Barrow v. Vill. of New Miami
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 4873,160 N.E.3d 335 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NOS. CA2019-07-112 CA2019-08-136 |
| Parties | Doreen BARROW, et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF NEW MIAMI, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
{¶1} Appellant/Cross-appellee, the village of New Miami ("New Miami") appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in an action instituted by appellees/cross-appellants, Doreen Barrow and other similarly situated individuals ("Plaintiffs"), challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. Plaintiffs have also filed a cross-appeal challenging the distribution of their award. For the reasons detailed below, we reverse the summary judgment granted to Plaintiffs and enter judgment on behalf of New Miami.
{¶2} New Miami operated a civil enforcement program to deter motorists from exceeding the speed limit at several village street intersections. The Automated Speed Enforcement Program ("ASEP") was instituted in July 2012 with the adoption of Ordinance 1917.
{¶3} The enforcement apparatus included a camera, vehicle sensor, and flash that could measure the speed of the vehicle and take a photograph of the infraction. Optotraffic, L.L.C. is a third-party company that provided the equipment and shared revenue with New Miami. If a vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit, a camera would photograph the license plate and the registered owner of the vehicle would receive a notice of liability in the mail. As relevant here, the speed limit was 35 m.p.h. The system in New Miami was set to record violations for vehicles travelling 46 m.p.h. or higher.
{¶4} Pursuant to the notice of liability, motorists could pay the penalty and waive the right to a hearing. Alternatively, motorists could request a hearing within 20 days from the date of the violation. The hearing was conducted by a hearing officer appointed by the mayor of New Miami. As outlined in the notice, motorists could proffer four affirmative defenses at the hearing: the vehicle was stolen, someone else was driving the vehicle, the vehicle was loaned to someone, or the license plate was not clearly discernable in the photograph.
{¶5} In order to avail themselves of the defense that someone else was driving the vehicle, the owner was required to provide the name and address of the person who had custody or control of the motor vehicle at the time of the violation. Likewise, if the owner wished to defend on the basis that the vehicle or license plates had been stolen, the owner was required to submit proof that a police report about the stolen vehicle or license plates had been filed prior to the violation or within 48 hours after the violation occurred.
{¶6} Motorists who neglected to pay the penalty were subject to a late fee and referred to a collection agency, and the judgment against them was reported to credit reporting agencies.
{¶7} Plaintiffs are all motorists who were sent notices of liability. Some of the Plaintiffs paid the penalty and some did not. In 2013, Plaintiffs collectively filed suit against New Miami challenging ASEP and seeking class action certification. Count 1 sought a declaration that ASEP improperly divested the municipal court of jurisdiction over traffic violations in contravention of the Ohio Constitution. Count 2 sought a declaration that ASEP violated Plaintiffs' due process rights. Count 3 prayed for injunctive relief prohibiting continued enforcement of ASEP. Finally, Count 4 sought equitable restitution of any penalties, fees, or charges ("penalties") paid by Plaintiffs pursuant to ASEP, on the ground that retention of the penalties would unjustly enrich New Miami.
{¶8} In March 2014, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on Counts 1, 2, and 3 and denied New Miami's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that ASEP unlawfully divested the municipal court of jurisdiction and violated the Ohio Constitution's guarantee of "due course of law." The trial court granted an injunction against continued enforcement of ASEP. Subsequently, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment regarding their unjust enrichment/restitution claim. The trial court certified a class comprised of all persons who had received notices of liability under ASEP.
{¶9} New Miami appealed the class action certification decision. On December 30, 2014, we reversed and remanded for the trial court to clarify its Civ.R. 23 findings in support of certification. Barrow v. New Miami , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-04-092, 2014-Ohio-5743, 2014 WL 7390202 (" Barrow I "). On remand, the trial court articulated its rationale, made the requisite findings, and certified the class. New Miami once again appealed. On February 1, 2016, we affirmed the trial court's class certification. Barrow v. New Miami , 12th Dist. Butler, 2016-Ohio-340, 58 N.E.3d 532 (" Barrow II ").
{¶10} Subsequently, the parties renewed their motions for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment/restitution claim in Count 4 with New Miami arguing it was immune from liability pursuant to the political subdivision immunity of R.C. Chapter 2744. In another interlocutory appeal, this court found that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment/restitution claim is an equitable claim of restitution and is therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. Barrow v. New Miami , 12th Dist. Butler, 2018-Ohio-217, 104 N.E.3d 814, ¶ 51 (" Barrow III "). In so doing, we specifically noted that we were making no ruling on the amount of New Miami's liability, noting that the sole issue before us was whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment against New Miami upon its claim of immunity pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. Id. at ¶ 47, fn 3.
{¶11} On July 10, 2019, the trial court entered its final appealable order granting summary judgment. Following the release of a supreme court decision during the pendency of this case, the trial court altered its final decision and granted summary judgment in favor of New Miami on Count 1 and found that the ordinance did not unlawfully usurp the jurisdiction of the municipal courts over traffic violations. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on Counts 2, 3, and 4, concluding that ASEP violated the due process of law guarantees under the Ohio Constitution. As a result, the trial court granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of ASEP and ordered New Miami to pay Plaintiffs $3,066,422.11 with interest. The trial court ordered that the payments be paid in ten annual installments. New Miami now appeals the trial court's decision, raising two assignments of error. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, also raising two cross-assignments of error for review.
{¶12} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶13} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS II, III, AND IV, AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ALL COUNTS.
{¶14} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS EQUITABLE RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,066,422.11
{¶16} In its first assignment of error, New Miami argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs by finding that ASEP violated Plaintiffs' rights to due process and denying New Miami summary judgment. We sustain New Miami's first assignment of error.
{¶17} Though this case has been before this court three prior times, this is the first time that review of the merits of summary judgment has been properly before us. Furthermore, there has been additional guidance from the supreme court during the pendency of this case. In Walker v. Toledo , 143 Ohio St. 3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, the supreme court held that municipalities may, pursuant to their home-rule authority under Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, impose civil liability on traffic violators through the use of automated red-light cameras. Id. at ¶ 3. The court ruled that the ordinance in that case did not unlawfully usurp the jurisdiction of municipal courts over traffic violations. Id. at ¶ 22-25. The court further held that municipalities' home-rule authority permitted them to establish civil administrative proceedings that must be exhausted before traffic violators may pursue judicial remedies. Id. at ¶ 26-28 ; See also State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland , 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 24 ().
{¶18} Though Walker resolves Count 1, the supreme court stated that "administrative procedures must be established in furtherance" of the municipality's home-rule power. Id. at ¶ 28. In upholding the right of municipalities to establish administrative proceedings for civil enforcement of red light and speeding violations captured by automated camera systems, Walker provided little specific guidance concerning the nature of due process protections required in those proceedings. Thus, the issue before this court is whether ASEP provided sufficient due process guarantees to those who received a notice of liability. See Toney v. City of Dayton , 2d Dist. Montgomery, 2017-Ohio-5618, 94 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 11.1
Trial court's decision
{¶19} The trial court's decision, which predated Walker , found that ASEP lacked adequate due process guarantees. In particular, the trial court found:
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