Bartholomay v. Plains Grain & Agronomy, LLC
Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 20160030.,20160030. |
Parties | Penny BARTHOLOMAY, individually for herself and the heirs at law of Jon D. Bartholomay, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant v. PLAINS GRAIN & AGRONOMY, LLC, Defendant and Appellee. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Craig E. Johnson (argued) and Jared J. Hines (appeared), Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.
Barton J. Cahill, Moorhead, MN, for defendant and appellee.
CROTHERS
, Justice.
[¶ 1] Penny Bartholomay, individually for herself and the heirs of her deceased husband, Jon Bartholomay, appeals from a judgment dismissing her wrongful death action against Jon Bartholomay's former employer, Plains Grain & Agronomy, LLC. We affirm, because the facts alleged do not provide a genuine issue of material fact to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act.
[¶ 2] On January 18, 2013, Jon Bartholomay was loading grain into railcars at the Sheldon Grain Elevator as an employee of Plains, which was an insured employer under the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act, N.D.C.C. tit. 65. Jon Bartholomay fell from the top of a railcar he was loading and suffered serious injuries. Plains had no safety equipment in place to protect against falls, but intended to install a fall protection system. Jon Bartholomay never regained consciousness and died as a result of his injuries on February 15, 2013.
[¶ 3] Penny Bartholomay sued Plains for wrongful death damages alleging it intentionally exposed Jon Bartholomay to unsafe working conditions. Plains answered and claimed the lawsuit was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. Penny Bartholomay responded that her lawsuit could proceed because, under the sole exception to employer immunity from civil liability under the Act, Jon Bartholomay's injuries were caused by Plains' “intentional act done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury.” N.D.C.C. § 65–01–01.1
. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit because, as a matter of law, Plains' alleged conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional act done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury.
[¶ 4] Penny Bartholomay argues the district court erred in dismissing her action because she presented evidence demonstrating Plains committed an intentional act with the conscious purpose of causing Jon Bartholomay's accident, injuries and eventual death.
[¶ 5] This Court's standard for reviewing a summary judgment is well established:
Fleck v. Missouri River Royalty Corp., 2015 ND 287, ¶ 6, 872 N.W.2d 329
(quoting Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 6, 868 N.W.2d 368 ).
[¶ 6] “Generally, when an employer complies with the workers compensation statutes, the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer is limited to recovery under the workers compensation statutes.” Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D.1988)
; see also N.D.C.C. §§ 65–01–01, 65–01–08, 65–04–28, and 65–05–06. “Under the workers' compensation act, an employee generally gives up the right to sue the employer in exchange for sure and certain benefits for all workplace injuries, regardless of fault.” Trinity Hosps. v. Mattson, 2006 ND 231, ¶ 11, 723 N.W.2d 684. Section 65–01–01.1, N.D.C.C., provides that “[t]he sole exception to an employer's immunity from civil liability under this title ... is an action for an injury to an employee caused by an employer's intentional act done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury.” The statute was enacted in 1999, see 1999 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 549, § 1, after the decision in Zimmerman by Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 1997 ND 203, 570 N.W.2d 204.
[¶ 7] In Zimmerman, this Court held there is a public policy exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act and the Act 1997 ND 203, ¶ 21, 570 N.W.2d 204
(footnote omitted). Zimmerman involved a car wash employee whose right arm was torn off while using an industrial centrifuge extractor that had a safety interlock system which had been inoperative for months. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3. The employer knew the interlock was inoperative but failed to repair it because the car wash would have to be shut down for an hour and a half. Id. at ¶ 22. This Court noted that some jurisdictions use the “substantial certainty test” for the intentional tort exception to workers compensation exclusive remedy provisions, under which the employer has committed an intentional tort “if the employer intended the act that caused the injury or knew the injury was substantially certain to occur from the act.” Id. at ¶ 19. This Court also noted other jurisdictions use the “true intentional torts” test which allows “an employee to pursue a civil cause of action only if the employer intended the act and intended an injury.” Id. at ¶ 20.
[¶ 8] The Zimmerman majority adopted the “true intentional torts” exception and affirmed summary judgment dismissal of the action:
1997 ND 203, ¶¶ 22–23, 570 N.W.2d 204
. This Court concluded, “using a true intentional injury standard, the evidence is not sufficient to support a claim because there is no evidence Valdak had knowledge an injury was certain to occur from failure to repair the extractor.” Id. at ¶ 26.
[¶ 9] The dissent in Zimmerman claimed that the majority created an “inconsistency” by adopting a “true intentional tort” exception but defining it as a “strict version” of the “substantial certainty” test which does not require the employer to have intended the consequences. 1997 ND 203, ¶¶ 31–33, 570 N.W.2d 204
(Neumann, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices would have reversed and remanded because “reasonable minds could differ as to whether Valdak knew Zimmerman's injury was certain to follow from a failure to repair the extractor,” and therefore “a question of fact exists regarding whether an intentional tort was committed.” Id. at ¶ 40 (footnote omitted). Section 65–01–01.1, N.D.C.C., was subsequently enacted to avoid the “ambiguous and contradictory language of the Supreme Court in the Zimmerman decision ... by clearly defining the limited circumstances under which a suit may be brought against an employer.” Hearing on H.B. 1331 Before the House Industry, Business, and Labor Committee, 56th Legis. Sess. (Jan. 19, 1999) ( ).
[¶ 10] Any inconsistency in the Zimmerman decision was clarified by the Legislature's enactment of N.D.C.C. § 65–01–01.1
which requires the “employer's intentional act [be] done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury. ” (emphasis added). As explained in 9 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 103.03, pp. 103-6–103-8 (2014):
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