Barrett v. USD NO. 259
| Citation | 272 Kan. 250,32 P.3d 1156 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 86,022.,86,022. |
| Parties | FRANCES BARRETT, Individually and on behalf of the heirs-at-law of ROBERT ALEXANDER BARRETT; and as Administratrix of the Estate of ROBERT ALEXANDER BARRETT, Appellee, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 259, a/k/a Wichita Public School System; and DAN JOHNSON, Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Alan L. Rupe, of Husch & Eppenberger, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause, and S. Douglas Mackay and Anthony M. Singer, of the same firm, were on the brief for appellants.
Kyle J. Steadman, of Arden J. Bradshaw & Associates, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
William Scott Hesse, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, was with him on the briefs for intervenor State of Kansas. Donald L. Moler, Jr., and Sandra Jacquot were on the brief for amicus curiae League of Kansas Municipalities.
Lawton M. Nuss, of Clark, Mize & Linville, Chartered, of Salina, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Association of Defense Counsel.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Robert Alexander Barrett, a 12th grade high school student at Southeast High School in Wichita, collapsed on the practice field after participating in the first mandatory football practice of the 1998 season. He died in the hospital the next day. A wrongful death action was filed, and this is an interlocutory appeal in that action by Unified School District No. 259 and the coach, Dan Johnson, from a partial summary judgment holding that the recreational use exception to the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6104(o), denied equal protection and was, therefore, unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff under the facts of this case. The trial court also ruled that the discretionary function exception to the KTCA, K.S.A. 75-6104(e), was not available to the defendants "because of the existence of a mandatory duty of defendants to protect its student athletes from heat exposure." We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On August 17, 1998, Robert Alexander Barrett (Alex) attended the first football practice of the season at Wichita Southeast High School. This practice was mandatory and began with warmup and stretching exercises at 8 a.m. The temperature at the beginning of practice was approximately 83 degrees. The players did not wear pads; however, they did wear helmets. They were required to keep their helmets on while participating in the drills but could remove them during water breaks.
Between 8:15 a.m. and 10:15 a.m., Coach Johnson and his assistants instructed on tackling form and the fundamentals of offense and defense. Alex participated with the offensive line under the direct supervision of Coach Johnson. Players were afforded a 5-minute water break during every 20 minutes of practice at which time they could get water from the "water ring," a watering device that accommodated 11 players at a time or from their own jugs or bottles. There were no other rest breaks during the session. At 10:15 a.m., a 45-minute break was held. Practice resumed at 11 a.m. at which time the temperature was higher than it had been earlier in the morning. Between 11 a.m. and 12:50 p.m., Alex continued to work with the offensive line under the direct supervision of Coach Johnson. At 12:50 p.m., circuit conditioning started which consisted of small groups working at one of five different conditioning stations manned by the coaches. A group of players would spend 4 minutes at each station, have a 2-minute rest period, and then rotate to the next station.
After the first two conditioning stations, Alex told a member of the coaching staff that he did not feel well. Assistant Coach Al Hobson instructed Alex to go to the water ring and get a drink. Coach Johnson saw Alex at the ring and shouted to see if he was okay. Alex was drinking water and did not answer. After getting a drink, Alex returned to the conditioning drills. While at Assistant Coach Fluty's station, Alex asked and was allowed to sit out of the drill. Alex told Fluty that he was hot and tired; Fluty instructed Alex to get a drink of water.
After the conditioning drills, the team began to leave the field. Alex collapsed and was transported by ambulance to a hospital. He died the next day.
Wichita Southeast's Athletic Director Bill Faflick distributed a "Coaches Handbook" to all coaches at the school prior to the first mandatory practice. The handbook outlined the duties and responsibilities of the coaches. On August 1, 1998, U.S.D. No. 259 distributed a memorandum to all the athletic directors of its schools on heat illness prevention which instructed them to discuss prevention with their coaches. Faflick and Coach Johnson discussed the prevention of such illnesses. The Kansas State High School Athletic Association also issued warnings regarding heat stress and the importance of gradual acclimatization to its member schools. U.S.D. No. 259 had also adopted policies that made student safety a concern and responsibility of each school's administration, teachers, and staff.
Frances Barrett, Alex's mother, filed suit individually and as administratrix of Alex's estate against U.S.D. No. 259 and Coach Dan Johnson, claiming negligence and gross negligence. Barrett filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging that the defendants were not entitled as a matter of law to rely on K.S.A. 75-6104(o), the recreational use exception to the KTCA, because its application to cases where the injury is caused by a coach's negligence and not by a condition of the property violates equal protection under the United States Constitution and §§ 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. She also alleged that the defendants were not entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception to the KTCA found in K.S.A. 75-6104(e), because defendants owed a duty of care to the students. The defendants countered with their own motions for summary judgment.
The trial court ruled that the application of the recreational use exception under the KTCA to cases involving coaching negligence where the injury was not caused by a condition of the recreational property violated equal protection because it created a distinction between similarly situated students based solely on the location of the injury without a rational basis. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception under the KTCA was not applicable as the school owed a general duty of care to its students, and further, had issued safety policies and guidelines which reinforced this duty of care. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The defendants asked the trial court to certify its rulings for interlocutory appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2102(b). The State of Kansas also moved to intervene and asked the trial court to certify the case for interlocutory appeal. The trial court sustained both motions. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(b), granting this court original jurisdiction as a matter of right in those cases where a statute has been held to be unconstitutional.
U.S.D. 259, Coach Dan Johnson, intervenor State of Kansas, and amici curiae League of Kansas Municipalities and Kansas Association of Defense Counsel argue that the trial court erred in finding that the recreational use exception, as applied to cases involving coaching negligence where the injury is not caused by a condition of the recreational property, violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Kansas and the United States Constitutions. The defendants contend that such a conclusion is not supported by the case law and further argue that a rational basis exists for treating similarly situated persons differently under the law.
On appeal from a trial court's ruling that a particular statute is unconstitutional, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review. Battrick v. State, 267 Kan. 389, 391, 985 P.2d 707 (1999). The burden of one asserting the unconstitutionality of a particular statute is a weighty one. This is as it should be for the enacted statute is adopted through the legislative process ultimately expressing the will of the electorate in a democratic society. Thus, when approaching the review of a claim of unconstitutionality, certain basic principles of review are observed.
First, the constitutionality of a statute is presumed and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. Before a statute may be stricken down the statute must clearly violate the constitution. This court's duty is to uphold the statute under attack rather than defeat it; if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. Statutes are not stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt. State ex. rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov. of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, 264 Kan. 293, 300, 955 P.2d 1136 (1998).
The trial court found the recreational use exception, as applied in the case at hand, violated equal protection under the United States Constitution and §§ 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. We have interpreted §§ 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to be counterparts to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State ex rel. Tomasic v. City of Kansas City, 237 Kan. 572, Syl. ¶ 12, 701 P.2d 1314 (1985).
Whether a statute violates equal protection is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. The concept of equal protection of the law is one which "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." State v. Mueller, 271 Kan. 897, Syl. ¶¶ 6...
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