Barron v. Barronian

Decision Date07 March 1931
Citation175 N.E. 271,275 Mass. 77
PartiesBARRON v. BARRONIAN et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Original suit in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court by Charles Barron against Florence Barronian, administratrix, and others, to vacate a decree of the probate court.

Decree affirmed.

Wm. J. Brown, of Providence, R. I., for petitioner.

R. W. Frost, of Boston, for respondents.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a suit in equity brought in the Supreme Judicial Court. Its object is to vacate a decree of the probate court. The decree sought to be vacated was entered under these circumstances: The defendant Florence Barronian, hereafter called the defendant, was duly appointed administratrix by the probate court of Suffolk county of the estate of a deceased resident of Boston, and in that court brought a petition in equity, to which the present plaintiff was a party defendant, against numerous savings banks alleging that she had as such administratrix in her possession books of deposit showing deposits in the banking institutions joined as defendants standing in the name of several aliases of her intestate as trustee for various persons, and praying that these several deposits in savings banks be declared to be assets of the estate of her intestate and that the savings banks be ordered to pay such deposits to her as administratrix. The present plaintiff appeared as a party defendant, filed appropriate pleadings and contested the allegations of that petition. After hearing, the probate court entered a decree that said deposits were the assets of the estate of the intestate and ordered them paid to his administratrix. It is contended by the plaintiff that the probate court was without jurisdiction to entertain a suit in equity of that nature, it being his further contention that such jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the Supreme Judicial Court or the superior court.

Apart from comparatively recent statutes, jurisdiction over that subject matter was not vested in the probate court. Probate courts have jurisdiction in equity in those cases alone where it is expressly conferred upon them by statute. It is provided now by G. L. c. 215, § 6, that ‘Probate courts shall have jurisdiction in equity, concurrent with the supreme judicial and superior courts, of all cases and matters relative to the administration of the estates of deceased persons, to wills * * *, or to trusts created by will or other written instrument. * * *’ These are words of broad import. While there may be exceptions to their comprehensive sweep growing out of the nature of things, the case at bar does not present any such exception. The bank books were in the possession of the administratrix. The meaning of the form of the deposit and the facts touching the making of the deposit and the title thereto were matters having a vital relation to the administration of the estate of the intestate and possibly also to the creation of trusts to which the estate was a necessary party. As matter of interpretation of the statute, it must be held to include a proceeding in the probate court such as is here assailed.

The same result follows from consideration of the authorities. It is sufficient to say without reviewing the facts of each decision that the case at bar falls well within the principle declared and the points decided in several cases. Stowell v. Ranlett, 238 Mass. 599, 131 N. E. 451;Phillips v. McCandlish, 239 Mass. 301, 131 N. E. 861;Mitchell v. Weaver, 242 Mass. 331, 136 N. E. 166;Chase v. Smith, 257 Mass. 252, 153 N. E. 452;Coffey v. Rady, 267 Mass. 301, 304, 305, 166 N. E. 833;Lowell v. Hudson, 268 Mass. 574, 168 N. E. 87;Buzzell...

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9 cases
  • Whitmarsh v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 4, 1974
    ...be used sparingly, and that it should rarely be used in a case where some other practical remedy is available. In Barron v. Barronian, 275 Mass. 77, 80, 175 N.E. 271 (1931), we characterized a request for relief under this statute as a request 'for extraordinary intervention.' In GILDAY V. ......
  • In re Keenan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1941
    ...3. See Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212, 214: Connecticut River Railroad v. County Commissioners, 127 Mass. 50 , 58; Barron v. Barronian, 275 Mass. 77 , 80: Dolan v. Commonwealth, 304 Mass. 325, 333. In absence, however, of such a determination by the Supreme Judicial Court there is no......
  • In re Keenan
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1941
    ...214,50 Am.Dec. 732;Connecticut River Railroad Co. v. County Commissioners of Franklin, 127 Mass. 50, 58,34 Am.Rep. 338;Barron v. Barronian, 275 Mass. 77, 80, 175 N.E. 271;Dolan v. Commonwealth, 304 Mass. 325, 333, 23 N.E.2d 904. In the absence, however, of such a determination by the Suprem......
  • Dondis v. Lash
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1931
    ...the appellant to enter his appeal. * * *’ Plainly this petition was filed within the time allowed by the statute. Compare Barron v. Barronian (Mass.) 175 N. E. 271; Banker & Tradesman, March 30, 1931. The delay of the plaintiff beyond the statutory period then permitted in giving the order ......
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