Barton v. N.M. Racing Comm'n

Docket NumberA-1-CA-39837
Decision Date28 August 2023
PartiesDALLAS J. BARTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION; IZZY TREJO, in his individual capacity; LEASA JOHNSON, in her individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Lisa C. Ortega District Court Judge

Western Agriculture, Resource and Business Advocates, LLP A Blair Dunn Jared R. Vander Dussen Albuquerque, NM for Appellant

Park &Associates, LLC Alfred A. Park Geoffrey D. White Albuquerque, NM for Appellee New Mexico Racing Commission

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUFFY, Judge.

{¶1}I n this appeal, Plaintiff Dallas J. Barton argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint against the New Mexico Racing Commission for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} Plaintiff is a horse trainer licensed by the Commission. In 2018, Thunder Dome-a horse trained by Plaintiff-tested positive for a prohibited amount of Phenylbutazone. Plaintiff alleged that he was fined, suspended, and stripped of his first-place purse. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking the district court's review of the agency proceedings, pursuant to Rule 1-075 NMRA, and contemporaneously filed a complaint that included two claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim for declaratory relief. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the Commission violated his due process rights by changing its testing laboratories and testing procedure without notice.

{¶3} In the administrative appeal, the district court reversed the Commission's decision and remanded the matter for the Commission to dismiss the proceedings against Plaintiff. In the same order, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeals the district court's dismissal of his complaint.

DISCUSSION

{¶4} "[T]he question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo." Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300.

{¶5} In this case, the district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint under Smith, which discussed the interplay of judicial review of administrative decisions by writ of certiorari under Rule 1-075, and the use of declaratory judgment actions to challenge an administrative action. See Smith, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 12-20. Here, Plaintiff sought certiorari review of the administrative decision and prevailed in overturning the Commission's adverse decision, thereby eliminating the punitive result of the administrative proceedings. Under the circumstances, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief adhered to this Court's precedent. See Johnson v. Lally, 1994-NMCA-135, ¶ 1, 118 N.M. 795, 887 P.2d 1262 (concluding that "past wrongs, even unconstitutional wrongs, do not create a foundation for declaratory relief without either continuing illegal actions or continuing consequences to [the p]laintiff"). Based on Smith and Johnson, we affirm the district court's determination that declaratory relief was not available to Plaintiff.

{¶6} These cases, however, only resolve the portion of Plaintiff's complaint that sought declaratory relief based upon the contention that the Commission had violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights; they do not provide grounds for dismissal of the other claims for damages alleged in the complaint. The district court did not expressly rule on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims or provide a basis to explain why the court believed dismissal was appropriate as to those counts.

{¶7} Plaintiff argues there is no bar to the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over those causes of action, contending specifically that "nothing in Smith or Rule [1-0]75 prohibits the filing of a complaint in addition to the petition for writ of certiorari and, in fact, judicial efficiency would encourage it." Plaintiff adds that neither the rule nor any statute "prohibits [an a]ppellant from seeking relief for the first time concurrently with the [d]istrict [c]ourt's appellate review." We agree.[1] In Tri-State Generation &Transmission Association, Inc. v. D'Antonio, 2011-NMCA-014, ¶ 24, 149 N.M. 386, 249 P.3d 924, this Court noted that "[t]he district courts of this [s]tate have broad jurisdiction-legal and equitable, original and appellate.... Moreover, the court's original jurisdiction may be exercised at the same time as its appellate jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) See also Maso v. N.M. Tax'n &Revenue Dep't, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 ("[T]he district court can simultaneously exercise its appellate and original jurisdiction."); White v. Farris, 2021-NMCA-014, ¶ 22, 485 P.3d 791 (same). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff "invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the district court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari under Rule 1-075" did not foreclose the court "from also exercising its original jurisdiction." Tri-State Generation &Transmission Ass'n, Inc., 2011-NMCA-014, ¶ 24.

CONCLUSION

{¶8} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief but reverse the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for damages and remand for further proceedings.

{¶9} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: J. MILES HANISEE, Judge, KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part BOGARDUS, Judge, (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

{¶10} I concur in the majority decision affirming the district court's reversal of the Commission's decision. I depart from the majority regarding its remand to consider Petitioner's § 1983 claim. It is unclear wh ether Plaintiff challenges the district court's dismissal of his constitutional claims, including the § 1983 claims the phrase "§ 1983" was mentioned only once in Plaintiff's brief in chief, in the introduction. Petitioner's argument on appeal was entirely devoted to his claim for declaratory relief. Accordingly, in my view, Plaintiff did not develop his arguments challenging the district court's dismissal of the constitutional claims and therefore this Court should not consider the challenges. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (stating that this Court will not consider unclear or undeveloped arguments).

{¶11} Even so, setting aside the constitutional challenges, this Court clarified in Johnson, 1994-NMCA-135, ¶¶ 5, 17, that declaratory relief, even for a past constitutional violation, is inappropriate absent the likelihood of continuing unconstitutional activity, or continuing legal consequences. The Johnson court resolved a dispositive question in this case: "[W]hether a declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy solely to vindicate past grievances, when that judgment would have no significant, practical effect or purpose with regard to any future conduct of the parties." Id. ¶ 1. The plaintiff in Johnson sought a declaratory judgment determining that the defendant, a prosecutor, violated his civil rights by initiating criminal proceedings maliciously and without cause. Id. The district court denied the declaratory relief and this Court affirmed, concluding that "past wrongs, even unconstitutional wrongs, do not create a foundation for declaratory relief without either continuing illegal actions or continuing consequences to [the p]laintiff." Id. ¶ 11.

{¶12} In this case, there is no ongoing constitutional violation. According to Petitioner, the alleged constitutional violation occurred when the Commission changed testing laboratories and, therefore, testing procedures, without notice. This alleged violation is a single, past occurrence, similar to the alleged violation in Johnson, where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully initiated a criminal proceeding. Id. ¶ 1. "[D]eclaratory relief is simply not available to clarify or declare [single,] past conduct, without something more." Id. ¶ 16. In Johnson, this Court further held that even if the alleged constitutional violations caused the plaintiff to suffer uncompensated damages, "such declaratory relief would in no way redress those past injuries." Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We further acknowledged that the argument that a defendant's denial of the allegation in a declaratory judgment claim "seem[s] to create a 'controversy' of some weight." Id. ¶ 9. This "initial controversy," however, is insufficient to warrant declaratory relief; thus, we must look beyond it to "decide whether there is a substantial controversy." Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, issuance of a declaratory judgment would only be appropriate in these circumstances if there are continuing legal consequences to the Petitioner. See id. ¶ 17 ("Our focus, therefore, is not solely whether the wrongful acts themselves are likely to be repeated, but also, whether [the d]efendant's past acts continue to have ...

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