Grullon v. City of New Haven, Docket No. 11–3184.

• Decision Date: 19 June 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 11–3184.
• Parties: Raymond GRULLON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, and Warden, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

720 F.3d 133

Raymond GRULLON, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF NEW HAVEN, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, and Warden, New Haven C.C.C. Facility, Defendants–Appellees.

Docket No. 11–3184.

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 11, 2013.

Decided: June 19, 2013.

Katherine Swan, New York, NY (Guy Miller Struve, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Michael K. Skold, Assistant Attorney General, Hartford, CT (George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, on the brief), for Defendant–Appellee Warden.

Before: KEARSE and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges, RAKOFF, District Judge ^*.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Raymond Grullon, who commenced this action pro se as a pretrial detainee, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Stefan R. Underhill, Judge, dismissing his complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants City of New Haven (the “City”), the New Haven C.C.C. Facility (“NHCC” or the “Correctional Center”), and the Warden of the New Haven C.C.C. Facility (the “Warden”), alleging, inter alia, denial of visitation rights, telephone usage, and access to a law library, and deprivation of proper temperature control, ventilation, and various amenities. The district court dismissed Grullon's claims against the City and the Correctional Center pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as lacking an arguable basis in fact or law. The court dismissed Grullon's claims against the Warden in his official capacity pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) on grounds of sovereign immunity and mootness; it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of any allegation from which the Warden's personal involvement could be inferred. On appeal, Grullon contends that the district court erred in dismissing his individual-capacity claims against the Warden without granting leave to amend the complaint to add a plausible allegation that the Warden had been informed of the alleged denials and deprivations. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Grullon should have been allowed to amend his complaint, and we vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Grullon's complaint, the factual allegations of which we take as true for purposes of reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, see, e.g., DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir.2010), alleged principally as follows.

In January 2010, Grullon, who was in custody in New York, was transferred to NHCC because of an outstanding arrest warrant against him in Connecticut. At NHCC, Grullon “was not afforded a phone call, toothpaste, soap, p[e]n, [or] paper.” (Complaint at 8 (capitalization omitted).) Grullon was informed that NHCC did not have a law library and did not provide legal materials; Grullon did not otherwise have “access to the courts, or adequate assistance by a trained advisor.” ( Id. (capitalization omitted).) Grullon was “placed into a cold cell” with “no ... blankets etc., sheets,” or other sleeping supplies. ( Id. (capitalization omitted); see also id. at 5–A (alleging “dismal conditions” including “Excessive Heat”).) Grullon was placed in a cell with another inmate and bunk beds, but with “no ladder[ ],” and “no way of getting up-top”; and for the top bunk there were “no [ ]guard rails,” producing “a dangerous condition.” ( Id. at 8 (capitalization omitted).) Grullon's cell had dangerously poor “ventilation”; and the jail had an inadequate supply of food. ( Id. (capitalization omitted).)

As required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district court promptly reviewed the complaint, see28 U.S.C. § 1915A (district court is required, as soon as practicable, to review a complaint by a prisoner or detainee seeking redress against a governmental entity, officer, or employee, to determine whether it contains a cognizable claim). In an Initial Review Order dated August 17, 2010, the court dismissed the action against the City pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) on the ground that the complaint contained no allegations against the City; and it dismissed the action against the Correctional Center on the ground that the Correctional Center—an institution of the State of Connecticut—is not a suable “person” under § 1983. The court did not immediately dismiss Grullon's action against the Warden.

The Warden thereafter moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the claims against him in his official capacity, arguing that the damages claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the requests for equitable relief were moot because Grullon was no longer being detained at NHCC, having been transferred to another facility. The Warden moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity on the grounds that the complaint failed to assert a plausible claim of any constitutional violation and failed to allege the Warden's personal involvement in any of the alleged deprivations.

Grullon, in opposition to the motion, argued that one means of establishing a supervisory official's liability for a constitutional violation is to show that the official “after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong.” (Grullon Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Grullon Response”or “Response”) ¶ 6 (citing Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.1986)) (capitalization omitted).) Grullon attached to his Response a copy of a letter he had written and addressed to the Warden, bearing the handwritten notation “Sent 4/18/10” (“Grullon Letter” or “Letter”). In the Letter, Grullon complained of, inter alia, the lack of a law library, thick dust clogging the vents in his cell, and inadequate volume on the telephones available to inmates. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Grullon requested that, if the court found the allegations in his complaint insufficient with respect to the Warden's personal responsibility, he “be allowed to amend his complaint.” (Grullon Response ¶ 11 (capitalization omitted).)

In a Ruling on Motion To Dismiss, dated July 8, 2011, reported at 2011 WL 2680843, the district court granted the Warden's motion to dismiss all of Grullon's claims. The court ruled that as to the claims against the Warden in his official capacity, the claims for damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the claims for equitable relief were moot because Grullon was no longer being detained at NHCC. See id. at *2. As to the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity, the court ruled that Grullon had failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted because he did not show that the Warden was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations. See id. at *3–*4.

With regard to the individual-capacity claims, the district court stated, inter alia, that

Grullon does not mention the Warden of NHCC other than in the caption of the complaint and description of defendants. Grullon does not allege that the Warden was directly involved in or knew about the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement at NHCC. Nor does Grullon claim that he made the Warden aware of the objectionable conditions.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The court noted that “[i]n response to the motion to dismiss, Grullon submits a copy of a letter that he claims to have sent to the Warden on April 18, 2010 regarding certain conditions of confinement at NHCC.” Id. But the court stated that it could not consider the Letter on the motion to dismiss:

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, ... the Court may consider only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.... This letter was not attached to the complaint or referenced in the complaint and does not constitute a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court added that even if it were to take judicial notice of the Letter, the complaint would fail because “Grullon d[id] not allege that the Warden actually received the letter or whether he took any action in response to the letter.” Id. at *4. The court further stated that, in any event,

a supervisory official's mere receipt of a letter complaining about unconstitutional conduct is not enough to give rise to personal involvement on the part of the official. See Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1997) (prison official who received letter from inmate and forwarded it to subordinate for investigation and response was not personally involved in depriving inmate of constitutional right).... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted on the ground that Grullon did not allege the personal involvement of the Warden in the claimed unconstitutional conditions of confinement at NHCC.

2011 WL 2680843, at *4.

The district court denied Grullon's request for leave to amend his complaint to add allegations of notice to the Warden based on the Letter, ruling that there was an insufficient interval between the date of the letter and the filing of the complaint for Grullon to have exhausted his administrative remedies:

It is apparent that any attempt to amend the complaint to add Grullon's claim that he sent a letter to the Warden on April 18, 2010 would be futile because Grullon did not allow the Warden sufficient time to respond to the letter before filing this case. State of Connecticut Administrative Directive 9.6(6)(A) requires an inmate to attempt to informally resolve his complaints about conditions prior to filing a formal grievance. A prison official is to respond to an informal written attempt at resolution within fifteen calendar days of receipt of the written request. If the letter to the Warden is construed as Grullon's attempt to informally resolve his complaints about various conditions...