Barriera v. State, 5D16–630.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 5D16–630.,5D16–630.
• Parties: Juan Ines BARRIERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

196 So.3d 1265

Juan Ines BARRIERA, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D16–630.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

July 29, 2016.

Juan I. Barriera, Madison, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Juan Barriera appeals the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Barriera candidly acknowledges that his sentence “is not technically illegal.” Nevertheless, he argues that the postconviction court erred by not granting him habeas corpus relief to rectify a “manifest

196 So.3d 1266

injustice.” We write to explain why Barriera is not entitled to relief.

In 1994, following a jury trial, Barriera was convicted of armed burglary of a dwelling, a first-degree felony punishable by up to life in prison. § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1994).¹ He was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender (“HVFO”) to serve life in prison, with the trial court also orally pronouncing that Barriera “would not be eligible for parole for at least fifteen years.”² This court affirmed Barriera's judgment and sentence without opinion. Barriera v. State, 661 So.2d 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

Over the ensuing years, Barriera filed several motions seeking postconviction relief, which were all denied by the lower court. His appeals of the denial orders were also unsuccessful. In 2015, Barriera, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Florida Commission on Offender Review, inquiring as to his parole eligibility for the armed burglary conviction. The commission responded that, due to the nature and the timing of his offense, Barriera would essentially never be eligible for parole. Barriera, thereafter, filed his present motion, arguing that his sentence is illegal and, more particularly, that a manifest injustice has occurred because the trial court intended that he be eligible for parole, yet the Commission on Offender Review determined otherwise. In the order on appeal, the postconviction court held that Barriera's sentence was not illegal and the transcript from the sentencing hearing did not demonstrate that the sentencing court intended for Barriera to receive parole.

Citing to Johnson v. State, 9 So.3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and Stephens v. State, 974 So.2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Barriera essentially asks that we treat his...