Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–P–288.,11–P–288.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: Kevin BARROWS v. WAREHAM FIRE DISTRICT & others.

82 Mass.App.Ct. 623

976 N.E.2d 830

Kevin BARROWS

v.WAREHAM FIRE DISTRICT & others.¹

No. 11–P–288.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Argued Nov. 4, 2011.

Decided Oct. 12, 2012.

Frank J. McGee for the plaintiff.

Michael J. McGlone for the defendants.

Present: TRAINOR, MILKEY, & AGNES, JJ.

TRAINOR, J.

The plaintiff, Kevin Barrows, appeals from a summary judgment entered by a judge of the Superior Court on his claims of defamation and slander against the municipal defendants, the Wareham fire district and the board of water commissioners of Wareham (collectively, town) (counts I and II of the complaint); and Michael Martin, individually and as the superintendent of the water department of the Wareham fire district (count III of the complaint). Barrows argues on appeal that it was error for the judge to rule (1) that the town was exempt from liability pursuant to G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ); and (2) that Martin was exempt from liability based on a conditional privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements.

Ultimately, the appeal poses two questions: (1) whether a claim of defamation based on allegations of reckless conduct by a municipal employee is an intentional tort for the purposes of a G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ), exemption from the liability imposed by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (Act), and (2) whether that same alleged misconduct is exempt from individual liability because of the privilege granted to a public official in the exercise of his official duties. We conclude that (1) under the Act, a municipality is exempt from liability for a reckless defamation claim against a municipal employee based on the specific inclusionof both forms of defamation, slander and libel, in the list of torts enumerated in G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ); and (2) Martin did not act with a level of misconduct necessary to forfeit his conditional privilege as a public official. For these reasons and others discussed below we affirm the summary judgment.

Facts. The summary judgment record provides us with the following undisputed facts. Barrows was employed by the water department of the Wareham fire district (water department) as a foreman. On July 18, 2005, Martin, the superintendent of the water department, met with both Barrows and Andrew Cunningham, Barrows's direct supervisor, and delivered to Barrows a written list of thirteen separate allegations of gross misconduct. Barrows was ordered to appear before Martin the next morning, July 19, 2005. At the July 19 meeting, Barrows was accompanied by Nancy Caldeira and Robert Silvia, his union representatives. He refused to answer any of the allegations at the meeting, as he wanted to seek legal advice before proceeding. Later on July 19, Martin delivered to Barrows a letter terminating his employment based on some of the allegations.

The allegations of misconduct were based on actions taken by Barrows in 2004. The allegations claimed, and Barrows has conceded, that he took dirt and sand dug from graves in the town cemetery and stockpiled it behind the water department building in an area subject to regulation under the Wetlands Protection Act. Barrows also allowed two local construction companies to store significant amounts of their own construction by-products in the same location.

As evidence that he was being targeted by Martin, Barrows submitted an affidavit of Cynthia Parola, a former Wareham selectman, in which she stated that Martin told her in the summer of 2002, “I'm going to make it my mission to get rid of Kevin Barrows.”

Barrows appealed his termination to the prudential committee, a body authorized to review termination appeals. After a public hearing, which Barrows had requested, the prudential committee determined that Barrows did not commit any violations and that his firing was not justified. Barrows was immediately reinstated to his position with full back pay for any lost wages and benefits. The Wareham conservation commission later found that some of the material that Barrows had placed or had authorized to be placed behind the water department building had been deposited into an area subject to regulation under the Wetlands Protection Act. It cost the town approximately $150,000 to remediate the problem.

Discussion. 1. Summary judgment. Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422, 456 N.E.2d 1123 (1983). See Community Natl. Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976); Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17, 532 N.E.2d 1211 (1989).

The town argues that the grant of summary judgment on counts I and II was proper as a matter of law pursuant to G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ). The town and Martin further argue that summary judgment was also appropriate on count III pursuant to the privilege applicable to statements made by public officials in the performance of their official duties.

[82 Mass.App.Ct. 626]2. Claims against the town. “[T]he primary purpose of the Act was to replace the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity, and its myriad judicially created exceptions, with a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the tort liability of public employers.” Morrissey v. New England Deaconess Assn.—Abundant Life Communities, Inc., 458 Mass. 580, 590, 940 N.E.2d 391 (2010). The Act “created a cause of action against public employers for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of their employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525, 537, 845 N.E.2d 338 (2006). See G.L. c. 258, § 2. The Act expressly exempts intentional torts from its provisions, and therefore a public employer cannot be sued for the intentionally tortious conduct of its employee. See G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ). ² While § 10( c ) lists a number of intentional torts, its use of the word “including” indicates that the enumerated list is representative, not all-inclusive, and that any intentional tort is covered by § 10( c ). See Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist. Commn., 398 Mass. 140, 149, 495 N.E.2d 840 (1986); Molinaro v. Northbridge, 419 Mass. 278, 279, 643 N.E.2d 1043 (1995).

Barrows argues that since his complaint alleges reckless misconduct in the defamation claim, the town is not exempt from suit under the provisions of § 10( c ). Barrows's argument is based largely on Forbush v. Lynn, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 696, 699, 625 N.E.2d 1370 (1994), in which we determined that the alleged wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct of municipal employees “should not be equated with the intentional torts which § 10( c ) exempts from the coverage of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.” Contrast Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 401, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (“The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.... Wanton or reckless conduct is the legal equivalent of intentional conduct”). The municipality in Forbush was not immune from tort liability under the Act when a child was seriously injured while playing on a public playground as a result of the municipality's wilful, wanton, and reckless conduct. Forbush v. Lynn, supra at 699, 625 N.E.2d 1370.³

Relying on Forbush, Barrows argues that the town defamed him wantonly and recklessly, and that therefore his complaint should not have been dismissed pursuant to G.L. c. 258, § 10( c ).⁴ He argues that the Legislature did not intend wanton and reckless defamation to be exempted under § 10( c ) as an intentional tort.

We do not agree with Barrows's argument and are not persuaded by his attempt to apply the Forbush analysis to the tort of defamation. First, the tort at issue in Forbush was a claim for personal injury based on reckless or wanton conduct, a tort that is not specifically exempted from liability under the Act by § 10( c ).⁵

Additionally, as we will discuss in more detail, the gravamen of the tort of defamation does not lie in the nature or degree of the misconduct but in its outcome, i.e., the injury to the reputation of the plaintiff. Barrows misconstrues (1) the nature of the tort of defamation and (2) the significance of its specific inclusion as an intentional tort in § 10( c ). “Defamation is the publication of material by one without a privilege to do so which ridicules or treats the plaintiff with contempt.” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 812, 626 N.E.2d 862 (1994), quoting from Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319, 572 N.E.2d 7 (1991). Defamation is essentially spoken or written words or expressions that injure reputation.⁶ See Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 853, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975). While jurisdictions differ as to the extent to which a statement must be capable of injuring the plaintiff's reputation for it to be defamatory, in Massachusetts the false statement must be one that “discredits the plaintiff ‘in the minds of any considerable and respectable segment in the community.’ ” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, supra at 811, 626 N.E.2d 862, quoting from Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 751, 400 N.E.2d 847 (1980).

Although defamation is explicitly enumerated in § 10( c ), it is unique among the listed intentional torts in that it does not require any intentional misconduct.^7,8 Assuming the other elements of defamation are present, the publication of a false statementabout a private party is equally tortious whether it is made intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. See, e.g., Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 390, 372 N.E.2d 1281 (1978) (defamation verdict reinstated where jury could have determined that defendant during...