Bartlett v. New York Cent. & H.R.r. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1907
• Citation: 195 Mass. 299,81 N.E. 204
• Parties: BARTLETT et al. v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

195 Mass. 299

81 N.E. 204

BARTLETT et al. v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 14, 1907

COUNSEL

John E. Talbot, for appellants.

Woodward Hudson, for appellee.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

A board of county commissioners duly organized constitutes a court clothed with judicial functions, and ministerial duties conferred by statute, and their final decrees until set aside are to be given the same effect and degree of conclusiveness which generally attach to judgments of judicial tribunals. Smith v. Boston, 1 Gray, 72; Brewer v. Boston Clinton & Fitchburg R. R. Co., 113 Mass. 52; Plummer v. Waterville, 32 Me. 566; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435, 439, 11 Am. Dec. 218; Cooper v Reynolds, 77 U.S. 308, 19 L.Ed. 931. Whenever given authority to hear and determine matters submitted to them, the regularity of the proceedings, or the validity of the decision, if they made an error of law, can be inquired into only on certiorari, by which the entire record is brought up for examination. Foley v. Haverhill, 144 Mass. 352, 353, 11 N.E. 554. Until thus reviewed the record reciting and setting forth their action is conclusive upon the parties in interest, and not subject to impeachment by collateral attack, unless it appears that the board was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or the order made exceeded their statutory powers. Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 455, 18 N.E. 425; Nichols v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 174 Mass. 379, 54 N.E. 881; Ahearn v. County of Middlesex, 182 Mass. 518, 520, 65 N.E. 905. Where precedent jurisdictional requirements are present mere irregularities of procedure, or an erroneous decision on questions of fact, or of law arising upon evidence cannot be reviewed, or corrected, in a suit founded upon their decree. Old Colony R. R. Co., v. Fall River, ubi supra. If, therefore, the order upon which the plaintiffs rely was within the jurisdiction of the county commissioners, and in terms is sufficiently definite, it should be enforced by an appropriate decree. By St. 1906, p. 482, c. 463, the statute relating to railroads were codified, and by part 2, § 259, c. 111, Rev. Laws, in force when the order was passed, repealed. But by this section also any right already accrued was expressly preserved, and it was further provided, that so far as they were the same, the provisions of the codifying act should be construed as a continuation of existing statutes. By Rev. Laws, c. 111, § 124, a railroad company whose location extended over a public way, was required to construct its railroad so that it would not obstruct the way, and unless a crossing at grade was authorized, the railroad must pass either under, or over the way. The defendant admits that in the year 1847 the Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation, to whose franchise it has succeeded, constructed the railroad now operated, under a street which then was, and ever since has been, a public way in the town of Holliston. Because of certain alleged encroachments by the railroad upon the width of the way, either as originally laid out, or established by prescriptive use, the selectmen of the town petitioned the county commissioners for relief under Rev. Laws, c. 111, § 132. The remedy given by this section is independent of the provisions of sections 132 to 139, whereby after a crossing has been constructed to pass either over or under the way, changes in the method employed may be ordered upon the petition either of the directors of the railroad corporation, or of the mayor and aldermen of a city, or the selectmen of a town, within whose limits the crossing is situated. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., v. County Commissioners, 164 Mass. 551, 554, 42 N.E. 100; Nichols v. Boston & Maine R. R., ubi supra. In their petition the inquiry submitted was, whether the railroad was so constructed and maintained across the street as unreasonably to obstruct its use by the public. Obviously this question would have to be determined upon evidence as to the location of the way, and the exigencies of public travel.

The broad contention of the defendant is that the decree entered after a hearing was without authority of law. It strongly urges in support of this position that as the statutes at that time did not require the consent of the county commissioners, the original lay out and construction of the crossing not only were valid, but under Rev. Laws, c. 53, § 1, after the lapse of time which had intervened since the setting of the first fence, or at common law after the second fence was built, they had no power subsequently to take action, even if it appeared to their satisfaction, that the railroad so crossed the way at the time of filing the petition as to obstruct it. Rev. St. 1836, c. 396, §§ 67, 68; St. 1846, p. 199, c. 271, § 1. But in so far as the argument rests on the recital in their record, 'that the construction of said crossing as carried out was unauthorized,' it may be said that if this is an error of law, it does not affect their jurisdiction. Ahearn v. County Commissioners, ubi supra. The board had ample authority to make this inquiry, and to proceed to an adjudication, for the obligation of the defendant's predecessor, and of the defendant, which controls and operates the railroad, not to obstruct the way, is not confined to conditions of travel as they existed when the railroad was built. Com. v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray 339; Cook v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., 133 Mass. 185. See Davis v. County Commissioners, 153 Mass. 218, 227, 26 N.E. 848, 11 L. R. A. 750. Or as was said in Dickinson v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 155 Mass. 16, 20, 34 N.E. 334, where this question was considered: 'Railroad companies which lay out their railroads across existing highways, are made subject to the jurisdiction of the county commissioners in respect to their duty of not obstructing the highways, not only at the outset, but continuously. The general policy of the Legislature is to authorize the county commissioners to put upon the railroad companies the burden of keeping the highways free from obstructions which result from building railroads across existing ways. To this end, the county commissioners may at the outset pass such decrees as seem suitable for the purpose; and if necessary to pass further decrees at a later date, jurisdiction is conferred upon them to enable them to do it.' This construction, moreover, is amply supported by the very words of the...