Barry v. State Bar of Cal., S214058
Decision Date | 05 January 2017 |
Docket Number | S214058 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | Patricia J. BARRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. |
Patricia J. Barry, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joseph Starr Babcock, Lawrence C. Yee, San Francisco, Thomas A. Miller, Danielle Adoracion Lee; Kerr & Wagstaffe, James M. Wagstaffe and Michael von Loewenfeldt, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.
Under California's anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant may bring a special motion to strike a cause of action arising from constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Unless the plaintiff establishes a probability of prevailing on the claim, the court must grant the motion and ordinarily must also award the defendant its attorney's fees and costs. (Id. , subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).) In this case, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had failed to show a probability of prevailing because, among other reasons, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. The question presented is whether a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim may grant a special motion to strike the claim under section 425.16, and thus may award attorney's fees and costs to the defendant. We conclude that the answer to that question is yes, and accordingly reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute in 1992 in response to concerns about "a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).) The statute is designed to deter such lawsuits—termed "strategic lawsuits against public participation" or "SLAPP suits"—in order to "encourage continued participation in matters of public significance" and to ensure "that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process." (Ibid. ) The statute instructs that its provisions are to be "construed broadly" in service of these goals. (Ibid. )
The anti-SLAPP statute's core provision authorizes defendants to file a special motion to strike "[a] cause of action against a person arising from" the petition or speech activities "of that person ... in connection with a public issue." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Such motions shall be granted "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (Ibid. ) The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps: " " (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115 ; see Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685.) At this second step of the analysis, a trial court considers "the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based" in evaluating the plaintiff's probability of success. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The court " ‘ "accept[s] as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate[s] the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law." ’ " (Oasis West Realty , at p. 820, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256, 250 P.3d 1115.) " ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute ... is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ " (Ibid . )
Because SLAPPs "seek to deplete ‘the defendant's energy’ and drain ‘his or her resources,’ " the anti-SLAPP statute contains several provisions designed to "limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit" and to " ‘ "prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without great cost to the SLAPP target." ’ " (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 106 P.3d 958 (Varian Medical ).) Once a special motion to strike is filed, for example, a court must consider the motion within 30 days (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (f) ), and discovery is stayed pending resolution of the motion (id. subd. (g)). Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, a defendant that prevails on a special motion to strike is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. (Id. subd. (c)(1).)
This case arises from State Bar disciplinary proceedings involving Attorney Patricia J. Barry. After the State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel filed disciplinary charges against her, Barry stipulated to having committed violations of the rules of professional conduct. She further agreed to recommended discipline including a 60-day actual suspension from the practice of law. The State Bar Court entered an order approving the recommended discipline.
Despite having agreed to the State Bar Court's recommendation, Barry thereafter filed a petition for writ of review in this court, asking the court to set aside the stipulation and dismiss the disciplinary charges. Barry asserted, among other things, that the stipulation was false and that she had entered into it due to financial hardship. This court denied Barry's petition for writ of review and imposed the recommended discipline.
After this court denied Barry's petition, Barry filed an action in superior court against the State Bar. Alleging that the State Bar's actions were retaliatory and discriminatory, Barry asserted causes of action under a variety of state laws, as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. She sought an order vacating the stipulation and dismissing the underlying disciplinary charges, or, in the alternative, granting her a jury trial on the underlying disciplinary charges. Barry also sought various reforms of the State Bar.
The State Bar both demurred to the complaint and filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b) ). The trial court granted the State Bar's anti-SLAPP motion. At the first step of the analysis, the trial court concluded that all of Barry's claims concerned the State Bar's actions in pursuing charges against Barry and recommending to this court that she be disciplined, and thus arose from protected petitioning activity. (See Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 203, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 41, 138 P.3d 193.) At the second step of the analysis, the trial court concluded that Barry had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on her claims for a variety of reasons, including because a superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters, which are reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of this court. (See, e.g., Jacobs v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 191, 196, 141 Cal.Rptr. 812, 570 P.2d 1230 ; Sheller v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1710, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 207.)1 The court accordingly granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded $2,575.04 in attorney's fees to the State Bar as the "prevailing defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)2
On appeal, Barry did not challenge the trial court's conclusions that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her claims or that the claims arose from protected activity. Rather, she argued that because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her claims, it also lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the State Bar's anti-SLAPP motion or to award attorney's fees. Agreeing with Barry, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeal reasoned: " [¶ ] ...
We granted the State Bar's petition for review.
(Varian Medical , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 196, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 106 P.3d 958, quoting Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942.) As the case comes to us, the primary question presented is whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, the anti-SLAPP statute requires a court to make a determination on the merits of the plaintiff's claims before granting a special motion to strike. We begin by considering the language of the statute. (See, e.g., Larkin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 358 P.3d 552.) The anti-SLAPP statute provides that a cause of action arising from protected activity is subject to a ...
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Barry v. State Bar of Cal., S214058
...2 Cal.5th 318386 P.3d 788212 Cal.Rptr.3d 124Patricia J. BARRY, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.The STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.S214058Supreme Court of CaliforniaFiled January 5, 2017Patricia J. Barry, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.Joseph Starr Babcock, Lawrence C......