Barton v. Radcliffe

• Decision Date: 11 May 1889
• Citation: 21 N.E. 374,149 Mass. 275
• Parties: BARTON v. RADCLIFFE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

149 Mass. 275

21 N.E. 374

BARTON v. RADCLIFFE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 11, 1889

COUNSEL

Hayes Longee and FP. Magee, for plaintiff.

Geo. H Kingsbury and W.C. Harriman, for defendant.

OPINION

DEVENS J.

The defendant, in answer to the action brought in the name of the plaintiff, but for the benefit of Rice, as the assignee thereof, upon judgment obtained by the plaintiff against him relies upon St. 1883, c. 223, § 14. The first clause of this section provides that "in actions at law the defendant shall be entitled to allege, as a defense, any facts which would entitle him in equity to be absolutely relieved against the plaintiff's claim or cause of action, or against a judgment obtained by the plaintiff in such action." This answer alleges that at the time the judgment in the original suit was obtained, the note there sued, which was signed by him, and upon which Rice was either co-promisor or indorser had been actually paid by Rice, as the plaintiff well knew. It further alleges that the judgment had not been assigned to Rice, and that Rice had held as collateral security 52 shares of stock intended to be transferred to the nominal plaintiff, which in fact had never been transferred, but which had been wrongfully converted by Rice to his own use, and thus that it would be inequitable and unjust that the judgment against the defendant upon the note should be collected from him.

The purpose of the statute was not to create any new equitable defenses in addition to those already existing, but to permit a defendant in an action at law to avail himself of those which were recognized by courts of equity, and thus relieve him from the necessity of initiating a new procedure in order to obtain the benefit of them. That a defense should be established under it, such defense must be one within the rules and principles of equity jurisprudence. A court of equity will interfere undoubtedly to restrain a party from executing a judgment, when facts appear showing that it would be against conscience that he should do so, of which facts the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself, but which he had been prevented from doing by fraud or accident unmixed with any fraud or negligence in himself or his agents. Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332; Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How. 443; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 2 S.Ct. 25. The defendant, in now asserting that the note on which judgment was recovered against him was then paid, presents no different inquiry from that which was involved in the original suit. The plaintiff then asserted the note to be unpaid. He practiced no fraud, and, if this assertion was untrue, the defendant had then the opportunity to controvert it, as it was the precise issue in the case.

Nor is there anything to indicate that it would be unconscionable that the plaintiff should enforce his judgment for the benefit of Rice. The note on which it was founded was given by the defendant on full consideration, which he actually received, although he transferred it as collateral security immediately thereafter. He made no answer nor appearance in the cause, and was defaulted. It was his own duty to have paid the note, and he had not done so. Even if the note had actually been paid by the indorser, so that an action should...