Barton v. Ne. Transp.
| Decision Date | 24 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-326 (KMK) |
| Parties | CATHERINE BARTON and ZACHARY ZAITZEFF, Plaintiffs, v. NORTHEAST TRANSPORT, INC., and LAND-AIR EXPRESS OF NEW ENGLAND, LTD., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Catherine Barton, Zachary Zaitzeff Pro Se Plaintiffs
Jennifer H. McGay, Esq., Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP Counsel for Defendant Northeast Transport, Inc.
Catherine Barton (“Barton”) and Zachary Zaitzeff (“Zaitzeff”; collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action pro se against Northeast Transport, Inc. (“Northeast Transport”) and Land-Air Express of New England, Ltd. (“Land-Air”; collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants acted negligently and inappropriately, resulting in the destruction of goods Plaintiffs produced for retail sale and, ultimately, the collapse of Plaintiffs' business. (See Compl. § 3.1 (Dkt. No. 1).) Before the Court is Northeast Transport's Motion To Dismiss (the “Motion”), filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 33).)[1] For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs' Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.
Plaintiffs were the proprietors of a small family business in Verbank, Dutchess County, New York. (Compl. § 3.7.) In that capacity, Plaintiffs created “low calorie and low sugar sodas packaged in 12[-]ounce clear glass bottles with a screw off cap” that were sold in the lower Hudson Valley region. (Id. § 3.4.)
On or about January 15, 2018, Plaintiffs, as proprietors, engaged Northeast Transport to transport the bottles from the bottling facility in Rochester, New York, to Plaintiffs' business in Verbank. (Id. § 3.7.) As part of this arrangement, Plaintiffs had “called and expressed concern” to Northeast Transport that the freezing temperatures meant the glass bottles could freeze and break. (Id. § 3.11.) Plaintiffs were assured by Northeast Transport “not to worry about it because the company and its driver would use their discretion in taking precautions when picking up and delivering the soda bottles.” (Id. § 3.12.) Notwithstanding these assurances, Northeast Transport had contracted with Land-Air to perform the actual transportation. (Id. § 3.9.) Northeast Transport did not inform Plaintiffs of this arrangement. (Id.)
By January 15, 2018, the bottling facility had bottled 183 cases of the soda, and each case contained 24 bottles, totaling 4, 392 bottles. (Id. § 3.8.) That day, Land-Air picked up the bottles from the bottling facility in Rochester. (Id. § 3.10.) The bottles were then held in a noninsulated truck for two days. (Id.)[2]
Upon delivery in Verbank-where the weather stood at sub-freezing temperatures, (id. § 3.13)-“all 183 soda cases were frozen and destroyed, ” (id. § 3.14). Northeast Transport did not purchase insurance for the shipment. (Id. § 3.15.)
At the time of this incident, Plaintiffs' business was “in limbo and in dire straits with substantial customers lost.” (Id. § 3.16.) Plaintiffs lost considerable revenue from having been unable to sell the cases of soda. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiffs had to shut down the business, at first doing so temporarily. (Id.)
During the initial shutdown period, customers refused to make additional orders for fear that the business would not be able to recover and execute prospective orders, thereby perpetuating and exacerbating the incident's damage. (See id. §§ 3.17.a-17.b.) Given an absence of future orders amid continued expenses and reputational damage, Plaintiffs were forced to permanently close their business. (Id. §§ 3.17.b-17.d.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint was docketed on January 7, 2021. (See generally Compl.) Northeast Transport filed a motion to dismiss and supporting papers on June 4, 2021. (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 14); Declaration of Jennifer McGay in Supp. of Motion (Dkt. No. 15); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 16).) This initial motion was denied without prejudice three days later for failure to comply with the Court's Individual Rules. (See Dkt. No. 18.) On June 25, 2021, Plaintiffs submitted what it titled a “Statement & Motion for Summary Judgment.”
(See generally Statement & Motion for Summary Judgment (“Statement”) (Dkt. No. 25).)
Subsequently, the Court held a pre-motion conference on July 13, 2021, (see Dkt. (minute entry of July 13, 2021)), after which the Court issued a scheduling order, (see Dkt. No. 31).
Subsequently, and adhering to the scheduling order, Northeast Transport re-filed the Motion To Dismiss and filed the supporting papers as exhibits thereto. (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 33); Declaration of Jennifer McGay in Supp. of Motion (“McGay Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 33-1); Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 33-8).) Plaintiffs timely submitted a brief in opposition to the Motion. (See Pls.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.'s Mem.”) (Dkt No. 37).)[3] Northeast Transport filed a reply brief on September 9, 2021. (See
For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted.
“The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are ‘substantively identical.'” Gonzalez v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 12-CV-1470, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (D. Conn. June 3, 2014) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also McNeil v. Yale Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi Int'l, Inc., No. 21-639, 2021 WL 5286647, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2021) (summary order) (“The standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is substantively ‘identical' to the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”); Marquez v. Hoffman, No. 18-CV-7315, 2021 WL 1226981, at *8 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) .
“A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action only when it has authority to adjudicate the cause pressed in the complaint.” Bryant v. Steele, 25 F.Supp.3d 233, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry[, ] and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010); United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing subject matter jurisdiction as the “threshold question” (quotation marks omitted)).
The Second Circuit has explained that a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or fact-based. See Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). When a defendant raises a facial challenge to standing based solely on the complaint and the documents attached to it, “the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden” and a court must determine whether the plaintiff asserting standing “alleges facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has standing to sue.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011)). In making such a determination, a court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 57. However, where a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is fact-based and a defendant proffers evidence outside the pleadings a plaintiff must either come forward with controverting evidence or rest on the pleadings if the evidence offered by the defendant is immaterial. See Katz v. Donna Karan Co., LLC, 872 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2017). If the extrinsic evidence presented by the defendant is material and controverted, the Court must make findings of fact in aid of its decision as to standing. See Carter, 822 F.3d at 57.
The Supreme Court has held that while a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint, ” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” id. at 570. However, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (...
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