Barton v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1814 WDA 2014,1814 WDA 2014
• Citation: 124 A.3d 349,2015 PA Super 203
• Parties: Tredd BARTON, Appellant v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC., Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Products, NA, Inc.and Kohler, Co., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

124 A.3d 349

2015 PA Super 203

Tredd BARTON, Appellant

v.LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC., Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Products, NA, Inc.and Kohler, Co., Appellees.

No. 1814 WDA 2014

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 26, 2015.

Filed Sept. 24, 2015.

Timothy G. Wojton, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Brett W. Farrar, Pittsburgh, for Lowe's Home Centers Inc., appellee.

Warren E. Voter, Philadelphia, for Kohler Co., appellee.

Opinion

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.:

Tredd Barton brought this products liability action against Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Products, N.A., Inc. (“Husqvarna”), Kohler Co. (“Kohler”) and Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. (“Lowe's”) (collectively “appellees”) after Barton's new lawnmower allegedly caught fire and burned down his barn. The trial court sustained appellees' preliminary objections to Barton's third amended complaint and dismissed it with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. Barton filed a timely appeal, and both Barton and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.1925. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Barton commenced this action in September 2011 via writ of summons. He reissued the writ in August 2012 and filed his original complaint in April 2013. Lowe's and Husqvarna filed preliminary objections to Barton's original complaint, prompting Barton to file an amended complaint. The trial court sustained preliminary objections of Husqvarna and Lowe's to Barton's amended complaint and directed Barton to file a second amended complaint “alleg [ing] some basis upon which the [appellees'] product was defective.” Order, 11/15/13. Subsequently, the trial court sustained all appellees' preliminary objections to Barton's second amended complaint and directed Barton to state his claims with greater specificity and correct other defects. Order, 4/9/14.

Barton filed a third amended complaint (mislabeled as his “second” amended complaint), which is the subject of this appeal. Barton alleged that Husqvarna manufactured and distributed a riding lawnmower which contained an engine manufactured and provided by Kohler. Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 11, 23. On June 30, 2010, Lowe's, a retailer, sold a Husqvarna lawnmower to Barton. Id.,¶ 5. On July 3, 2010, Barton used the lawnmower for the first time to cut grass on his property and then stored the lawnmower in his barn. Id.,¶ 6. Inside the barn, “the engine and/or the riding mower itself caught fire and/or exploded[,] causing the barn to burn down ... [T]he engine ran too hot and melted the fuel lines on the mower, [which] cause[d] fuel to leak onto the hot engine or muffler and therefore caused the fire ...”¹Id.Based on these allegations, Barton asserted claims of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty against each defendant.

All appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice. Barton filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Barton and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.1925.

Barton raises three issues in this appeal:

Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in granting the appellees' demurrers to [Barton's] strict liability counts when [Barton] alleged, inter alia,that the Husqvarna lawnmower he purchased on June 30, 2010 caught fire and/or exploded after its first use on July 3, 2010, and when such fire and/or explosion was expressly attributed by [Barton] to the engine running too hot, which caused melting of the fuel lines and the leakage of fuel?

Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in granting the appellees' demurrers to [Barton's] breach of warranty counts when [Barton] alleged, inter alia,that the Husqvarna lawnmower he purchased on June 30, 2010 caught fire and/or exploded after its first use on July 3, 2010, and when such fire and/or explosion would naturally render the Husqvarna incapable of mowing lawns and, thus, unfit for its intended purpose?

Did the trial court commit an error of law or abuse of discretion in granting the appellees' demurrers to [Barton's] negligence counts when [Barton] alleged, inter alia,that the appellees either manufactured, sold, assembled or otherwise placed the Husqvarna riding mower into the stream of commerce, thereby laying the factual predicate for the trial court's recognition of the widely accepted inherent and implied duty all manufacturers and sellers owe to their consumers?

Initially, we note the scope and standard of review applicable to this appeal:

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true.

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the averments in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial court's decision regarding preliminary objections only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. When sustaining the trial court's ruling will result in the denial of claim or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be sustained only where the case i[s] free and clear of doubt.

Thus, the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.

Weiley v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,51 A.3d 202, 208–09 (Pa.Super.2012)(citations omitted).

Barton first argues that the third amended complaint states a cause of action against the appellees for strict liability, because it alleges the existence of a defect in the lawnmower.²We agree.

In Webb v. Zern,422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), our Supreme Court formally adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law governing strict products liability actions. This section provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965). To prevail in an action under section 402A, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective, the defect existed when it left the defendant's hands, and the defect caused the harm.

Riley v. Warren Manufacturing, Inc.,455 Pa.Super. 384, 688 A.2d 221, 224 (1997). The threshold inquiry in all products liability cases is whether there is a defect. Id.This threshold

can be crossed ... either by proving a breakdown in the machine or a component thereof, traditionally known as a manufacturing defect; or in cases where there is no breakdown, by proving that the design of the machine results in an unreasonably dangerous product, traditionally known as a design defect.

Id.A third doctrine recognized under section 402A is the “failure-to-warn” theory, under which the plaintiff may recover for the defendant's failure to provide adequate instructions to the user on how to use the product as the product was designed. Weiner v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,718 A.2d 305, 309 (Pa.Super.1998). “To succeed on a claim of inadequate or lack of warning, a plaintiff must prove that the lack of warning rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and that it was the proximate cause of the injury.” Id.

The trial court gave the following reasons for dismissing Barton's strict liability claims against all appellees:

Despite this [c]ourt's order [sustaining preliminary objections to the second amended complaint] directing [Barton] to plead the precise nature of the defect—whether it was a defect in manufacture or design—Barton has pled only his ‘belief’ that the engine runs too hot[,] causing the fuel lines to leak. To begin, the alleged overheating of the engine is not a defect—it is a symptomthat might indicate a defect, but could also indicate other problems unrelated to a manufacturing or design defect such as insufficient oil levels or a clogged air intake. At any rate, such an averment, even if construed as alleging a defect, is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a products liability action because, under Riley,Barton must specifically plead either a manufacturing or design defect, and by failing to do so—even after four amendments—his claim must be dismissed as legally insufficient.

Pa.R.A.P.1925(a)Opinion, p. 6.

The trial court applied too onerous a standard to Barton's third amended complaint. The trial court seems to suggest that a plaintiff can only have a design defect action or a manufacturing defect action under section 402A, but not both. In fact, it is accepted practice for a plaintiff to proceed under more than one defect theory. See, e.g., Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corporation,876 F.Supp.2d 479, 490–92 (M.D.Pa.2012) (applying Pennsylvania law)(pl...