Barton v. Annucci

• Decision Date: 11 August 2015
• Docket Number: 14-CV-4733 (SJF)(SIL)
• Parties: WILLIAM BARTON, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, individually, BRIAN FISCHER, individually, ANDREA D. EVANS, individually, TINA STANFORD, individually, and L. MARTINIS [sic], individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

WILLIAM BARTON, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, individually, BRIAN FISCHER,individually, ANDREA D. EVANS, individually, TINA STANFORD,individually, and L. MARTINIS [sic], individually, Defendants.

14-CV-4733 (SJF)(SIL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 11, 2015

OPINION & ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, J.

I. Introduction

On or about August 8, 2014, plaintiff William Barton ("plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action against defendants Anthony J. Annucci ("Annucci"), Acting Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("NYDOCCS"); Brian Fischer ("Fischer"), former Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("NYDOC") and NYDOCCS; Andrea D. Evans ("Evans"), former Chairperson of the New York State Board of Parole ("NYBOP"); Tina Stanford ("Stanford"), Chairwoman of the NYBOP; and Lourdes Martinez ("Martinez"), i/s/a "L. Martinis," plaintiff's assigned parole officer (collectively, "defendants"), all in their individual capacity only, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, violations of his right to be free from false arrest and his due process rights, respectively, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Pending before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to, inter alia, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failureto state a claim for relief. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Background

A. Factual Background¹

The Sentence and Commitment, dated June 28, 2001, of the County Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk ("the state court") indicates, in relevant part, that upon plaintiff's conviction by plea of one (1) count of robbery in the first degree in violation of New York Penal Law § 160.15-04, plaintiff was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a determinate term of imprisonment of ten (10) years, to be followed by a period of post-release supervision ("PRS") for five (5) years. (Affirmation of Richard de Simone ["Simone Aff."], Ex. A).² It is undisputed, however, that the sentencing judge did not pronounce a specified period of PRS at the time of plaintiff's sentencing in 2001, notwithstanding that the imposition of a term of PRS wasmandatory under New York Penal Law § 70.45.³

On April 29, 2008, the New York State Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that Sections 380.20 and 380.40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law required that the PRS component of a defendant's sentence be pronounced by the sentencing judge in the defendant's presence at the time of sentencing.⁴ See People v. Sparber, 10 N.Y.3d 457, 469-70, 859 N.Y.S.2d 582, 889 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2008), superceded in part by N.Y. Penal Law § 70.85 and N.Y. Correct. Law § 601-d; Matter of Garner v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 10 N.Y.3d 358, 362, 859 N.Y.S.2d 590, 889 N.E.2d 467 (N.Y. 2008), superceded in part by N.Y. Penal Law § 70.85 andN.Y. Correct. Law § 601-d. Accordingly, in June 2008, Section 601-d of the New York Correction Law was enacted to "facilitate[] a review by the sentencing court of all cases in which the court did not specify a period of PRS in the commitment order" involving sentences imposing a determinate term of imprisonment following the enactment of N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45. Mark Bonacquist, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Correct. Law § 601-d (McKinney 2015); see also Ruffins I, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02 ("In response to the Garner and Sparber decisions, the New York legislature passed Correction Law § 601-d, which created a procedure by which improperly sentenced defendants could be identified and resentenced. That law became effective June 30, 2008.") As originally enacted,⁵ N.Y. Correct. Law § 601-d provided, in relevant part, as follows:

"This section shall apply only to inmates in the custody of the commissioner, and releasees under the supervision of the division of parole, upon whom a determinate sentence was imposed between September first, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, and the effective date of this section, which was required by law to include a term of post-release supervision:

1. For purposes of this section, such a person shall be deemed a "designated person" if the commitment order that accompanied such person does not indicate imposition of any term of post-release supervision; provided, however, that if such agency with custody of or supervision over such person has the sentencing minutes that show that a term of post-release supervision was actually pronounced at sentence, such person shall not be deemed a designated person.

2. Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the department that an inmate in its custody, or to the satisfaction of the division of parole that a releasee under its supervision, is a designated person, such agency shall make notification of that fact to the court that sentenced such person, and to the inmate or releasee."

(emphasis added).

Since the state court's Sentence and Commitment indicated that plaintiff's sentenceincluded a period of PRS for five (5) years, plaintiff was not deemed to be a "designated person" under N.Y. Correct. Law § 601-d.⁶ It is undisputed that plaintiff was never resentenced by the state court and that after plaintiff completed the imprisonment component of his sentence "on or before 06-28-11," (Compl., ¶ 8), defendants imposed PRS conditions upon him in accordance with the state court's Sentence and Commitment. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was subsequently imprisoned for violating the conditions of his PRS.⁷

In or about November 2013, plaintiff commenced a proceeding against the NYDOP pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Suffolk ("the Article 78 proceeding"), challenging the imposition of PRS to his sentence.⁸ By order dated May 28, 2014, the Article 78 court, inter alia, granted plaintiff's petition, finding that the NYDOCCS was "proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction, by imposing a period of [PRS] upon [him][,]" in violation of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(2). Barton v. Division of Parole, State of N.Y., No. 27278-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 28, 2014). It is undisputed that plaintiff was released from prison the day after the NYDOCCS received a copy of the decision in the Article 78 proceeding.

B. Procedural History

On or about August 8, 2014, plaintiff commenced this civil rights action against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that defendants' imposition of PRS following his release from incarceration, and subsequent arrest for violating the conditions of the PRS, violated his right to be free from false arrest and his due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, respectively.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to, inter alia, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim for relief.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

"A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]'devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1959.

In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., L.P., 737 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted); Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). However, this tenet "is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937. "In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id.; see also Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010).

Nonetheless, a plaintiff is not required to plead "specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make the claim plausible." Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120-1 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 729-30 (2d Cir. 2013). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whetherthey plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S....