Barrows v. Hogan

• Decision Date: 02 August 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 74-467.
• Parties: John H. BARROWS, Petitioner, v. Marvin R. HOGAN, Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

379 F. Supp. 314

John H. BARROWS, Petitioner, v. Marvin R. HOGAN, Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Defendant.

Civ. No. 74-467.

United States District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

August 2, 1974.

John H. Barrows pro se.

Michael D. McDowell, Lewisburg, Pa., for the Government.

OPINION

MUIR, District Judge.

John Barrows, the petitioner in this habeas corpus case, is an inmate at the Lewisburg Penitentiary. On January 13, 1972, the Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for the offense of "possession of stolen mail." Petitioner received a sentence of 3 years which required his "mandatory" release, giving credit for maximum good time, on April 19, 1974. On February 14, 1974, an indictment was handed down against Petitioner in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111, assaulting "an employee of a United States correctional institution." Petitioner was acquitted on this charge on June 6, 1974 by a jury in this Court. On November 1, 1973, the Lewisburg Penitentiary Good Time Forfeiture Board announced the result of its October 25, 1973 hearing with respect to Petitioner's alleged assault on a prison employee. The Board recommended a forfeiture of 152 days good time. The Warden accepted the recommendation and, according to the Petitioner's calculation, the Petitioner is scheduled for release on September 23, 1974. Petitioner's allegation as to his release date is not disputed by Respondent and is therefore accepted. 28 U.S. C. § 2248.

Petitioner claims that by reason of his acquittal in this Court of the charge of assaulting a federal officer, the Good Time Forfeiture Board is required to reinstate his time forfeited because the forfeiture was based on the same alleged offense as that on which he was acquitted in court. The Government's response to the Court's Order to Show Cause argues that the Petitioner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies to have his good time days restored. The Government cited Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1973). Soyka was also a habeas corpus matter and dealt with a situation where a prisoner requested credit on his sentence for time already served in prison. Soyka stands for the proposition that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a prisoner is entitled to enter federal court with a complaint alleging future illegal detention.

Petitioner alleges that he did exhaust his administrative remedies by speaking to various individuals in authority at the prison. The Government maintains that Petitioner did not follow the formal written procedure set forth in policy statement No. NE-2001.6 "Administrative Remedy of Complaints Initiated by Offenders." The Petitioner does not deny that he did not proceed through the written route.

In my view, Soyka v. Alldredge, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case and in the interests of justice should not be followed in this case. It is beyond dispute that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a worthwhile and workable concept. However, the statement of the Supreme Court, in cases of habeas corpus relief with respect to induction into the military service, that the doctrine of administrative remedies must be applied in each case with an "understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved" is equally applicable in the field of prisoner law. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1968); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1971). Where, as in the facts of this case, Petitioner would be free from prison were the relief sought granted, the Court should balance the interests in judicial economy and administrative expertise produced by the administrative...