Barone v. County of Suffolk

• Decision Date: 14 June 2011
• Citation: 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 05213,85 A.D.3d 836,925 N.Y.S.2d 614
• Parties: Cheryle BARONE, respondent,v.COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, appellant, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

85 A.D.3d 836

925 N.Y.S.2d 614

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 05213

Cheryle BARONE, respondent,

v.COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, appellant, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 14, 2011.

Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Christopher A. Jeffreys of counsel), for appellant.Rossillo & Licata, P.C., Westbury, N.Y. (Joseph J. Licata, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOSEPH COVELLO, RUTH C. BALKIN, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant County of Suffolk appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated October 7, 2010, as denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the contention of the defendant County of Suffolk, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The County failed to establish, prima facie, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity ( see Bresciani v. County of Dutchess, N.Y., 62 A.D.3d 639, 640, 878 N.Y.S.2d 410; Appelbaum v. County of Sullivan, 222 A.D.2d 987, 988–989, 635 N.Y.S.2d 349; see generally Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893). Specifically, the County failed to establish, as a matter of law, that once it was made aware of the alleged dangerous condition involving the subject intersection, it undertook an adequate study of the intersection ( see Bresciani v. County of Dutchess, N.Y., 62 A.D.3d at 640, 878 N.Y.S.2d 410; Scott v. City of New York, 16 A.D.3d 485, 486, 791 N.Y.S.2d 184). Moreover, the County failed to establish, prima facie, that there existed a reasonable basis for its planning decisions for the subject intersection or that it continued to effectively review its plan in light of its actual operation ( see Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d at 284, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893; Alexander v. Eldred, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 466–467, 483 N.Y.S.2d 168, 472 N.E.2d 996; Scott v. City of New York, 16 A.D.3d at 486, 791 N.Y.S.2d 184; Burgess v. Town of Hempstead, 161 A.D.2d 616, 617, 555 N.Y.S.2d 396). Also, contrary to the County's contention, it failed to establish, as a matter of...