Barrett v. Van Pelt

• Decision Date: 13 April 1925
• Docket Number: No. 160,160
• Parties: BARRETT v. VAN PELT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

268 U.S. 85

45 S.Ct. 437

69 L.Ed. 857

BARRETT

v VAN PELT.

No. 160.

Argued Jan. 6, 1925.

Decided April 13, 1925.

Messrs. K. E. Stockton and Charles W. Stockton, both of New York City, for petitioner.

Messrs. Selig Edelman, of New York City, Ralph Merriam, of Chicago, Ill., and Lamar Hardy and Louis C. White, both of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

February 23, 1918, at Louisville, Ky., respondent's assignor delivered to the Adams Express Company a carload, consisting of 522 cases of fresh eggs for transportation to New York City, there to be delivered to Harold L. Brown Company. The shipment was so delivered March 4, 1918. This action was brought to recover damages for loss in market value due to delay in transportation. At the trial, respondent contended that the express company was bound to make delivery of the eggs within a reasonable time, which he claimed to be not more than 30 hours. It was shown that the price of eggs in New York declined between the time respondent claimed delivery to consignee should have been made and the time when it was made. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of respondent. A judgment was entered thereon. Petitioner appealed. It was affirmed by the Appellate Division. 205 App. Div. 332, 199 N. Y. S. 509. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York was denied. This court granted certiorari. 263 U. S. 697, 44 S. Ct. 134, 68 L. Ed. 508.

The case involves the construction of a provision of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1915, known as the First Cummins Amendment (38 Stat. 1196, 1197, c. 176), amending section 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 386, as amended by section 7 of the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 593, 595 (Comp. St. § 8604a). Chapter 176 requires any common carrier receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce to issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and makes it liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property, and contains certain provisos, the last two of which are:

'Provided further, that it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of claims than ninety days and for the filing of claims for a shorter period than four months, and for the institution of suits than two years: Provided, however, that if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a condition precedent to recovery.'

At the time of the delivery of the property for transportation, the express company issued and delivered a receipt or bill of lading therefor, which contained the following:

'Received from Ky. Creameries the shipment hereinafter listed, subject to the classification and tariffs in effect on the date hereof, which shipment the company agrees to carry upon the terms and conditions of the uniform express receipt in effect on date of shipment.'

Section 7 of the uniform receipt contains the following:

'Except where the loss, damage or injury complained of is due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, as conditions precedent to recovery claims must be made in writing to the originating or delivering carrier within four months after delivery of the property or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within four months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed; and suits for loss. damage or delay shall be instituted only within two years and one day after delivery of the property, or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within two years and one day after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed.' Official Express Classification No. 25, filed May 18, 1917, I. C. C. A-2130.

No claim was made or filed within four months after the delivery of the property to the consignee. We are required to decide whether the case is one where notice or filing of claim may be required as a condition precedent to recovery. If the first clause of the above-quoted provision stood alone, the rule established would be clear. But the purpose of the second clause is to except some cases from the application of the general rule and to provide that as to them no notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required. The language and structure of the second clause is so inapt and defective that it is difficult to give it a construction that is wholly satisfactory.¹ The Appellate Division held that the requirement of the receipt for the filing of claims within four months after delivery was prohibited by law, and was without force or effect. The court quoted from its opinion in Bell v. New York Central Railroad Co., 187 App. Div. 564, 566, 175 N. Y. S. 712, 713:

'It will be noted that both the Cummins Amendment and the bill of lading provision make a double classification of claims, to wit: (1) Those for loss due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in transit, which we will call transit claims; and (2) those for loss otherwise sustained, which we will call nontransit claims. The Cummins Amendment permitted the carrier to require as a condition precedent to recovery the filing of a nontransit claim within four months, and in such cases to require suit to be instituted within two years. In the case of transit claims it forbade the carrier to require the filing of a claim as a condition precedent to recovery but authorized a requirement, that suit be instituted within two years.'

Respondent supports this construction. But we think it is not satisfactory. The language does not require such a classification. The court suggests no reason for such a division, and there seems to be no substantial considerations supporting it. Apparently, no effect is given the phrase, 'by carelessness or negligence.'

The petitioner contends that the word 'delay' is to be read with 'while being loaded or unloaded.' This would make two classes of claims excepted from the general rule. One would include claims for loss due to delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded. The other would include those for damage in transit due to carelessness or negligence. But it is not apparent why claims for loss, damage or injury due to delay in transit should not be included in the same class as claims for damages due to delay while being loaded or unloaded. And no good reason is shown for the elimination of the element of carelessness or negligence from the definition of one class, while including it in the definition of the other.

It must be assumed that Congress intended to make the classification on a reasonable basis having regard to considerations deemed sufficient to justify exceptions to the rule. The element of carelessness or negligence is important. There are such differences between liability without fault and that resulting from negligence that Congress upon good reasons might permit carriers to require notice and filing of claim within the specified times where the carrier is without fault, and forbid such a requirement in the cases referred to where the loss results from the carrier's negligence. Notice and filing of claim warns the carrier that there may be need to make investigations which otherwise might not appear to be necessary; and if notice of claim is given...