Barteldes Seed Co. v. Gunn
| Decision Date | 17 October 1916 |
| Docket Number | 7745. |
| Citation | 159 P. 502,61 Okla. 95,1916 OK 876 |
| Parties | BARTELDES SEED CO. v. GUNN ET AL. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under subdivision 16 of section 3342, Revised Laws of 1910, all current wages and earnings for personal or professional services earned within the last 90 days is reserved to the head of every family residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution, and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts.
Under section 5199, Revised Laws of 1910, the earnings of a debtor who is a resident of this state, for his personal services at any time within three months next preceding the issuing of an execution, attachment, or garnishment process, cannot be applied to the payment of his debts when it is made to appear, by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise, that such earnings are necessary for the maintenance of a family supported wholly or partly by his labor.
The object of these statutes is to give to the head of a family his current wages or his personal earnings in whatsoever manner acquired for his personal services earned within the time specified by the statute, and he is entitled thereto although his wages or his earnings for his personal services may be reserved to him under a contract, whereby he is to receive so much for the job performed.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 3. Error from County Court, Canadian County; R. B. Forest, Judge.
Action by the Barteldes Seed Company against C. E. Gunn and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Modified and affirmed, with directions.
E. F Maley and J. N. Roberson, both of El Reno, and McLaury & Hopps, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
D. F Carl, of El Reno, for defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error recovered judgment against C. E. Gunn in the county court of Canadian county in April, 1915, for the sum of $231.29. Thereafter, in order to enforce the collection of said judgment, it sought to subject thereto a debt due by the Stiles Construction Company to C. E. Gunn.
It appears from the evidence here that on February 16, 1915, the said Gunn made a contract with the Stiles Construction Company whereby he obligated himself to do all the hauling required in the erection of the post office at El Reno, for which he was to receive so much per 1,000 tons or yards as the case might be, and in order to carry out the provisions of his contract he employed other parties to assist him in said hauling, and at the time of the service of the garnishment herein there was due by him to several parties moneys for their services in aiding him in the performance of said contract. It further appears that the construction company owed him about $113 which the plaintiff in error attempted to subject to the satisfaction of its debt. It is asserted here by Gunn that, at the time of the service of the garnishment herein, he was a resident of this state with a family dependent upon him for support, and that the money attempted to be subjected here constitutes his earnings for his personal services within three months next preceding the service of said garnishment, and that for these reasons the fund due him by the Stiles Construction Company is not subject to the garnishment issued in this cause, while it is asserted by the plaintiff in error that all of said fund is subject to garnishment for the reason that the sum is due under a contract for the services of Gunn and others, and that Gunn is not entitled to claim the same as exempt. The record here discloses that Gunn made no profit from the labor of others, and the parties performing services were to receive from him the same pay as he himself received, and they are not parties to this appeal.
It appears from an examination of our statute (section 3342, subd. 16) that:
"All current wages and earnings for personal or professional services earned within the last ninety days" "shall be reserved to the head of every family residing in the state exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts."
And it further appears from section 5199 that:
"The earnings of a debtor, who is a resident of this state, for his personal services at any time within three months next preceding the issuing of an execution, attachment or garnishment process, cannot be applied to the payment of his debts when it is made to appear by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise that such earnings are necessary for the maintenance of a family supported wholly or partly by his labor," etc.
Under these provisions of the statute Gunn asserts that this money involved here is not subject to garnishment. It cannot be contended that this money is due him for wages, inasmuch as the evidence conclusively shows that the money is due for services performed by Gunn and others in the performance of his contract with the Stiles Construction Company, and, if he is entitled to the same as exempt, it must be under the other provision of the statute for earnings for personal services, as there can be no claim for professional services involved here. Clearly the object of this statute is to give to the head of a family his current wages and his earnings in whatsoever manner acquired for his personal services earned within the time specified within the statute. The court cannot extend it beyond the time nor beyond the purposes for which the statute intended to protect the head of the family, and if there should be any doubt whatever, as to the application of the statute to the fund in question, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the claimant. However, the courts cannot give to statutes of this character an application which the Legislature did not intend should be extended to it.
Under the evidence here Gunn performed some of the services for which this money was due by the construction company to him, and the same clearly constitutes his earnings, and, as we view the law, it is absolutely immaterial how the pay may be reserved to him, whether so much by the day, or week, or month, or so much for the job, it nevertheless constitutes his earnings for his personal services out of which he is entitled to his exemptions. However, for that part of the fund due by the Stiles Construction Company to him for services performed by others, we are of the opinion that he is not entitled to claim any exemptions therefrom, as many elements may enter into the same other than the personal services of Gunn, and the object of the statute, we think, is to exempt the earnings for personal services as contradistinguished from the income arising from a business involving other elements of gain; and it is clearly evident that the contract feature of the services performed by others involved many elements of profit aside from the mere personal earnings of Gunn.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Smith v. Brooke, 49 Pa. St. 150, said:
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