Barraza v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Decision Date | 30 March 2012 |
Docket Number | No. CIV S-09-1050-CMK,CIV S-09-1050-CMK |
Parties | ANTHONY JULIAN BARRAZA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 27) and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or remand and grant the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff applied for social security benefits protectively on February 2, 2006, alleging an onset of disability on January 27, 2006, due to glaucoma and diabetes. (Certified administrative record ("CAR") 60-63, 79-85, 92-94). Plaintiff also claims disability based on impairments due to anxiety, ulcer and back pain. (CAR 110-11, 134-40, 180-85). Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on August 5, 2008, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mark C. Ramsey. In a November 6, 2008 decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled2 basedon the following findings:
(CAR 9-23). After the Appeals Council declined review on February 19, 2009, this appeal followed.
The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in four ways: (1) the ALJ failed to credit all of plaintiff's severe impairments at step two; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff's credibility; (3) the ALJ failed to credit third party statements; and (4) the ALJ erred in utilizing the Grids instead of a vocational expert.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to include all of his severe impairments at step two, including his anxiety, diabetes and obesity.
In order to be entitled to benefits, the plaintiff must have an impairment severe enough to significantly limit the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).3 In determining whether a claimant's alleged impairment is sufficiently severe to limit the ability to work, the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all impairments on the ability to function, without regard to whether each impairment alone would be sufficiently severe. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523 and 416.923. An impairment, or combination of impairments, can only be found to be non-severe if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. See Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-28; see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting SSR 85-28). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the severity of the impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908. The plaintiff's own statement of symptoms alone is insufficient. See id. Indeed, "[t]he mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of adisability." Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) ().
Here, the ALJ evaluated all of plaintiff's impairments, including glaucoma, diabetes, anxiety, peptic ulcer disease, as well as back, neck and knee pain.4 The ALJ also addressed plaintiff's obesity. However, he determined none of these impairments had more than a minimal limitations on plaintiff's abilities. With respect to plaintiff's diabetes, ulcer and pain, the ALJ stated:
In determining whether the claim's diabetes, peptic ulcer disease and chronic pain complaints are severe within the meaning of applicable regulations and rulings, the undersigned has given much consideration to the lack of recurrent objective signs in support of more than minimal limitations in his ability to perform basic physical activities for more than a 12 consecutive month period caused by such problems. With respect to the claimant's chronic pain complaints, the undersigned in unable to find any recurrent positive objective examination signs to support the intensity and persistence of his complaints. A chronological review of the claimant's progress notes of record is conspicuously absent [of] any signs of weakness, motor loss, range of motion loss or other neurological deficit that is not sporadically reported or isolated in the record. The undersigned notes that the claimant has had significant signs of tenderness, however, such signs have responded to such minimal treatment as Ibuprofen. The record shows a complete lack of objective signs just a few months after his motor vehicle accidents.
(CAR 14).
As for plaintiff's diabetes and obesity, the ALJ stated:
the claimant has consistently complained of symptoms of pain, gastrointestinal upset, and limited mobility with bowel incontinence, but he has not had any corresponding lasting signs of tenderness, range of motion loss, weakness or gait abnormality. Although the undersigned notes that the claimant's weight has steadily increased from 220 pounds in January 2006 to a recenthigh of 278 pounds, the undersigned does not find any increase in objective clinical findings. Accordingly, the undersigned is unable to find that the claimant's obesity has added any significant limitations that have lasted or are expected to last for 12 consecutive months.
(CAR 15).
Finally, addressing plaintiff's panic and anxiety attacks, the ALJ stated:
In determining the severity of the...
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