Barnhart v. Morales
| Decision Date | 05 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14–12–00167–CV,14–12–00167–CV |
| Citation | 459 S.W.3d 733 |
| Parties | Vonda Barnhart, Appellant v. Sylvia Morales and Luis Perez, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Joe Michael Russel II, Temple, TX, for Appellant.
Lucy Haroutunian Forbes, Gregg Anderson, Houston, TX, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.
In this car wreck case, appellant Vonda Barnhart appeals from a final judgment signed following a jury trial, raising nine issues. In her first two issues, Barnhart contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted medical records and a police report containing the results of a blood serum alcohol test performed at the hospital following the wreck. According to Barnhart, the trial court should have sustained her hearsay objection because the records were untrustworthy given that appellees, Sylvia Morales and Luis Perez, failed to offer evidence establishing a complete chain of custody for Barnhart's blood sample. We overrule both issues because, in a civil case, chain of custody goes to the weight to be given the evidence, not to its admissibility.
Barnhart's remaining issues concern the damages awarded to appellees. Barnhart challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award of past physical impairment damages to Morales and the award of future physical impairment damages to Perez. Because the record on appeal contains factually sufficient evidence that both appellees experienced physical impairment as a result of the injuries they sustained in the wreck, we overrule these issues. Barnhart next asserts that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the award of future mental anguish damages to both appellees. We overrule these issues because the jury's awards were for both physical pain and mental anguish, and Barnhart does not argue on appeal that there is insufficient evidence of future physical pain. Barnhart also challenges the final judgment's award of exemplary damages to appellees. In Barnhart's view, there is factually insufficient evidence supporting the jury's gross negligence finding. We overrule this issue because Barnhart failed to raise it in her motion for new trial. In her final two issues, Barnhart contends the exemplary damages award is excessive and violates her constitutional due process rights. We overrule both issues because the evidence supports the exemplary damages found by the jury and the amount does not run afoul of the constitutional limitations on exemplary damage awards. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Appellees and their children spent Sunday, June 7, 2009, at the Magnolia River on the east side of Houston. On their way home that evening on Interstate 10, Morales's truck began to have serious mechanical problems.1 Morales maneuvered the truck to her right and into the safety zone where the southbound flyover of Beltway 8 merged onto westbound Interstate 10. Morales was able to get most of the truck out of the right hand lane of Interstate 10, but part of the rear end of Morales's truck remained in that lane of traffic. Unable to move the truck any further, Morales put her emergency flashers on and appellees transferred their two children to the car of Morales's brother, who had been following Morales home from the river. Appellees, not wanting to abandon the truck on a busy freeway, decided to remain with the truck to wait for a tow truck. Perez stood in the back of the pick-up truck waving oncoming traffic away from the stalled truck while Morales sat in the driver's seat with her seatbelt fastened.
June 7 was Barnhart's birthday. That afternoon, Barnhart went to celebrate her birthday at the Riverside Inn, described as a biker bar, restaurant, and marina on the east side of Houston. Barnhart spent more than two hours that afternoon at the Riverside Inn celebrating with about twenty acquaintances. Barnhart admitted that she consumed two beers and a shot of Captain Morgan's rum while at the Riverside Inn. Barnhart left the Riverside Inn and was driving westbound on Interstate 10 when she hit the back of Morales's truck. Barnhart testified that she never saw the truck, Perez, or Morales prior to the collision. Barnhart testified that she did not swerve, apply her brakes, or take any other action to avoid hitting the truck. According to Barnhart, she could not see because the setting sun was shining in her eyes.
Arturo Islas was merging onto Interstate 10 from Beltway 8 and he saw the collision. Islas pulled over and went to the crash scene to render assistance. Islas checked Perez's condition, called 9–1–1, and then went to check on Barnhart, who was still in her vehicle. According to Islas, Barnhart was bleeding and he told her not to move. Islas observed beer cans inside the car and dollar bills attached to Barnhart's shirt.2 Islas then checked on Morales, who was still inside her truck. Islas gave Morales his name and phone number and left the scene before the police or ambulance arrived.
As a result of the collision, which occurred about ten minutes after Morales' truck had stalled, Perez was thrown out of the back of the truck. Perez suffered a broken right wrist and a broken right ankle.
Morales sustained a back injury, which was eventually diagnosed as two herniated lumbar discs in her lower back. Barnhart suffered injuries to her face. Morales, Perez, and Barnhart were all taken by ambulance to Memorial Hermann Hospital.
Harris County Sheriff's Deputy Chris Hughes responded to the accident. Deputy Hughes arrived at the scene after the ambulance. After checking on the status of Morales and Perez, Hughes approached Barnhart, who was standing next to her vehicle. When Hughes spoke to Barnhart, he smelled alcohol on her breath. Hughes was unable to conduct sobriety checks on Barnhart at the scene due to the need to transport her to the hospital, but he suspected she was intoxicated. Hughes based his suspicion on his observations that Barnhart's eyes were red and bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and she had the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from her person. Hughes also noticed that she had money pinned to her shirt. Hughes went to the hospital to provide information to the hospital and to also “check for impairment.” Hughes attempted to conduct a field sobriety test on Barnhart at the hospital, but she refused.
Barnhart's Memorial Hermann medical records report that after she arrived at the hospital, the staff treating her observed that Barnhart appeared intoxicated, her speech was slurred, and she smelled of alcohol. Barnhart's medical records also indicate that she was uncooperative and had to be restrained. During her treatment, the hospital took a blood sample and performed a blood serum alcohol test approximately one hour and forty minutes after the wreck. Barnhart's records report the result of that test as .335 percent.
Wayne Snodgrass, a medical doctor and toxicologist, explained during the trial that an alcohol test conducted on whole blood would produce a result slightly lower than a serum alcohol test. Dr. Snodgrass went on to explain that a blood serum alcohol test result can be converted to the result that a blood alcohol test would show. Dr. Snodgrass then performed that conversion and testified that Barnhart's blood alcohol level was .28 percent. Dr. Snodgrass also testified that Barnhart's blood alcohol level would have been higher at the time of the wreck and he opined that her blood alcohol level at that point in time would have been .31 percent. Dr. Snodgrass testified that given Barnhart's blood alcohol content, it was medically impossible that she had only consumed two beers and a single shot of rum. Dr. Snodgrass opined that Barnhart would have had to consume between 13 and 17 alcoholic drinks to reach that blood alcohol level.
Dr. Snodgrass testified that the legal blood alcohol limit in Texas is .08 percent, and therefore Barnhart's blood alcohol level was three and a half times higher. Dr. Snodgrass opined that Barnhart would have been severely impaired as a result of her alcohol consumption and should not have been driving. Dr. Snodgrass explained this was true despite descriptions in Barnhart's medical records that she was alert and oriented. According to Dr. Snodgrass, someone who is a regular drinker, a person often described as able to hold their liquor, might not appear impaired, but the level of impairment is the same as for a person who has no tolerance at all to alcohol. According to Dr. Snodgrass, a person driving a car with a .28 percent blood alcohol level would be unable to comprehend that there was a stalled vehicle ahead in time to maneuver around the stalled vehicle.
During the trial, both Morales and Perez testified about the injuries they received in the wreck as well as the adverse impact those injuries have had on their lives.
Morales testified that her back injury was painful and she attended physical therapy for about two months in an effort to reduce the pain. Eventually, when the pain did not subside, Morales received three steroid shots over a six-week period. Morales testified that the steroid shots alleviated the pain for a period of time, but the pain always returned. Morales also testified that she continued doing the exercises she learned during physical therapy at home.
Morales then turned to the impact her injury has had on her lifestyle. According to Morales, she used to spend time with her children at the park, but she could no longer do so because of her back pain. Morales also testified that she can no longer lift heavy objects because of the pain. Morales's medical records indicate that her injury impacted her life in other ways as well. The records show that her back pain (1) prevented her from walking more than one-quarter mile, (2) made it too painful to sit for more than 30 minutes or drive for more than an hour, (3) eliminated her social life, (4) eliminated her sex life,...
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...procedure was a factual statement, not an opinion or complex diagnosis of a medical condition subject to exclusion. Barnhart v. Morales , 459 S.W.3d 733 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2015). Occupants of a stalled vehicle brought a personal injury action against the motorist who collided with ......
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