Barrow v. General Motors Corp., 68313
| Decision Date | 05 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 68313,68313 |
| Citation | 172 Ga.App. 287,322 S.E.2d 900 |
| Parties | BARROW v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Byron Attridge, Lanny B. Bridgers, Gordon A. Smith, Atlanta, for appellees.
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injury in Evans Superior Court against General Motors Corporation and Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation. The complaint alleged the defendants were non-resident corporations who were doing business in the State of Georgia; that defendants manufactured a certain 1980 Chevrolet which they sold to plaintiff; that the automobile was dangerous, defective and not suited for the use intended; that the automobile rolled while supposedly locked in park and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought damages for personal injury and exemplary damages.
General Motors filed an answer affirming that Chevrolet Motors Division was included under its name and was not a separate defendant. Besides setting forth various defenses to the allegations of the complaint in its answer, General Motors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(3). The motion alleged General Motors is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Georgia; that its registered agent is in Fulton County; that it does not maintain an office or registered agent or any agent in Evans County; that NeSmith Chevrolet/Oldsmobile is an independent business selling General Motors products in Evans County but is not an agent for General Motors. After the motion came on for hearing, the lower court judge permitted plaintiff additional time to depose the owner of NeSmith Chevrolet and a General Motors service representative who resided in Jacksonville, Florida. After the submission of this additional evidence, judgment was entered granting General Motors' motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. Held:
1. OCGA § 9-11-8(a)(2) requires that the "original complaint shall contain facts upon which the court's venue depends..." Where the complaint fails to set forth facts establishing venue it is subject to dismissal. Chancey v. Hancock, 225 Ga. 715, 716, 171 S.E.2d 302; Jones v. Woods, 158 Ga.App. 391, 280 S.E.2d 418 and cases therein cited. Since the complaint here did not allege facts which would establish venue in Evans County but merely that General Motors did business in the State of Georgia, it was vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
2. The plaintiff/appellant did not attempt to amend his complaint so as to set forth facts showing venue. However, the lower court permitted him to make proffer of such fact. Because of this we examine the proof contained in the record even though a sound basis for dismissal of the complaint already existed.
OCGA § 14-2-63(d) provides: "For the purpose of determining venue, each domestic corporation and each foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state shall be deemed to reside and may be sued for damages because of torts, wrong, or injury done, in the county where the cause of action originated, if the corporation has an office and transacts business in that county ..." (Emphasis supplied.) The term "office" as used in that section has been defined as being synonymous with "place of business." Scott v. Atlanta Dairies Co-op., 239 Ga. 721, 723, 238 S.E.2d 340. Accord Gillis v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 155 Ga.App. 804, 805, 272 S.E.2d 728. This court has further explained such concept as follows: "the term 'office' as that word is used in Code Ann. § 22-404(c) and (d) [now OCGA § 14-2-63(c) and (d) ] is any 'place where a particular kind of business is transacted or a service is supplied' by a corporation and that it [an office] can be operated without being open to the public." Musgrove v. Kirksey, 159 Ga.App. 276, 277, 283 S.E.2d 292.
In this case the agreement between NeSmith Chevrolet and General Motors provided: ...
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Department of Transp. v. Dupree, A02A1573.
...preponderance of evidence lies, not necessarily on whether the issue may be decided as a matter of law. Barrow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 Ga.App. 287, 288(2), 322 S.E.2d 900 (1984). Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, supra at 842-843, 392 S.E.2d In this case, the trial court submitted t......
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Republic Title Co. v. Andrews, A18A1205
...conventional quiet-title action against several defendants was proper in county where several resided).19 Barrow v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 172 Ga. App. 287, 288 (1), 322 S.E.2d 900 (1984) ; see Chancey v. Hancock , 225 Ga. 715, 716, 171 S.E.2d 302 (1969) (holding that a complaint which fails t......
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Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc.
...preponderance of evidence lies, not necessarily on whether the issue may be decided as a matter of law. Barrow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 Ga.App. 287, 288(2), 322 S.E.2d 900 (1984). A holding that issues of fact remained would necessitate the resolution of those facts and a determination of ......
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Hughes v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, A04A0427.
...under the any evidence rule. See Huddle House v. Paragon Foods, 263 Ga.App. 382, 383, 587 S.E.2d 845 (2003); Barrow v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 Ga.App. 287, 289, 322 S.E.2d 900 (1984) (on motion for rehearing). But where, as here, there is no dispute as to the trial court's findings of fact a......