Barr v. Builders, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 40144,40144
• Citation: 296 P.2d 1106,179 Kan. 617
• Parties: Charles C. BARR, Appellee, v. BUILDERS, Inc., and Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, Appellants.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1106

296 P.2d 1106

179 Kan. 617

Charles C. BARR, Appellee, v. BUILDERS, Inc., and Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, Appellants.

No. 40144.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 5, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The jurisdiction of this court in workmen's compensation cases is specifically limited to questions of law.

2. In reviewing a record to determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding, this court is required to review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and if substantial evidence appears therein, such finding is conclusive and will not be disturbed on review, even though the record discloses some evidence which might warrant the trial court making a finding to the contrary.

3. The term 'substantial evidence,' when applied by this court in reviewing an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, means evidence possessing something of substance and relevant consequence and carrying with it fitness to induce conviction that the award is proper, or furnishing substantial basis of fact from which issue tendered can be reasonably resolved.

4. Conversion hysteria (traumatic neurosis) following physical injury long has been recognized as being compensable under workmen's compensation laws, not only in England from whence we took our compensation act but in this country under statutes quite like our own, even though financial, marital or other worries may have contributed thereto.

5. The record in a workmen's compensation case is examined, considered and held: That there was substantial evidence to support the award and the judgment for the claimant.

Byron Brainerd, Wichita, argued the cause, and Claude I. Depew, Lawrence Weigand, Lawrence Curfman, Charles W. Harris, Orval J. Kaufman, J. Ruse McCarthy, Thomas A. Wood, and Donald A. Bell, Wichita, were with him on the briefs, for appellants.

Ralph B. Foster, Wichita, argued the cause, and Sidney L. Foulston, Jr., Lloyd F. Cooper, W. Jay Esco and Dale H. Cooper, Wichita, were with him on the briefs, for appellee.

FATZER, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case where the commissioner rendered an award in favor of the claimant, which was affirmed by the district court, and an appeal has been taken from that judgment by Builders, Inc., and its insurance carrier.

The appellant has made four specifications of error, which are briefed under one general heading, i. e., whether there was substantial evidence introduced before the examiner and affirmed by the trial court, upon which to base claimant's award. Both parties agree this is the only point in the appeal. Most of the usual preliminary features of a compensation case such as employment, being under the Act, notice of alleged accident, demand for compensation, and amount of wages are not controverted. No point is urged as to the fact of claimant's accident, which occurred July 20, 1954, or about his actual disability, so, the serious question presented is the sufficiency of the evidence of causal connection between the accident and the disability.

Specifically, appellant contends the expert testimony, which diagnosed claimant's disability as conversion hysteria, was highly speculative and conjectural and could not form the basis of an award, since one of the factors which might have produced the disability, i. e., the financial difficulty claimant experienced in August, 1954, was not considered in forming the opinion, and further, that such testimony was indefinite with respect to traumatic relationship between the injury and the disability.

Omitting portions relating to compensation and expenses found to be due under the Workmen's Compensation Act, G.S.1949, 44-501 et seq., the all-decisive finding made by the commissioner in making his award, which was substantially adopted and approved by the trial court in rendering its judgment, in part, reads:

'It is found, in addition to the stipulations, that claimant was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent on July 20, 1954, from which claimant suffered temporary total disability commencing August 21, 1954. * * *'

As preliminary, we point out that under G.S.1955 Supp. 44-556, appellate jurisdiction in compensation cases is confined to reviewing questions of law only. In so doing, it is necessary to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence which tends to support the trial court's factual findings, and this court is required to review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Under the rule established by the decisions of this court, such findings are conclusive and will not be disturbed on review even though the record discloses some evidence which might warrant the trial court making a finding to the contrary. Andrews v. Bechtel Construction Co., 175 Kan. 885, 267 P.2d 469; Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P.2d 259; McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 277 P.2d 652; Evans v. Board of Education of Hays, 178 Kan. 275, 284 P.2d 1068; and, Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 292 P.2d 729. Numerous decisions of like import will be found in 9 West's Kansas Digest, Workmen's Compensation, k1940-1969, and 5 Hatcher's Kansas Digest (Rev.Ed.) Workmen's Compensation, § 153.

In giving the announced rule effect, we inquire: What is substantial evidence? In In re Estate of Harris, 166 Kan. 368, 372, 373, 201 P.2d 1062, it was stated it must appear from the record that the trial court's findings are based upon facts which substantiate them, otherwise they do not rise to the dignity of 'substantial evidence.' The term 'substantial evidence,' when applied by this court in reviewing an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, means evidence possessing something of substance and relevant consequence and carrying with it fitness to induce conviction that the award is proper, or furnishing substantial basis of fact from which issue tendered can be reasonably resolved.

We turn to another rule established by this court in a long line of decisions applicable to workmen's compensation cases, which is that our workmen's compensation statute is to be liberally construed with a view of making effective the legislature's intent and not for the purpose of nullifying it. Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 147 Kan. 719, 78 P.2d 868; Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 211 P.2d 89; and Sundgren v. Topeka Transportation Co., 178 Kan. 83, 283 P.2d 444.

Another rule the decisions of this court require us to apply in considering this appeal is that traumatic neurosis following physical injury long has been recognized as being compensable under workmen's compensation laws, not only in England from whence we took our compensation act, but in this country under statutes quite like our own, Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 793, 62 P.2d 920, and, the rule is applicable to such injury even though financial, marital and other worries play a part, Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351, 107 N.E. 934; Rexroat v. State, 142 Neb. 596, 7 N.W.2d 163; Peterson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 178 Wash. 15, 33 P.2d 650; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 59 Ariz. 87, 123 P.2d 163; and, Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, pp. 75, 76.

Keeping these rules in mind, we turn now to the record for the purpose of determining whether the evidence most favorable to claimant is sufficient to sustain the award. The claimant testified that on July 20, 1954, while in the employ of appellant he fell from a scaffold into window of a house he was working on, striking his back and ribs on the window sill, and then fell from the window to the ground--a distance of four and a half to six feet; that he reported the accident to his superintendent and attempted to continue work but he could not do so; that he was immediately afflicted with pain in his side and lower back; that his superintendent told him to go to Dr. Clyde W. Miller, the company doctor, which he did; that Dr. Miller examined him, made X-rays and taped from, 'right under my arm clear down to the right, down along below my belt,' and that he told Dr. Miller his whole side was hurting. He further testified that he returned to work on July 28, 1954, to light duty as a 'lead man,' that he was in pain about the ribs, back and head but found he could keep his mind off it if he worked; that he had to quit work again on August 21, 1954, because of increased pain; that between July 28, 1954, and August 21, 1954, claimant lost two days work. He further testified that he was having difficulty in walking; that his doctor placed him in the hospital on August 28, 1954, where he was confined until September 30, 1954, when he was released. Claimant had no history of disability prior to the accident and was in good physical condition prior to that time. Upon his admission to the hospital claimant found that it was becoming increasingly difficult to walk and that his shoulder was paining him severely; he fell frequently and on one occasion fell in a shower bath at the hospital after which his shoulder pained him more severely. Two weeks before he left the hospital he lost the use of his legs and was unable to walk, which condition exists at the present time. When claimant lost the use of his legs he also lost all sense of feeling in them; he was unable to move or to use them. When he was in the hospital, anesthetic tests were made by doctors who examined his lower extremities; they stuck pins into his legs, and used a vibrator and a tuning fork on them. Claimant left the hospital in an ambulance. He testified that when sitting down he felt like he was cut in two, and there was no feeling of life below his waist.

Sometime prior to the accident claimant had been buying a house and had made payments on it for about a year; he quit making payments in August or September, 1953. A foreclosure action was...