission also provided plaintiffs with a booklet entitled "When a highway comes your way." Plaintiffs rejected the Commission's offer.
On March 14, 1972, the State Director of Highways gave the Federal Highway Administration written assurances pursuant to section 305 of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (the Act)2 that the Commission would comply with the real property acquisition practices delineated in section 301 of the Act3 as a condition to receiving any federal financial assistance in the highway improvement project.4 These assurances were approved by the Federal Highway Administration.5
Updated appraisals of plaintiffs' property were submitted to the Commission between June and August, 1972. On September 26, 1972, the Commission made a second written offer to plaintiffs in the increased amount of $246,050 for the purchase of their property. Plaintiffs again were provided a booklet entitled "When a highway comes your way." Plaintiffs rejected the Commission's offer on September 26, 1972.
On October 24, 1972, the Commission initiated an action in the Jackson County Circuit Court seeking condemnation of plaintiffs' property. This action was authorized by a Commission resolution of January 31, 1972.
Count I alleges federal question jurisdiction under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.6 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that several of the land acquisition practices delineated in section 301 of the Act have not been observed by the Commission to the greatest extent practicable under Missouri law. Section 301 establishes nine mandatory practices for federal agencies in the acquisition of real property for federal programs. The following are the two practices delineated in section 301 relevant to this action:
Plaintiffs allege that these provisions are applicable to the Commission by virtue of the Commission's March 14, 1972, written assurances to the Federal Highway Administration under section 305 of the Act that it would comply with the acquisition practices of section 301. Section 305 of the Act provides the following:
Defendants have challenged plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegation, asserting that section 102(a) of the Act effectively precludes judicial review of a state agency's action under the acquisition practices of section 301. Section 102(a) provides the following:
(a) The provisions of section 301 of title III of this Act create no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation.9
Defendants direct the Court's attention to four cases construing section 102(a) to preclude judicial review of a state agency's acquisition practices. Nall Motors, Inc. v. City of Iowa City, Civil No. 72-47-D (S.D.Iowa, Jan. 2, 1973) (not reported); Martinez v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 347 F.Supp. 903 (E.D.Pa.1972); Rubin v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 347 F.Supp. 555 (E.D.Pa. 1972); Will-Tex Plastics Mfg., Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 346 F.Supp. 654 (E.D.Pa. 1972). In each of these cases the district courts found that section 301 of the Act does not create rights in favor of property owners. The decisions rested on the "no rights or liabilities" language of section 102(a) of the Act and upon the congressional intent behind section 102(a) as expressed in H.R.Rep.No.91-1656, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. ___, 1970 U. S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 5850, 5854-55.10 Plaintiffs suggest, however, that the district courts in the cited cases erred in relying on the House Report. Because of this contention, we have examined the history of the Act at great length. Although we do not agree completely with plaintiffs' suggestion, we find that subsequent Senate action on section 102 of the bill detracts significantly from the House Report as a reliable reflection of congressional intent. For this reason we will review the entire legislative history of the Act with a view toward discerning the intent behind section 102(a) of the Act.
Before doing so, however, the need for clarity dictates that we offer a brief explanation of the Act's provisions. Title I of the Act contains two sections.11 Section 101 provides definitions. Section 102 delimits the effects of the Act on property acquisitions. Specifically, section 102(a) contains the "no rights and liabilities" language which we must interpret. Title II of the Act is concerned principally with aid to persons displaced by federal or federally assisted state projects.12 Section 201 declares the purpose of the title:
The purpose of this title is to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Clear Sky Car Wash, LLC v. City of Chesapeake
...legislative history in its Remand Order. In so doing, the Court considered the most noted opinion on the question, Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1973),13 and found such opinion to be well reasoned. The Court again finds Barnhart instructive and is again unpersuaded by Pla......
-
Starke v. Secretary, US Dept. of Housing, CIV-76-0286-D.
...explicit terms it applies only to that section. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Policies Act see Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F.Supp. 464, 467 (W.D.Mo.1973). The Court in Barnhart analyzes the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a) and concludes that, under this section,......
-
Clear Sky Car Wash, LLC v. City of Chesapeake
...legislative history in its Remand Order. In so doing, the Court considered the most noted opinion on the question, Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F.Supp. 464 (W.D.Mo.1973),13 and found such opinion to be well reasoned. The Court again finds Barnhart instructive and is again unpersuaded by Plaint......
-
State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Little
...are cited as authority for the right to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See e.g. Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464, 468-473 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Ackerley Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990 (11th Cir.1989); Whitmier & Ferris Co., Inc., v. City......