Barnhill v. Smithway Motor Express

• Decision Date: 12 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 92,179.,92,179.
• Citation: 991 P.2d 527,1999 OK 82
• Parties: Randy G. BARNHILL, Petitioner, v. SMITHWAY MOTOR EXPRESS, Great West Casualty Company, and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

991 P.2d 527

1999 OK 82

Randy G. BARNHILL, Petitioner, v. SMITHWAY MOTOR EXPRESS, Great West Casualty Company, and The Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 92,179.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

October 12, 1999.

Bob Burke, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Petitioner.

Kent R. McGuire and Derrick T. DeWitt of Whitten, McGuire, Terry & Roselius, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Respondents, Smithway Motor Express and Great West Casualty Company.

LAVENDER, J:

¶ 1 The issue on certiorari is whether the decision of an Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court three-judge panel is supported by competent evidence. The decision affirmed a trial judge's denial of benefits to claimant, a truck driver, for injury suffered at his home on the last day of his vacation, when he fell off the step(s) of employer-owned tractor (cab) while attempting to put a small refrigerator owned by him into the cab. The trial judge's denial was based on finding the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. We hold the panel decision is supported by competent evidence and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) erred in vacating it and remanding for a compensation award.

PART I. BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.

¶ 2 To be compensable under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act (Act), 85 O.S.1991, § 1 et seq., as amended, an injury must arise out of and in the course of an employee's employment. 85 O.S. Supp. 1997, § 11(A); Nineteenth Seed Co. v. Townsend, 1964 OK 183, 394 P.2d 531, 533. The issues of whether an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment are ordinarily viewed as involving factual determinations to be resolved by the compensation court under the circumstances of each particular case. See Morris v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK 174, 606 P.2d 1129, 1130

; Garr v. Collins, 208 Okla. 113, 253 P.2d 838, 839 Second Syllabus (1953). The burden of proof is on claimant to show the disability for which compensation is sought was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Jarvis v. Hopkins, 1967 OK 209, 434 P.2d 208

First Syllabus. Upon claimant falls the responsibility to adduce sufficient factual proof on these issues to establish compensability, and it is he/she that carries the burden of both producing evidence and persuading the trier on these critical matters. Corbett v. Express Personnel, 1997 OK 40, 936 P.2d 932, 934 f.n. 5; American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 1995 OK 58, 903 P.2d 288, 291.

¶ 3 In that the questions are factual in nature, an appellate court uses the any-competent-evidence review standard in examining a compensation court's resolutions in regard thereto. American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, supra, 903 P.2d at 290. This standard requires the compensation tribunal's non-jurisdictional findings not be disturbed on review if supported by competent proof. Id. Only where there is no conflict in the evidence, and no opposite inferences may be drawn from undisputed proof, is it proper to treat such matters as questions of law. Lanman v. Oklahoma County Sheriff's Office, 1998 OK 37, 958 P.2d 795, 798; Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 1982 OK 120, 653 P.2d 201, 203; Rush Const. Co. v. Woodward, 159 Okla. 72, 14 P.2d 409 Second Syllabus (1932). Whenever conflicting/inconsistent inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, the issue is one of fact, not one of law. Lanman, supra, 958 P.2d at 798 f.n. 4. In the final analysis, only when there is a lack of competent evidence to support a compensation court's determination(s) as to whether an injury does or does not arise out of and in the course of employment may an appellate court disturb a trial court's decision [Id. at 798] — if there is competent proof the decision must be sustained.

PART II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

¶ 4 In April 1998 Randy G. Barnhill (claimant), a truck driver for respondent, Smithway Motor Express (employer)¹ sought benefits in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court for a back injury. In June 1998 a hearing was held on the issues of temporary total disability and continuing medical treatment. In defense, employer asserted the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Claimant was the sole live witness at the hearing and his testimony supplied the only depiction of the circumstances surrounding the accident.²

¶ 5 The accident occurred on March 31, 1998, the last day of an approximate week long vacation for claimant. In the afternoon of the 31st, at his home, he fell off the step(s) of employer-owned tractor (cab) while attempting, with his wife's assistance, to put a small refrigerator owned by him into the cab.³ The fall injured his back. After the fall, claimant used a home jacuzzi to see if that would help his back. Apparently, it did not remedy the situation and he called employer's after-hours dispatch to inform employer of the accident. He then went to a hospital emergency room. As of the June hearing, he had not returned to work.

¶ 6 Claimant testified he used the refrigerator to store the meals (food and beverage) he consumed on his over-the-road trips as a truck driver for employer. He also testified that, immediately before attempting to load the refrigerator into the cab, he had successfully loaded into it a week's worth of clothing, his own C.B. radio, and the bedding he would use during his next trip on the road. The refrigerator, which was empty, was the last item attempted to be loaded on the 31st.

¶ 7 Claimant acknowledged the refrigerator was for his own personal convenience and he traveled with it because he saved a substantial amount of money through its use, rather than stopping at commercial eateries (e.g. truck stops) for his meals. He also testified, in his view, bringing the refrigerator was a necessity for him because of the cost savings. He admitted no one with employer told him to bring the refrigerator on his trips — i.e. whether or not to bring it was a matter of his personal choice. He also testified he knew other truck drivers who worked for employer that brought refrigerators on their trips. Claimant also testified using the refrigerator saved time on his trips because he could eat out of it in fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by stopping at the side of the road or at a rest area, whereas it would take an hour to an hour and a half to stop at a regular truck stop restaurant.

¶ 8 Claimant also explained, the refrigerator was powered by plugging it into the cigarette lighter in the cab and he put it in the day before he was to leave on an over-the-road trip because it took about five hours to cool down. His testimony also revealed he understood that on April 1st he was to drive the tractor to employer's terminal to hook a trailer up to it and he was to begin an approximate week-long stint as a truck driver for employer, although he did not know his itinerary as of March 31st. He also testified he talked to one of employer's dispatchers the day before the accident, who told him he would be beginning a trip on the 1st and he was to report to the terminal at 7:30 a. m. No direct evidence is contained in the record that 7:30 a.m. was somehow an unusual or earlier than normal time for claimant either to begin an over-the-road trip or to report to the terminal when a trailer was required to be picked up there before commencing an over-the-road trip.

¶ 9 At the time of the accident, claimant had been working for employer for about twenty-five (25) months. His testimony disclosed he was paid on a mileage basis, but the details concerning how the mileage-pay worked are not explicitly contained in the record. In such regard, the record contains no evidence that would mandate a finding he was paid mileage for the distance traveled in driving the cab from his home to the employer's premises (i.e. the terminal) where he would pick up — i.e. hook it up to — a trailer. There is also no evidence that claimant was paid anything by employer to keep the cab at his home or that he was in any manner reimbursed for doing so. Also, the record contains no explanation as to why he was allowed to keep the cab at his home during his vacation or what benefit, if any, employer gained thereby, although claimant did essentially testify it was normal for him to keep the cab there in between his over-the-road trips. Further, no direct evidence was presented that eating out of his refrigerator, rather than patronizing commercial eateries, in any manner lessened the mileage traveled between his destinations so that employer would be liable for less pay to him for any of his over-the-road trips.⁴

¶ 10 Based on the above evidence, the trial judge denied claimant benefits. The denial was anchored on finding he did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. A three-judge panel affirmed and claimant appealed. The COCA vacated the panel's decision and remanded with direction to award compensation, ruling, as a matter of law, the evidence mandated a finding the back injury arose out of and in the course of claimant's employment. Employer sought certiorari, which we previously granted. We now vacate the decision of the COCA and sustain the panel's decision because it is supported by competent evidence.

PART III. THE DECISION DENYING BENEFITS, BASED ON FINDING CLAIMANT'S INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, IS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT PROOF.

¶ 11 Workers' compensation benefits are due an injured worker only when the injury both arises out of and in the course of employment. Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, supra, 653 P.2d at 202. The two elements are separate and distinct and both must be met before an injury comes within the confines of the Act. Id. The phrase "in the course of" employment relates to the time, place or circumstances under which an injury occurs. Id; Cudd Pressure Control v. McLemore, 1996 OK CIV APP 9, 916 P.2d 850, 852. To be considered in the course...