Barrett v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1880
• Citation: 9 Mo.App. 226
• Parties: JOHN H. BARRETT ET AL., Respondents, v. INDIANAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

9 Mo.App. 226

JOHN H. BARRETT ET AL., Respondents,

v.INDIANAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jun. 15, 1880.

1. Railroads doing business together, sharing profits, and sending freight over one or the other of the combined lines, at their pleasure or the shipper's request, may make themselves jointly liable to the shipper.

2. The question of agency is for the jury, upon all the evidence in the case, and is not concluded by the statements of the alleged agent.

3. Testimony tending to show that the defendant and other roads formed a ““line,” having a common office, in charge of a general agent, whose chief clerk was found at the office, and with whom a contract of shipment was made, is evidence of agency to go to the jury.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, THAYER, J.

Affirmed.

B. W. HANNA, for the appellant.

BROADHEAD, SLAYBACK & HAEUSSLER, for the respondent: “Where carriers on connecting routes form associations and arrangements for the purpose of carrying goods or parcels through the whole line, they are beyond question partners, and each is responsible for any loss or injury to goods which may happen, in whatever part of the line it occurs.”-- Coates v. United States Express Co., 45 Mo. 238-241; St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660; Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 6 Otto, 258.

HAYDEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action to recover the value of twelve hogsheads of tobacco, on the ground that the defendant contracted to convey the property from the towns of Brunswick and De Witt, in Missouri, in the city of New York, and that it never reached New York, and was lost to the plaintiffs. The petition avers that the defendant and certain other railroad companies constituted a continuous line from the towns named to New York, and at the time in question jointly carried on business, dividing the earnings. The verdict was for the plaintiffs.

The precise allegations of the petition and the weight of evidence are not here in question. The question is what the testimony tends to show. An examination of the testimony shows that the court below did not err in refusing to set aside the verdict as unsupported by evidence. It is contended by the defendant that no contract was made between the plaintiffs and any agent of the defendant for the transportation of goods. There is, however, testimony which clearly tends to show that Noyes was the general freight-agent in St. Louis of the defendant and of the railroad companies known as the Vandalia Line. One Smith was chief clerk under Noyes, and from the evidence it may fairly be inferred that Smith had authority from the defendant to make such contracts as he made with the plaintiffs. Indeed, from the testimony of the defendant's witness Simpson, who was the general manager of the companies (of which the defendant was one) which composed the “pool” in operation when this contract was made, it appears that Noyes, the general freight-agent, was allowed to impart authority to Smith, the general manager holding Noyes responsible in the premises. Smith was applied to by the plaintiffs, and, apparently to settle the rate, conferred with Bird, the agent of the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern Railway Company. What part Smith here took, and for whom he acted, were questions for the jury, on all the facts, and not to be settled by the say-so of Smith. It is clear there was evidence from which the inference might fairly be drawn that Smith, acting under authority of the defendant, made the contract for the transportation of the tobacco from Brunswick and De Witt, in Missouri, to New York, Bird, the agent of the other company, assenting and agreeing to the basis which involved the freight to be received by his road. The terms were fully agreed on and accepted by the plaintiffs. The evidence of Rankin, one of the firm, is clear and consistent. He considered that he was dealing--and upon the basis of his own testimony and that of the plaintiffs' other witnesses he certainly had a right to so consider--with the defendant, through its freight-agent, who had authority to make through contracts to New York for the transportation of freight. It is now contended, however, that whatever Smith did was done solely for the Pennsylvania Company, a corporation which was the owner of two so-called fast-freight lines,...