Bartleson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C02-3008-MWB.,C02-3008-MWB. |
| Parties | JODY M. BARTLESON, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, v. WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
On September 11, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a motion (Doc. No. 41) for leave to amend their complaint. The defendant filed a resistance (Doc. No. 43) on September 22, 2003. The court held a hearing on the motion on October 2, 2003, and directed the parties to file briefs in support of their respective positions. The defendant filed its brief on October 14, 2003 (Doc. No. 46), and the plaintiffs filed their brief on October 15, 2003 (Doc. No. 47). The motion is now fully submitted and ready for consideration.
The plaintiffs in this case, who are current and former employees of the defendant, have brought this action for violation of overtime provisions contained in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"). In their motion to amend, the plaintiffs seek to add a claim "for violations of Iowa Code Chapter 91A, the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act." (Doc. No. 41, ¶ 2) The defendant objects on several grounds, discussed below. Among other things, a real "fighting issue" with respect to the motion is that the amendment will add a second potential class of plaintiffs to the case. The FLSA permits class actions for unpaid wages, but such actions must be "opt in" class actions. In other words, affected employees must elect to opt into the suit and be listed as plaintiffs. See 29 U.S.C. § 216. There is no such restriction in the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act ("IWPCA"), under which a class action would involve a traditional "opt out" class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, including all affected employees as plaintiffs until they ask to be excluded. The defendant argues the IWPCA does not allow for a separate cause of action, Congress did not intend that FLSA actions should be joined with state wage payment claims, and in any event, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Although, the policy favoring liberal allowance of amendment does not mean the right to amend is absolute, Thompson-El v. Jones, 876 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1989), the Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 15(a) to mean that "absent a good reason for denial — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment — leave to amend should be granted." Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)); accord Hanson v. Hancock County Mem. Hosp., 938 F. Supp. 1419, 1430 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F. Supp. 1449, 1470-71 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Quality Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. City of Spencer, Iowa, 908 F. Supp. 1471, 1488-89 (N.D. Iowa 1995). The court must consider the prejudice to the opponent, whether additional discovery would be required, and whether the court's docket would be adversely affected. Elema-Schonander, Inc. v. K.C.F. Medical Supply, 869 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1989).
In the present case, the defendant first objects to the amendment on the basis that it is untimely. The defendant notes all deadlines for amendments to the pleadings have passed, notice has been given to potential plaintiffs in the FLSA action, and 21 parties have been added as "opt in" plaintiffs since September 24, 2002. (See Doc. No. 46) The defendant further argues the plaintiffs "have come forward with no reason for their delay in seeking this amendment." (Id., p. 3) The plaintiffs' counsel explained at the hearing that she filed the motion to amend after learning of the possibility of adding a claim under the IWPCA at a recent continuing legal education seminar, and she previously had not been aware of such a claim as a potential cause of action in this type of case. The court finds the plaintiff has not withheld filing the motion to amend in bad faith, for purposes of delay, or for any other improper purpose. Counsel's explanation overcomes any implication that the motion to amend was delayed willfully, or that the court's scheduling orders were "cavalierly disregarded by counsel." See Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985). Further, the amendment is not being sought to cure any deficiency in the pleadings that the plaintiffs previously failed to cure by prior amendments. Although the court is free to find that ignorance of existing law is not a satisfactory excuse for a delayed motion to amend, see Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990), the court declines to do so here, where the amendment being sought is based not on ignorance of the law, but ignorance of a creative legal theory applying that law.
As for impact on the court's docket, the trial of this case has been continued to September 13, 2004, and the discovery deadline is not until April 1, 2004. It seems unlikely the court's docket will be affected adversely if the amendment is allowed. The court similarly finds the defendant would not be prejudiced unduly by allowance of the amendment. As the defendant notes in its resistance, the facts underlying both the FLSA claim and the proposed IWPCA claim are identical. (See Doc. No. 46, p. 4)
Therefore, the court's ruling on the motion turns on whether or not the amendment would be futile, and, if not, whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the IWPCA claim.
The defendant argues the proposed amendment is futile "because Iowa Code Chapter 91A does not provide a separate cause of action under these facts and because Congress did not intend to allow state wage payment claims to be joined with FLSA claims." (Doc. No. 46, p. 4) In their Complaint, the plaintiffs allege the defendant improperly classified them as exempt employees under the FLSA. The defendant argues the IWPCA does not contain substantive provisions that define who is an exempt employee or when an employer may not claim an individual as an exempt employee. Rather, the IWPCA relies on "the statutory structure of the FLSA to determined the alleged `wage' due," and the Iowa law "is purely a remedial statute that, standing alone, cannot support Plaintiffs' claims." (Doc. No. 46, pp. 4-5) The defendant argues, "A long line of cases makes clear that the [IWPCA] is only a remedial act adopted as a means of permitting employees to collect `wages' due from an employer." (Doc. No. 46, p. 5, citing Runyon v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 653 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2002); Condon Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587, 596 (Iowa 2000); Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1997); Maday v. Elview-Stewart Sys. Co., 324 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 1982); Williams v. Davenport Comm. Ltd. P'ship, 438 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989))
The defendant's reasoning is flawed. The very fact that the Iowa law looks to the FLSA to determine the wages due under these circumstances lends support to the plaintiff's assertion that the FLSA and IWPCA claims properly may be brought in the same action. As the Iowa Supreme Court noted in Anthony v. State, 632 N.W.2d 897 (Iowa 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129, 122 S. Ct. 1068, 151 L. Ed. 2d 971 (2002), the State of Iowa has acceded to the FLSA's mandate regarding the payment of overtime wages, and the State's "statutory scheme for deriving pay plans has been implemented in a manner that includes FLSA overtime remuneration as compensation owed by an employer." Id., 632 N.W.2d at 902-03. See also Kartheiser v. American Nat'l Can Co., 271 F.3d 1135, 1136 (8th Cir. 2001) ().
Indeed, although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not considered this particular issue,1 numerous courts have recognized that joinder of claims under the FLSA and state wage payment laws is appropriate. See, e.g., De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2003) (); Goldman v. Radioshack Corp., slip op., 2003 WL 21250571 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2003) (); Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (E.D.N.C. 2001) ); Robinson v. Sizes Unlimited, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 442 (D.N.J. 1988) (). See also Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 411-12 (D.N.J. 1988) (), aff'd in pertinent part, 862 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 165, 110 S. Ct. 482, 107 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1989).
Rather than questioning whether FLSA and state-law claims appropriately may be brought in the same case, the issue that most often arises is whether the state-law plaintif...
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