Barrett v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1916
• Parties: C. W. BARRETT and G. L. BARRETT, Partners Doing Business as BARRETT BROTHERS, Respondents, v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

157 P. 1016

29 Idaho 139

C. W. BARRETT and G. L. BARRETT, Partners Doing Business as BARRETT BROTHERS, Respondents, v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 24, 1916

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-CARMACK AMENDMENT-INITIAL CARRIER - LIABILITY OF - PRESUMPTION AS TO CONDITION OF SHIPMENT - UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES-INTEREST.

1. Under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of Congress, 34 Stats. at Large, 594, Fed. Stats. Ann., Supp 1909, 273, a common carrier which receives goods for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another, if it routes the consignment over the line of another common carrier, makes the latter its agent, and is liable to the owner of the goods or his assigns, for any damage which results from negligence or carelessness in transportation, whether the damage occurs upon its own line or upon that of the carrier to which it delivers the consignment.

2. An initial carrier is not liable for damage to goods occurring on lines not its own and over which they were routed without notice to it. The obligation of such a carrier ceases when the goods reach the destination, in good condition, to which they were originally consigned.

3. Although the law expressly requires a common carrier to issue a receipt or bill of lading for goods accepted for transportation from one state into another, it is not necessary to the right of the shipper to recover for loss or damage to the shipment that it do so.

4. A common carrier which receives goods for interstate shipment is the initial carrier, although it only switches the car in which they are loaded to the lines of another common carrier to be transported out of the state.

5. Where the evidence shows that when goods were originally loaded they were in good condition and were properly loaded the presumption is that they remained in that condition until the contrary is shown.

6. Where a claim is for unliquidated damages, the amount of which is not susceptible of ascertainment by computation or by reference to market values, the claimant is not entitled to interest prior to judgment.

[As to liability of initial carrier for torts or negligence of connecting lines, see note in 106 Am.St. 604]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Lincoln County. Hon. Chas. O. Stockslager, Judge.

Action for damages. Judgment for plaintiffs. Modified and affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. No costs allowed.

E. J Cannon and D. Worth Clark, for Appellant.

"An initial carrier is the carrier first receiving the goods." (4 Words and Phrases, p. 3610; Beard v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. Ry. Co., 79 Iowa 527, 44 N.W. 803.)

The mere changing of the destination en route cannot alter the character of the shipment and make it an initial or original shipment at the point where such change in destination is made. (Dunlap v. Great Northern R. Co., 34 S.D. 320, 148 N.W. 529.)

The initial carrier is the carrier which originally receives the goods for transportation. (Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 31 S.Ct. 164, 55 L.Ed. 167, 31 L. R. A., N. S., 7.)

Under the testimony in this case it is conclusively shown that either the C. B. & Q. or the O. W. R. & N. was the initial carrier, and in order to take advantage of the provisions of the Carmack Amendment plaintiffs were required to proceed against one of those companies, and cannot now recover from appellant without proving conclusively that it alone was responsible for the loss and damage sustained by them. ( Eastern Ry. Co. v. Montgomery (Tex. Civ.), 139 S.W. 885.)

P. S. Haddock, for Respondents.

The liability of the initial carrier cannot be extended beyond the contract evidenced by the bill of lading, and that is, to deliver the shipment at the place of destination named therein. (Parker-Bell Lumber Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 69 Wash. 123, 124 P. 389, 41 L. R. A., N. S., 1064.)

The failure of the initial carrier to issue any receipt or bill of lading for an interstate shipment will not relieve it from liability under the statute, but it will be liable to the shipper to the same extent that it would have been liable to the lawful holder of the shipping receipt or bill of lading had it performed its statutory duty to issue such receipt or bill of lading. (International Watch Co. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 80 N.J.L. 553, 78 A. 49; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 32 S.Ct. 205, 56 L.Ed. 516, 517.)

"A company operating a mere switching railroad, transporting cars to and from trunk lines upon the basis of a division of profits, may be an interstate carrier." (Aton Piano Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 152 Wis. 156, 139 N.W. 743.)

Notice to the terminal carrier is notice to the initial carrier under the law, for the reason that all of the carriers are agents of the initial carrier. (Perkett v. Manistee etc. R. Co., 175 Mich. 253, 141 N.W. 607, 611.)

The presumption of law in all shipments of this kind is that the goods remain in good condition until the contrary is shown. ( Dunlap v. Great Northern R. Co., 34 S.D. 320, 148 N.W. 529; Colbath v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 105 Me. 379, 134 Am. St. 569, 74 A. 918.)

MORGAN, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Budge, J., concur.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

The record in this case discloses that on or about the first day of June, 1912, the respondents delivered to the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company at Connelsville, Missouri, a stock of drugs and certain drug-store fixtures to be shipped from that point to Spokane, Washington. The goods were routed by the above-named company over its line and over that of appellant. Before the car in which the goods were shipped reached the destination to which it had been consigned respondent, C. W. Barrett, called upon the general agent of appellant in Spokane and arranged to have it forwarded, upon its arrival, to Rupert, Idaho. Appellant's general agent altered the original bill of lading by striking out the name "Spokane" as the destination of the car and in lieu thereof inserting "Rupert, Ida.," and by adding: "N. P. to Spokane, O. W. R. N. O. S. L.," and by indorsing thereon, "destination changed by C. R. Lonergan, G. A. N. P. Ry. 6/17/12. C. D. 3517." After some delay the car reached Rupert and upon being opened it was found that a part of the goods were missing and a large portion of the remainder were in a badly damaged condition. The goods were so located in the car as to indicate that they had been removed therefrom and reloaded, and their condition and position tended to show that the reloading had been carelessly and negligently done.

This action was commenced to recover for loss of and damage to the goods and by reason of delay in their delivery, and because of loss of time due to the condition in which they arrived at their destination. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of respondents, upon which judgment was entered. Appellant moved for a new trial, which motion was denied, and this appeal is from the judgment and from the order denying the motion for a new trial.

The principal question presented is as to whether or not the facts in this case bring it within the scope of what is known as the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of Congress, 34 Stats. at Large, 594, Comp. Stats. 1913, sec. 8592, F. Stats. Ann., Supp. 1909, p. 273, so as to bind appellant whether the loss and damage which occurred was due to its negligence or to the negligence of the other common carriers over whose lines it routed the goods from Spokane to Rupert. That amendment is as follows:

"That any common carrier, railroad, or...