Barnhill v. State
| Decision Date | 10 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. SC00-547.,SC00-547. |
| Citation | 834 So.2d 836 |
| Parties | Arthur BARNHILL, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Arthur Barnhill, III. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm both the conviction for first-degree murder and the death sentence.
Arthur Barnhill, III (Barnhill), was raised by his grandparents after his mother essentially abandoned him and his father was imprisoned. When he was 20 years of age, Barnhill's grandparents asked him to leave the house because Barnhill did not follow their rules. He went to live with the family of his friend, Michael Jackson, a codefendant in this case. He lived with the Jacksons for approximately two weeks before he was asked to leave their home as well. Barnhill decided to go to New York, where his girlfriend lived. To get there, Barnhill planned to steal a car and money from Earl Gallipeau, who was 84 years old. Gallipeau was a lawn service customer of Barnhill's grandfather. Barnhill and Gallipeau met when Barnhill did lawn work for his grandfather at Gallipeau's house.
On Sunday, August 6, 1995, Barnhill and Michael Jackson walked to Gallipeau's house to steal Gallipeau's car. They entered the house through the garage and waited in the kitchen for approximately two hours. Gallipeau was in another room watching television. According to Michael Jackson, it was not until they were in Gallipeau's kitchen that Barnhill revealed his plan to kill Gallipeau before taking the car. At that point, Jackson abandoned the enterprise and left. At least one witness saw Michael Jackson walking alone in Gallipeau's neighborhood away from Gallipeau's house.
When Gallipeau got up from watching television and went into the kitchen, Barnhill ambushed him and attempted to strangle him. When the attempt failed, Barnhill got a towel to use as a ligature around Gallipeau's neck. The second attempt was unsuccessful, so Barnhill removed Gallipeau's belt from around his waist and wrapped it around Gallipeau's neck four times, breaking Gallipeau's neck and killing him. Barnhill then dragged Gallipeau through the house to a back bedroom and left him there.
Barnhill took Gallipeau's money, wallet, keys, and car, and eventually met Jelani Jackson, Michael Jackson's brother. Barnhill and Jelani Jackson drove to New York and Barnhill went to his girlfriend's apartment. Shortly thereafter, New York police located Gallipeau's vehicle, found Barnhill, and arrested him on an old warrant.
Barnhill told police that he was at Gallipeau's house with Jelani Jackson, but that Jelani Jackson actually killed Gallipeau and he only held Gallipeau's hands down to help. This, Barnhill indicated, explained the presence of Gallipeau's blood on his shirt. Barnhill filed a motion to suppress his statement to police and evidence obtained during his arrest, which the trial court denied. Within ten days after the suppression hearing, defense counsel requested a competency hearing for Barnhill. After counsel requested the competency hearing, he filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge based on certain comments made at the suppression hearing. The trial judge denied the motion to disqualify. Barnhill thereafter entered pleas of no contest to first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling while armed, armed robbery, and grand theft. The trial court made a finding of guilt as to each charge.1
Both the State and Barnhill presented testimony and evidence during the penalty phase. The State called twenty-four witnesses, including the medical examiner, Gallipeau's neighbors and housekeeper who called police to investigate after Gallipeau's wallet was found in the street, the police officer who found Gallipeau's body, police officers from New York who arrested Barnhill and questioned Jelani Jackson, and Jelani and Michael Jackson. Barnhill called thirteen witnesses, including various family members and friends who testified to Barnhill's home life, upbringing, and mental and emotional performance. Barnhill called Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Gutman to testify to his mental health and presented the perpetuated testimony of Dr. Feegel.
The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three. The trial court then conducted a Spencer2 hearing, at which Barnhill testified. After considering the jury recommendation action, evidence presented at the penalty phase trial, additional evidence in mitigation presented at the Spencer hearing, including Barnhill's own testimony, memoranda and arguments of counsel, the trial court imposed the following sentence: On count I of the indictment, the trial court sentenced Barnhill to death for the first-degree murder of Gallipeau; on count II, the trial court sentenced Barnhill to life for burglary while armed; on count III, the trial court sentenced Barnhill to life for robbery with a deadly weapon; on count IV, the trial sentenced Barnhill to five years for grand theft. Each sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence of death.
Barnhill raises seven issues on direct appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for disqualification; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to strike two jurors for cause who stated they had deep-rooted beliefs in favor of the death penalty; (3) the trial court erred in limiting the defense's relevant voir dire examination by repeatedly interrupting counsel and chastising him in front of the venire; (4) the trial court erred in denying the defense motion for continuance so that the defense could present the live testimony of its expert; (5) the trial court erred in adjudicating and sentencing Barnhill for both the robbery of Gallipeau and the theft of Gallipeau's automobile; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on statutory mitigating circumstances which the defense had waived; (7) the trial court included improper aggravating circumstances, excluded existing mitigating circumstances, and failed to properly find that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. We discuss each of Barnhill's claims below.
Barnhill argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge. We disagree and affirm the ruling that the motion was insufficient. Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (2001), gives litigants the substantive right to seek disqualification of a judge. Rule 2.160, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, sets forth the procedure to be followed in the disqualification process.
Section 38.10, provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an affidavit stating fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the court where the suit is pending on account of the prejudice of the judge of that court against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party, the judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this state for the substitution of judges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that any such bias or prejudice exists and shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
Similarly, rule 2.160 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The test a trial court must use in reviewing a motion to disqualify is set forth in MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1990). In MacKenzie, we held that "the standard for determining whether a motion is legally sufficient is `whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.'" Id. at 1335 (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)). Whether the motion is "legally sufficient" is a question of law. See Id. It follows that the proper standard of review is de novo. See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2000)
; Sume v. State, 773 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Barnhill's motion to disqualify was based on the trial judge's finding that Barnhill was untruthful when he testified that he was living with his girlfriend in New York. The judge's...
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