Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive, Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4:07–cv–00886.,4:07–cv–00886.
• Citation: 876 F.Supp.2d 479
• Parties: Jill SIKKELEE, individually and as, Personal Representative of the estate of David Sikkelee, deceased, Plaintiff, v. PRECISION AIRMOTIVE, CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

876 F.Supp.2d 479

Jill SIKKELEE, individually and as, Personal Representative of the estate of David Sikkelee, deceased, Plaintiff,

v.PRECISION AIRMOTIVE, CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:07–cv–00886.

United States District Court,

M.D. Pennsylvania.

July 3, 2012.

Clifford A. Rieders, Rieders Travis Humphrey Harris Waters & Waffenschmidt, Williamsport, PA, David I. Katzman, John D. McClune, Patrick J. Gallagher, Katzman Lampert & McClune, Troy, MI, for Plaintiff.

John M. Devaney, Perkins Cole LLP, Washington, DC, Mary P. Gaston, Sara E. Baynard–Cooke, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA, William J. Conroy, William A. Rubert, Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy, P.C., Wayne, PA, Catherine B. Slavin, Sara A. Frey, Cozen O'Conner, John E. Salmon, Zachary J. Ballard, Salmon, Ricchezza, Singer & Turchi, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

JOHN E. JONES III, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court in this wrongful death and survival action is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 220) and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 252) of Defendant AVCO Corporation on behalf of its Lycoming Engines Division (collectively “Lycoming”). The Motions have been fully briefed (Docs. 223, 235, 249, 257, 269, 276, 292, 296) and are therefore ripe for our review. For all of the reasons fully articulated herein, we will grant in part and deny in part Lycoming's Motions.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties and the Court are intimately familiar with the lengthy and complex procedural and factual predicate of this litigation and we thus recite only the most pertinent procedural points here. Plaintiff initiated this action on May 16, 2007 with the filing of a Complaint that asserted claims for strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, concert of action, and misrepresentation against seventeen different Defendants ¹ arising out of an aircraft accident that resulted in the death of her husband, David Sikkelee (“the decedent”). (Doc. 1). The Defendants filed individual answers to the Plaintiff's Complaint between July 25 and August 1, 2007. (Docs. 52–57).

Several Defendants filed, or eventually joined in, a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on March 17, 2009. (Doc. 107). We granted in part and denied in part said motion after finding that the field of aviation safety is preempted by federal law and regulation. We thus dismissed Plaintiff's claims which were based on alleged violations of state law standards of care but permitted the Plaintiff to seek state law remedies for alleged violations of federal standards of care. (Doc. 158). The Court directed the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days. ( Id.).

On August 31, 2010, within the prescribed twenty (20) day period, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. On September 17, 2010, Defendants AVCO and Lycoming Engines filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike, (Doc. 165), Defendant Textron filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 166), and Defendants Precision Airmotive Corporation and Precision Airmotive LLC filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike. (Doc. 167). On October 15, 2010, the Kelly Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 175).

On April 8, 2011, 2011 WL 1344635, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part the above motions.² The Court denied Lycoming's Motion to the extent it related to Counts IV (strict liability) and VI (negligence), but granted it to the extent it related to Counts V (breach of warranties), X (misrepresentation) and XI (concert of action). We further ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint within ten (10) days in accordance with our decision. (Doc. 204). Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint within the prescribed ten (10) day period, (Doc. 205), and the Defendants answered on May 5, 2011. (Docs. 206–208).

On July 22, 2011, Lycoming filed a Motion for Determination of Applicable Law, (Doc. 219), seeking application of North Carolina law to all matters concerning liability in this litigation. On August 5, 2011, Lycoming filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking summary judgment on Count IV and Count VI to the extent that those causes of action relate to alleged defects in certain carburetor replacement components. (Doc. 220). On October 3, 2011, Lycoming filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the remainder of the claims in Count IV and Count VI relating to alleged defects in the subject aircraft engine. (Doc. 252).

On October 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement the Record with several recently-discovered AVCO admissions. (Doc. 256). By Order dated December 21, 2011, the Court granted the Motion to Supplement. (Doc. 279). Consistent with the Order's mandate, on January 10, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a supplemental statement of facts (Doc. 280), and on February 3, 2012, Lycoming filed a responsive statement of facts. (Doc. 284).

On March 13, 2012, the Court ruled on Lycoming's Motion to Determine Applicable Law and concluded that Pennsylvania law will apply to the liability portion of this action. (Doc. 288). In the Memorandum and Order denying the Motion, the Court noted that Lycoming had relied considerably on the application of North Carolina law in its Motions for Summary Judgment and thus granted the parties leave to supplement their briefs in light of this determination. ( Id.). On April 20, 2012, Lycoming filed supplemental briefs in support of its Motions (Docs. 292–93), and Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on May 21, 2012. (Doc. 296). Both Motions have now been fully and excellently briefed by the parties and are thus ripe for our review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant meets this burden by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The non-moving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir.2000). Arguments made in briefs “are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109–10 (3d Cir.1985). However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir.2006).

Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences that a fact finder could draw therefrom. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.1982). Still, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

The following facts are derived from the record and viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff in accordance with the standard of review applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Due to the factual complexity of this litigation and the familiarity of the parties and the Court with the record, we briefly state the pertinent facts herein and supplement them as necessary with additional facts throughout our analysis.

This action arises out of an aircraft accident involving a 1976 Cessna 172N airplane on July 10, 2005 at the Transylvania County Airport in Brevard, North Carolina. The accident resulted in the death of David Sikkelee (“the decedent”), husbandof Jill Sikkelee (“Plaintiff”), and significant injuries to the decedent's brother, Craig Sikkelee (“the passenger”). Shortly after takeoff on July 10, 2005, the plane crashed to the ground, resulting in the death of the decedent and serious injuries to the passenger. Plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by a faulty carburetor, specifically a loosening throttle body to bowl assembly within said carburetor, installed in the subject engine.

Lycoming designed and manufactured a certain 0–320–D2C aircraft engine, bearing serial number L–6590–39A (“engine S/N L–6590–39A” or “the subject engine”), in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 253, ¶ 1). Lycoming shipped the subject engine to Beagle Aircraft, Inc., on September 4, 1969. ( Id. ¶ 2). The Lycoming O–320 engine, S/N L–6590–39A, was installed on the Cessna 172N aircraft when it crashed on July 10, 2005. ( Id. ¶ 3). Plaintiff admits that the carburetor that was installed on the Cessna 172N was not the same carburetor Lycoming shipped with the subject engine in 1969 but was instead a different carburetor. (Doc. 221, ¶ 5). The carburetor...