Bascom v. Smith

• Decision Date: 21 June 1895
• Citation: 164 Mass. 61,41 N.E. 130
• Parties: BASCOM v. SMITH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

164 Mass. 61

41 N.E. 130

BASCOM v. SMITH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1895

COUNSEL

H.E Warner, for plaintiff.

Warren Ozero Kyle, for defendant.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

The court undertook to construe the contract declared on with reference to all the circumstances existing when it was made which the evidence tended to establish, and merely left it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances assumed had been established by the evidence. This is not leaving the whole construction of a written contract to the jury; and the jury, by their verdict, have found that the circumstances were as they were assumed to be, and have construed the contract in the same manner as the court. The principle of construing a writing most strongly against the party who wrote and proffered it, when it is reasonably capable of two constructions, and has been honestly understood and acted upon by the other party according to the construction which is most against the interest of the party proffering it, was announced in the charge of the presiding justice not as an instruction to the jury, but as the rule adopted by the court. It is a rule which had been adopted in certain cases of real ambiguity, although we have some doubt whether, on the circumstances shown, there was any need of invoking it in the present case. Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 47. Assuming that the defendant knew that Mr. Webb, in behalf of the Economo Duplex Stove Company, had requested the plaintiff to make a new set of range patterns, of which there is no doubt, the letters of October 7, 1890, and October 8, 1890 become intelligible enough. The plaintiff, in his letter to the defendant of October 7, 1890, indicates that he wants a note in writing from the defendant confirming what Mr. Webb had said, namely, that the defendant will become responsible to the plaintiff for work on the new set of patterns ordered of the plaintiff to the amount of $500, although the plaintiff politely says that he has such confidence in Mr Webb's integrity that he regards his letter as superfluous; and the defendant, in his letter in reply, signifies in writing his present willingness and intention to become responsible to the plaintiff for work on such new set of patterns to the amount of $500. The whole letter of the defendant shows that he expected that the plaintiff would go on and make a new set of patterns, as ordered by Mr. Webb; and the evidence shows that he knew that the plaintiff did go on, and make the patterns. There was evidence that the defendant understood that the plaintiff in doing so was relying upon his agreement to become responsible to the amount of $500, and the jury must have so found. Upon such a finding no special notice of the acceptance of the guaranty or of the offer of guaranty was necessary. Knowledge was equivalent...